Resurrecting the democracy: the Democratic party during

the Civil War and Reconstruction, 1860–1884 by Page, Alexander Robert
   
 
A University of Sussex PhD thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
  
 
 
 
 
Resurrecting the Democracy: The Democratic Party during 
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 1860–1884 
 
Alexander Robert Page 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in American Studies 
 
University of Sussex 
 
Submitted June 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Work not submitted elsewhere for examination 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part 
to another University for the award of any other degree. 
 
 
Signature:……………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 University of Sussex 
Alexander Robert Page 
Doctor of Philosophy in American Studies 
‘Resurrecting the Democracy: The Democratic Party during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 1860–1884’ 
 
This thesis places the Democratic party at the centre of the Reconstruction narrative and 
investigates the transformation of the antebellum Democracy into its postbellum form. In 
doing so, it addresses the relative scarcity of scholarship on the postwar Democrats, and 
provides an original contribution to knowledge by (a) explaining how the party survived 
the Civil War and (b) providing a comprehensive analysis of an extended process of 
internal conflict over the Democracy’s future. This research concludes that while the Civil 
War caused a crisis in partisanship that lasted until the mid-1870s, it was Democrats’ 
underlying devotion to their party, and flexibility over party principle that allowed the 
Democracy to survive and reestablish itself as a strong national party. 
 
Rather than extensively investigating state-level or grassroots politics, this thesis focuses 
on the party’s national leadership. It finds that public memories of the party’s wartime 
course constituted the most significant barrier to rebuilding the Democratic national 
coalition. Following an overview of the fractures exposed by civil war, the extent of these 
splits is assessed through an investigation of sectional reconciliation during Presidential 
and Radical Reconstruction. The analysis then shifts to explore competing visions of the 
party’s future during the late 1860s and early 1870s when public confidence in the 
Democracy hit its lowest point. While the early years of Reconstruction opened the party 
to the possibility of disintegration, by the mid-1870s Democrats had begun to adopt a 
stronger national party organisation. Through a coherent national strategy that turned 
national politics away from issues of race and loyalty and towards those of economic 
development and political reform, while simultaneously appealing to the party’s history, 
national Democratic leaders restored public confidence in the Democracy, silenced 
advocates of the creation of a new national party, and propelled the party back to power 
in 1884. 
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Introduction 
 
On June 3, 1861, the Democratic senator Stephen Douglas lost his brief but painful 
struggle with typhoid fever in his Chicago home. In the nation’s capital, Secretary of War 
Simon Cameron eulogised the northern Democracy’s favourite son in a statement that 
praised ‘a man who nobly discharged party for country; a Senator who forgot all prejudice 
in an earnest desire to serve the public … a patriot who defended, with equal zest and 
ability, the constitution as it came to us from our fathers, and whose last mission upon 
earth was that of rallying the people of his own State of Illinois … around the glorious 
flag of the Union.’1 Out of respect for Douglas, Cameron called for ‘the colors of the 
republic to be draped in morning [sic.] the honor of the illustrious dead.’2 Throughout the 
North, the flag of the Union was hung at half-mast to mourn the death of the pre-eminent 
Democrat. For the Democrats, Douglas’s death could not have fallen at a worse time. Just 
three months earlier Confederate shore batteries had fired on Fort Sumter tearing the 
nation apart, and the party stood fractured, leaderless and with little hope of reuniting the 
divided nation. On July 9, Ohio Representative Samuel Sullivan Cox proclaimed that 
Douglas’s death was ‘painfully palpable, since it makes more obscure the path by which 
our alienated brethren may return.’3 
Not only was the Democracy divided across the Mason-Dixon line, but northern 
Democrats had been engaged in a deeply damaging debate about the role of an opposition 
party in civil war. Some previously unflinchingly partisan Democrats such as former New 
York senator Daniel S. Dickinson identified party loyalty as an evil during sectional strife, 
and argued that the nation would be saved ‘not by political parties ... nor time-serving 
politicians, but by the patriotic pulsations of the great popular heart.’4 Dickinson was not 
alone in his belief that partisanship should be suppressed in favour of a patriotic devotion 
to the Union, and was joined by leading Democrats such as former Secretary of the 
Treasury, John A. Dix, Senator Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, and Massachusetts 
																																								 																				
1 New York Herald, June 5, 1861. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Chapman Coleman, The Life of John J. Crittenden, with Selections from his Correspondence and 
Speeches. Volume II (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1871), p. 324. 
4 Speeches; Correspondence Etc., of the late Daniel S. Dickinson of New York. Including: Addresses on 
Important Topics; Speeches in the State and United States Senate, and in Support of the Government during 
the Rebellion; Correspondence, Private and Political (Collected and Arranged by Mrs. Dickinson), Poems 
(Collected and Arranged by Mrs. Mygatt), Etc. Edited, with a Biography, by his Brother, John R. Dickinson. 
In Two Volumes. Volume II (New York: G. P. Putnam & Son, 1867), p. 4.  
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congressman, Benjamin F. Butler, in joining the wartime Union party. As historians have 
shown, by no means did the Democrats unanimously denounce secession. Rather, a vocal 
faction of Democratic dissenters assailed the Republican administration for launching an 
attack on ‘white man’s government,’ and desperately tried to broker a peace settlement 
with the South.5 By the war’s end, the Democratic party had become deeply factionalised, 
embittered, and inherently weak, and seemed on the verge of collapse. 
This thesis explains how a party shattered by the Civil War and blamed by many 
northerners for its complicity in secession and wartime disloyalty (a) reunited across the 
sectional dividing line and (b) went on to regain national power by 1884. It does so by 
explaining how Democrats reacted to the dissolution of the Union, and how, despite the 
intensity of anti-partisanship, the party was able to survive civil war. Secondly, it provides 
a comprehensive analysis of the party’s path through Reconstruction to its return to the 
White House in 1884. Using the letters of leading Democrats, newspapers, and pamphlets, 
this thesis delineates the protracted internal conflict over the Democratic party’s future in 
the aftermath of secession. It finds that the myriad problems caused by the Civil War 
threatened the survival of the Democracy to a greater degree than historians have 
acknowledged.6 In the ten years following the national crisis uncertainty dominated the 
mindset of Democrats. Their party had been decimated by wartime political conflict 
behind Union lines, and party members were divided over whether the party would ever 
be able to throw off its synonymy with treason and disloyalty. These doubts about the 
future partisan composition of the nation pushed Democrats to embrace a wide array of 
strategies to combat the uncertainty of Reconstruction, and it was not until the mid-1870s 
that Democrats’ underlying devotion to their party would bring an end to this crisis in 
partisanship. 
Unlike their Republican rivals, the Democrats of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction eras have rarely been afforded a central position in historiography. While 
recently some scholars have turned their attention to the influence of the Young America 
movement in promoting a more interventionist view of government among leading 
																																								 																				
5 Peekskill Highland Democrat, October 12, 1861; Peekskill Highland Democrat, August 26, 1861. 
6 This has been a key contention of scholars since the so-called New Political History emerged in the 1970s. 
See, for example, Joel H. Silbey, The American Political Nation, 1838–1893 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1991); Joel H. Silbey, The Partisan Imperative: The Dynamics of American Politics before the Civil 
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and Public 
Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986). 
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antebellum Democrats, little has been written on the postbellum Democrats.7 Historians 
have written a few select biographies of leading Democrats that have investigated the 
persistence of Jacksonianism and the impact of the Civil War on individuals, but no 
attempt has been made to explain the process of the reunification and resurgence of the 
national Democratic party.8 This thesis builds upon the relatively sparse literature on the 
postbellum Democrats by incorporating recent historiographical interest in sectional 
reconciliation, partisanship, and Civil War memory to provide a fresh interpretation of 
the national process of Democratic resurgence. 
Since the scholars of the so-called New Political History of the 1970s broadened 
the study of nineteenth century politics by investigating the cultural dimensions of party 
politics, traditional political history has waned in its popularity amongst historians. The 
work of scholars such as Paul Kleppner and Richard Jensen comprehensively used 
quantitative analysis to explain the ethnocultural dimensions of partisanship in the mid-
to-late nineteenth century, and have provided invaluable insights into the relationship 
between voters and political parties.9 Building upon the work of Kleppner and Jensen to 
argue that partisanship was central to the lives of nineteenth century Americans, Joel H. 
Silbey and Jean Baker’s studies of Civil War-era Democrats asserted that partisan 
commitment ‘did more to shape the behaviour of the Democracy ... than any single event, 
no matter how dramatic,’ and that ‘through their [Democrats] partisan activities, members 
learned roles that they repeated as Americans.’10 In the final analysis, Silbey found that 
																																								 																				
7 Of the relative few recent studies on the antebellum Democrats, see Yonathan Eyal, The Young America 
Movement and the Transformation of the Democratic Party, 1828–1861 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Michael Todd Landis, Northern Men with Southern Loyalties: The Democratic 
Party and the Sectional Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).  
8	For examples of recent biographies on Democrats that explore the postbellum period, see Thomas Mach, 
‘Gentleman George’ Hunt Pendleton: Party Politics and Ideological Identity in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2007); Jerome Mushkat, Fernando Wood: A Political 
Biography (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1990); William E. Parrish, Frank Blair: Lincoln’s 
Conservative (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998); Roy Andrew Jr., Wade Hampton: 
Confederate Warrior to Southern Redeemer (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008).	
9 Paul Kleppner, The Third Electoral System, 1853–1892: Parties, Voters, and Political Cultures (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 144; Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social 
Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850–1900 (New York: Free Press, 1970); Richard J. Jensen, ‘Quantitative 
Collective Biography: An Application to Metropolitan Elites,’ in Robert P. Swierenga (ed.), Quantification 
in American History: Theory and Research (New York: Atheneum, 1970); Richard J. Jensen, The Winning 
of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888–96 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). For 
other works of the New Political History that emphasised ethnocultural factors to explain voter behaviour, 
see Richard L. McCormick, ‘Ethno-cultural Interpretations of American Voting Behaviour,’ Political 
Science Quarterly Vol. 89, No. 2 (June, 1974), pp. 351–77; Melvyn Hammarberg, The Indiana Voter: The 
Historical Dynamics of Party Allegiance during the 1870s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 
10	Joel H. Silbey, A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860-1868 (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1977), p. 240; Jean H. Baker, Affairs of Party: The Political Culture of 
Northern Democrats in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 24. For 
4	
	
the party’s most substantial success during the Civil War era – its ability to survive – 
demonstrated the partisan continuity between the antebellum and postbellum periods.11 
Since then, the study of political culture has thrived and historians have argued that the 
expansion of the political sphere in the crucible of Civil War pushed parties to 
professionalise their organisations, and move away from the spectacle of antebellum 
campaigns and to a more concerted policy-driven canvass.12 It is the contention of this 
thesis that while politics was a central concern of Americans during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, partisanship itself was not as rigid as the scholars of political culture have 
found. Ethnocultural groups certainly identified with some parties more than others, and 
the parties themselves made concerted efforts to consolidate their support among such 
groups, but partisanship itself was a fluid concept. By focusing on the Democracy’s 
leading politicians, this study provides insights into a group of Americans who have been 
largely maligned by historians since the Cultural Turn. 
Since the Cultural Turn of the 1970s and 1980s, there has been a decline in 
scholarly interest in traditional political history. This has largely been the result of the 
blending of political development with the struggle of freed slaves in the postwar world 
in Eric Foner’s magisterial Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877 
(1988). Since, historians such as Steven Hahn have placed the experience of African 
Americans at the centre of the Reconstruction narrative and have written compelling 
accounts of the struggle of former slaves in their journey from bondage to freedom.13 
Simultaneously, scholars have broadened the study of Reconstruction by integrating 
stories from the West and North into the Reconstruction narrative to aptly characterise 
the period as one of national redevelopment.14 In doing so, scholars have opened new 
																																								 																				
further exploration of the centrality of partisanship to nineteenth century Americans, see Richard L. 
McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy; Silbey, The American Political Nation, 1838–1893; 
Silbey, The Partisan Imperative; Jean H. Baker, The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties 
from 1858 to 1870 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).	
11 Silbey, A Respectable Minority, p. 240. 
12 Glenn C. Altschuler & Stuart Blumin, Rude Republic: Americans and their Politics in the Nineteenth 
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 152–232. On the expansion of the 
political sphere in the Civil War era see, Mark E. Neely Jr., The Boundaries of American Political Culture 
in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Mary P. Ryan, Civic Wars: 
Democracy and Public Life in the American City during the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997). 
13 For example, see, Steven Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South 
from Slavery to the Great Migration (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); 
James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861–1865 (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 2013). 
14  For example, see Nicolas Barreyre, Gold and Freedom: The Political Economy of Reconstruction 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015); Eugene H. Berwanger, The West and Reconstruction 
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perspectives from which to view Reconstruction. Of these, the most promising body of 
literature for understanding political history has been that on reunion and reconciliation.15 
Since David Blight contended in his influential Race and Reunion (2001) that white 
supremacy was the driving force behind the reconciliation of white northerners and 
southerners following the Civil War, scholars have reasserted the centrality of the process 
of reunion in postwar America. Historians such as Caroline Janney have been able to 
demonstrate that achieving a genuine reconciliation between northerners and southerners 
was elusive for Americans.16 For postbellum Democrats a genuine reconciliation between 
northern and southerners was the central aim of Reconstruction and was critical to the 
party’s resurrection, but has been overlooked by historians who have eschewed an 
investigation of the national Democracy in favour of state parties, northern Democrats, 
southern Democrats, or individuals.17 
On the eve of the Civil War, the Democratic party was the only truly national 
party; not only did it appeal to northerners, southerners, and westerners, but Democrats 
viewed the party as a defender of divergent sectional interests. When southern Democrats 
walked out of the party’s convention in Charleston in April 1860, they publicly 
announced that they had lost faith in the Democratic party to act as a national institution. 
Despite the enduring strength of Democratic partisanship, the results of the Civil War 
posed significant obstacles to the remaking of the party. Firstly, the Democracy faced the 
challenge of reconciling the northern and southern wings of the party. To heal the intra-
																																								 																				
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981); Heather Cox Richardson, West From Appomattox: The 
Reconstruction of America after the Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
15  The growing literature on reunion and reconciliation is vast, and scholars have demonstrated the 
contested memory of the Civil War through investigations of the Lost Cause, the Union Cause, and the use 
of white supremacy in healing the wounds of the conflict. See, for example, David Blight, Race and 
Reunion: The Civil War in American History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2001); David Blight, Beyond the Battlefield: Race, Memory and the American Civil War (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002); Nina Silber, Romance of Reunion: Northerners and the 
South, 1865–1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Gary W. Gallagher, The Union 
War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); William A. Blair, Cities of the Dead: Contesting 
the Memory of the Civil War in the South, 1865–1914 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2004); Caroline Janney, Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
16 Janney, Remembering the Civil War. For an example of how scholars are placing reunion at the centre of 
the Reconstruction narrative, see Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of 
Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). 
17 For example, see,	Edward Gambill, Conservative Ordeal: Northern Democrats and Reconstruction, 
1865–1868 (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1981); Jerome Mushkat, The Reconstruction of the New 
York Democracy, 1861–1874 (New York: Associated Press, 1981); Wallace Hettle, A Peculiar Democracy: 
Southern Democrats in Peace and Civil War (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2001); Patrick G. 
Williams, Beyond Redemption: Texas Democrats after Reconstruction  (College Station: Texas A & M 
University Press, 2007); A. J. Going, Bourbon Democracy in Alabama, 1874–1890 (Tuscaloosa: University 
of Alabama Press, 1951); Baker, Affairs of Party; Silbey, A Respectable Minority. 
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party wounds, northern Democratic leaders frequently espoused white supremacist 
rhetoric to differentiate themselves from their Republican opponents. Secondly, northern 
Democrats had to find common ground to cooperate with each other following the 
damaging split between War and Peace Democrats. While Republicans had praised many 
War Democrats for their support of the Union, Peace Democrats had been constantly 
chastised as traitors throughout the North. As the two factions prepared to engage in 
peacetime politics, both were confronted with the difficult task of reviving the Democracy 
amid its tainted, treasonous reputation.18 
This thesis is based on a wide range of public and private sources. The collections 
at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, the Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, the Huntington Library, and the New York Public Library provided the 
foundation for this study, and the insights found in the private letters of Democrats have 
been invaluable in tracing the reactions of leading party members to the Civil War and 
Reconstruction. To capture how Democrats appealed to American citizens, a variety of 
public sources were used. These included the influential Democratic newspapers of the 
time, notably the New York World, Baltimore Sun, and New Orleans Times-Picayune, as 
well as pamphlets, and the speeches of Democrats in the Congressional Globe and 
Congressional Record. 
Chapter One investigates the extent to which the experience of Civil War divided 
the party. Focusing on northern Democrats, it highlights the fractures between War and 
Peace Democrats and introduces the critically important issues of treason and loyalty that 
significantly influenced politics in the postbellum United States. It identifies the 
emergence of a politics of Unionism in which War Democrats embraced an antiparty 
rhetoric that was rejected by the Peace Democrats in favour of a distinctly partisan assault 
on the Republican administration. It was through these two reactions to civil war that the 
roots of division within the party were to be found. The chapter demonstrates that by 
1865, a fundamental uncertainty about the future of the Democratic party was deeply 
embedded across the nation. 
																																								 																				
18 In recent years a number of scholars have stressed the centrality of loyalty to the political culture of the 
Civil War-era United States. The best of these are William A. Blair, With Malice Toward Some: Treason 
and Disloyalty in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), Melinda 
Lawson, Patriot Fires: Forging a New American Nationalism in the Civil War North (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2002), Adam I. P. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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Chapter Two assesses the impact of wartime Unionism on the attempts of 
Democrats during Presidential Reconstruction to reunify their party. In the aftermath of 
the Civil War, two competing visions of party strategy emerged. Accommodationist 
Democrats, most of whom were former War Democrats, sought to create bipartisan 
alliances with conservative Republicans and believed that a new middle party would be 
created. In opposition, ‘straight-out’ Democrats advocated a return to Jacksonianism, 
appealing to white supremacy to reconcile northern with southern Democrats and 
consolidate support among Catholics and white workers. The chapter details the failure 
of the accommodationist National Union Movement and how, subsequently, the straight-
out Democrats gained control of the party’s direction. It then demonstrates how the 
Democracy drew support largely from southern whites and northern urban working 
classes through a white supremacist platform, and how the defeat of Horatio Seymour in 
the 1868 presidential election created a rift between Democrats over the role of racism in 
their electoral strategy. 
The next two chapters focus on the continuation of factional conflict between 
accommodationist and straight-out Democrats. Chapter Three explores the emergence of 
the ‘New Departure’ strategy that urged Democrats to accept the Reconstruction 
settlement, and how competing Democratic factions utilised it as a rhetorical tool. 
Ultimately, factional disputes over the party’s future pushed the party into an alliance 
with dissident Liberal Republicans. Chapter Four demonstrates how, between 1872 and 
1874, national party leaders guided the emergence of a coherent national strategy that 
merged accommodationism with straight-out obstructionism, and delivered the party its 
first congressional majority since before the war. The years between 1868 and 1874 were 
chaotic for most Americans, and the turn of Democrats towards the issues of civil service 
reform and financial policy was crucial to the eventual return of the party to the White 
House. These two chapters therefore show how, out of the chaotic push and pulls of 
Democratic factionalism in the late 1860s and early 1870s, bipartisanship, corruption and 
reform, and financial debates created a new ground for Democrats to exploit. 
The party’s return to power did not come for another ten years, however. Chapter 
Five shows that despite the gains made by the Democracy between 1874 and 1876, the 
election of 1876 demonstrated that the persistence of sectional bitterness remained a 
barrier to national resurgence. While calls for reform and a reversal of the centralising 
tendencies of the postwar Republican administrations resonated with American voters, 
memories of the Democracy’s perceived disloyalty during the Civil War were deeply 
8	
	
embedded in the American consciousness. Moreover, while 1876 would signal the end of 
Reconstruction, the willingness of congressional Democrats to acquiesce in the 
inauguration of another Republican president shook the faith of many party supporters. 
What followed the so-called ‘Compromise of 1877’ was a period of uncertainty for 
Democrats who were forced to confront the growing rifts over currency reform that led 
to a significant third-party challenge in the 1878 elections. 
Chapter Six assesses the Democracy’s ability to finally escape the negative stigma 
associated with their conduct during the War of the Rebellion. Despite Democrats’ 
relative success in overcoming the challenge of the Greenback party in the late 1870s, 
Republicans waved the bloody shirt once more in 1880 to secure another presidential 
victory. By 1884, however, the perceived evil of corruption trumped Civil War memory. 
In the aftermath of the assassination of President Garfield by a disgruntled office seeker, 
the Democracy’s message of reform, reconciliation, and limited government appealed to 
voters, and Mugwumps, and trumped the Republican’s familiar message of ‘Rum, 
Romanism, and Rebellion.’ 
For the Democrats, the enduring legacy of the Civil War had been the single 
largest barrier to their return to power. Over the course of twenty years, the Democrats 
struggled to portray their party as one that could govern responsibly and protect the 
interests of southerners who had abandoned the party in 1860. After struggling to balance 
the forces of sectionalism, and conflicting views on the future of party politics in the 
United States, Democrats combined the experiences of their failures in the early 
Reconstruction years to reconcile their party behind a common desire for reform. This 
thesis demonstrates that reform was not simply an issue that related to their opposition to 
Republican patronage, but was in fact a far more expansive concept that coalesced with 
sectional reconciliation to create a coherent national strategy. Without viewing the 
Democratic return to power in 1884 across this chronological span, scholars have, until 
now, been unable to appreciate the complex and protracted process of reunifying the 
Democracy. This thesis readdresses this balance and in doing so uncovers the perilous 
and fractious journey of the Democratic party from secession to the White House. 
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Chapter One 
 
‘A Question Too Great for Party’: The Fracture of the Democratic Party, 1860-
1865 
 
 As delegates to the Democratic National Convention piled through the doors and 
filled the seats of the South Carolina Institute Hall in Charleston on April 23, 1860, 
Americans waited eagerly in anticipation of the proceedings. For days, Democrats had 
staged a mass exodus from state assemblies, local party headquarters, and the Capitol, 
and ‘like a horde of irregular troops en route to the scene of war’ made their way to the 
Palmetto State for a showdown over their party’s future. 1  Following the slow 
disintegration of relations between northerners and southerners over the expansion of 
slavery, Democrats hoped that the convention would be ‘the reunion and consolidation of 
the Democracy.’2 Desperate to ease the tension between northern and southern delegates, 
the temporary president of the convention Francis B. Flournoy urged the attendees to 
‘recollect that we have a common destiny and a common fame,’ that ‘you should regard 
each other as brothers, not hostile forces,’ and that ‘the Democratic party has but one flag 
– the flag of our common country – and that teaches fraternal love and unity … Let us 
talk no more about sections … We come here to consider the good of the great Democratic 
party. It is our duty to meet all our brethren most cordially, and so combine all interests 
as to secure the effect and advantages of a concentration of effort.’3 
 With an imposing reputation as a forceful speaker and a shrewd tactician, 
Illinoisan Stephen A. Douglas, the aptly named ‘Little Giant’ due to his slender height of 
five foot four inches, was the preeminent politician of the Democracy when the 
convention met, and clear favourite for the party’s nomination.4 While Democrats longed 
																																								 																				
1 New York Herald, April 21, 1860. 
2 Ibid., April 23, 1860. 
3 Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, Held in 1860, At Charleston and Baltimore. 
Proceedings at Charleston, April 23–May 3 (Cleveland: Nevins’ Print, Plain Dealer Job Office, 1860), p. 
16. 
4 For a background on Stephen Douglas and his position in the Democratic party in 1860, see, Martin H. 
Quitt, Stephen A. Douglas and Antebellum Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
Robert W. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1973); Robert W. 
Johannsen, The Frontier, The Union, and Stephen A. Douglas (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989); 
Yonathan Eyal, The Young America Movement; James L. Huston, Stephen A. Douglas and the Dilemmas 
of Democratic Equality (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006); William Brindle to Jeremiah 
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for the convention to reunite the party, deep divisions quickly overflowed onto the 
convention floor. Disagreements over the presidential nomination and the platform’s 
stance on popular sovereignty tore deep chasms between Democratic factions.5 Wounds 
that had been temporarily healed were exposed, and on April 30, after a week of heated 
debate, fifty southern delegates left the convention in protest of the adoption of a platform 
they believed provided no guarantees for the future of slavery in the western territories. 
For the first time in its history, the Democratic party was unable to nominate a presidential 
candidate at its national convention, and was forced to adjourn proceedings.  
Examining the course that Democrats took during the Civil War provides 
important insights into both the nature of partisanship on the northern home front, and the 
severity of the divisions that emerged in wartime America. The Democracy’s fracture at 
Charleston highlighted the disintegration of sectional relations in the American political 
nation. While an opposition to abolitionism had unified the party during the 1850s, by 
1860 this proved inadequate to hold the party together.6 The responses of Democrats to 
war were diverse and demonstrated that more was wrong with the party than a breakdown 
between its northern and southern wings. Rather, the unique partisan culture that had once 
entrenched notions of civic loyalty and nationalism at the centre of the Union’s political 
culture, fractured northern Democrats and forced them to reassess their relationship with 
the party.7 Instead of simply pushing Democrats into either a pro-war, anti-war, or anti-
partisan stance, the Civil War created a crisis in partisanship that required them to 
reevaluate the place of Jacksonian Democracy in an industrialised, free nation.8  
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The Path to Secession 
 
The dramatic events of the last week of April 1860 were the culmination of over 
a decade of political instability and conflict. The debate over the peculiar institution’s 
future had resulted in armed conflict in Kansas, physical violence in Congress, an 
abolitionist-led slave insurrection in Virginia, and the capitulation of one major political 
party. Throughout this time the Democracy had demonstrated a remarkable ability to 
survive as a national party, yet compromise in 1860 proved a step too far. Following the 
stalemate of the Charleston convention, the Democratic party sought to reconcile its 
northern and southern wings before it reconvened at Front Street Theatre in Baltimore on 
June 18. In the Senate on May 8, the North Carolinian senator, Thomas L. Clingman, 
appealed to southern Democrats to embrace the platform adopted at Charleston, and avoid 
a schism that would ‘make a purely sectional party … [and] the most insane party that 
could be adopted.’ 9  Southern Democrats however, were adamant that their northern 
brethren were not doing enough to guarantee the protection of slavery in the territories. 
While Douglas Democrats agreed with southern Democrats that the Dred Scott decision 
of 1857 made it unconstitutional for Congress to exclude slavery from the territories, they 
disagreed over the implications the decision had for the constitutional powers of a 
territorial legislature. Thus, when Douglas and his supporters refused to acquiesce in the 
southern Democratic interpretation of Dred Scott, and instead advocated the principle of 
popular sovereignty, Douglas and the northern Democrats lost the trust of the southern 
wing of their party.10  
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  After the South Carolina debacle, Democrats hoped that the Baltimore convention 
would yield a compromise.11 Any chance of this, however, was quickly dashed as the 
reconvened delegation refused to readmit Louisianans and Alabamans who had bolted in 
Charleston, and instead seated Douglas Democrats in their place. Dismayed by the actions 
of the convention, southern delegates staged a second withdrawal, and walked out of the 
Front Street Theatre.12 Without the presence of the southern Democrats, Douglas was 
nominated on a platform that made popular sovereignty its central plank. Seeing the depth 
of the fracture, many Democrats began to prepare themselves for a Republican victory in 
November.13  
Appalled by the actions of their northern co-partisans in the two conventions, 
southern Democrats nominated a second Democratic ticket that put its faith in the 
incumbent vice president, Kentuckian John C. Breckinridge, and committed the party to 
a legislative defence of the future of slavery in the West. For northern Democrats, the 
result was a disaster. The party had long depended upon its national appeal to win 
elections and, with the party divided, little hope was held for a Democratic victory in 
1860. The rupture demonstrated a distinct lack of trust and understanding between the 
northern and southern wings of the party, and, to worsen matters for the Democracy, the 
newly established Constitutional Union party threw a fourth hat into the presidential 
ring.14  
 The 1860 campaign was a deeply divisive, and bitter campaign for the Democrats. 
Despite the claims of northern Democratic papers that the party’s split was the result of 
the ‘presumption and arrogance’ of the ‘ultra men of the South,’ the reluctance of Douglas 
Democrats to compromise was equally at fault for the schism.15 The northern Democratic 
press highlighted the party’s past struggles to preserve the Union, drawing on the memory 
of Andrew Jackson and his ‘lofty stand which he maintained against the nullifiers of 
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South Carolina,’ calling on southern Democrats to ‘bear aloft the flag of their country, 
and stand by the noble sentiment of Douglas’ letter of acceptance: ‘The Union Must Be 
Preserved. The Constitution Must Be Maintained In All Its Parts.’’ 16  Despite the 
escalation of tensions between northern and southern Democrats as rumours of secession 
began to spread, few party members completely lost hope of blocking Lincoln’s election, 
or brokering a pre-election reconciliation.17  
 While Breckinridge held little hope of winning any northern state, Douglas still 
had widespread support in New York, Pennsylvania, and the midwestern states. Bolstered 
by strong support in his home state of Illinois and confident of support from immigrant 
voters, Douglas Democrats hoped that the Little Giant could take enough Electoral 
College votes away from Lincoln to block the accession of the Republican to the 
presidential chair. 18  Yet as October progressed, the outlook for the Democrats grew 
increasingly bleak. Anticipating defeat, the New Orleans Times-Picayune urged restraint 
in response to a Lincoln victory, and not plunge the South into ‘a waste over which shall 
brood the silence of another and hopeless desolation.’19  
 As news of the results spread, Democrats frantically tried to quell the fears of 
southerners and avert a national crisis. Leading party members attacked the legality of 
secession and claimed that northern congressional Democrats could protect southern 
interests by blocking any legislative attacks on slavery.20 Despite the efforts of Douglas 
Democrats to appease their southern counterparts through their support of the Crittenden 
Compromise, little they said or did resonated with southerners.21 As southern Democrats 
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wrote to their northern friends that ‘the southern people are… exasperated [sic]’ and that 
‘it is quite certain that South Carolina will secede,’ hopes for the Union’s future began to 
fade.22 
 Following the news of South Carolina’s decision to secede on December 20, 
Democrats reflected on the momentous moment. In a letter to August Belmont on 
Christmas Day, Stephen Douglas pre-empted the reaction many Democrats would have 
during the war by writing that he was ‘ready to make any reasonable sacrifice of party 
tenets to save the country.’ 23  Leaving the Union proved no easy task for southern 
Democrats who had spent their entire lives as members of a party and a nation that they 
believed had brought them prosperity. As the southern states steadily seceded through 
January 1861, southern Democrats contemplated their relationships with their northern 
co-partisans. On January 20, Jefferson Davis wrote to the former Democratic president 
Franklin Pierce, that while ‘Civil war has only horror for me,’ he hoped the president 
would ‘not be ashamed of our former connection or cease to be my friend.’24 Despite the 
sectional bitterness evidenced during the secession crisis, Davis’ letter demonstrated the 
complexity of feeling felt by southern Democrats leaving the Union. While he was willing 
to execute his duty to his state, Davis nonetheless held fond memories of his time in the 
nation and regarded many Democrats as his close friends. Davis was not alone in feeling 
this way. During their farewell addresses in the Senate, John Slidell and Judah P. 
Benjamin of Louisiana articulated fond memories they shared with their northern 
colleagues, and left Washington with ‘mixed feelings of admiration and regret,’ but hoped 
nonetheless that secession would usher in ‘a new era of triumph for the Democratic party 
of the North.’25 
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War or Peace: Democratic Factionalism, 1861  
 
On April 20, Daniel S. Dickinson, a former Democratic senator from New York, 
spoke at length to a large congregation in Union Square in the Empire City. An avowed 
Unionist who had supported Breckinridge the previous year, Dickinson proclaimed to the 
crowd that ‘it is no time for crimination or recrimination, or for reviving partisan issues 
… the only inquiry should be, Does [Lincoln] propose to steer the good Ship of State 
according to the chart of the constitution, between the Scylla and Charybdis which 
threaten her pathway.’26 If Lincoln acted through the Constitution and for the preservation 
of the Union, Dickinson argued that ‘he should be … triumphantly sustained; not by 
political parties extant or obsolete, nor time-serving politicians, but by the patriotic 
pulsations of the great popular heart.’27 For the New Yorker, the war was ‘not a question 
of administration but of government; not of politics, but of patriotism; not of policy, but 
of principles which uphold us all; a question too great for party.’28 
The response of northern Democrats to civil war varied greatly and did not follow 
distinct patterns. While anti-war protestors found pockets of individual strength across 
the Midwest, disagreements between Democrats characterised nearly all towns, cities, 
and states that remained in the Union. Dickinson’s remarks highlighted the concerns of 
many northern Democrats who embraced the belief that partisanship, and more 
specifically oppositional politics, held no place in a nation that was struggling for its 
survival. While the secession crisis itself did not shake Democrats’ conviction in their 
party, the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter changed their views. Many Democrats 
turned away from a hatred of Republican ‘radicalism,’ and instead adhered to the view 
that nationalism and loyalty was incompatible with partisanship.29 Against this backdrop, 
the first major faction of the wartime Democracy emerged in the form of the War 
Democrats. 
The War Democrats would play a vital role in upholding the Lincoln 
Administration against the voices of dissent in the Peace Democratic camp. War 
Democrats such as Andrew Johnson, Edwin M. Stanton, John Adams Dix, and John A. 
Logan became vocal supporters of Lincoln’s war policies, and were crucial in 
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engendering widespread support among Democrats for the wartime Union party.30 Yet 
despite the willingness of War Democrats to support a Republican administration, they 
remained committed to Democratic ideology. While they accepted the need for the federal 
government to expand its powers through the printing of paper money, the creation of 
new offices, and even the confiscation of Confederate property, War Democrats were 
adamant that such actions should only be taken through constitutional means.31 In fact, 
while scholars have asserted that the war polarised the views of Democrats and created 
irreconcilable rifts in the party, most northern Democrats held remarkably similar 
ideological attitudes towards wartime government.32 War Democrats, like their anti-war 
opponents, continued to adhere to a Jacksonian ideology that emphasised states’ rights 
and individual liberty, white supremacy, and a strict construction of the Constitution, and 
while they were more willing to temper their views for wartime exigencies than Peace 
Democrats, they did not lose their partisan identity. 
If the War Democrats subscribed to a conception of nationalism and loyalty that 
required Americans to rise above party, the Peace Democrats’ interpretation of wartime 
partisanship directly contradicted such notions.33  Chastised by Republicans and War 
Democrats as ‘Copperheads’ who were traitors to the Union, the Peace Democrats split 
between conditionals, who advocated a peace settlement on terms that would restore the 
Union, and unconditionals, who sought an immediate cessation of hostilities regardless 
of southern reintegration, the Peace Democracy rejected the consensual anti-partisan 
culture that emerged in the North throughout 1861. Rather, Peace Democrats viewed 
parties as essential to the political promises of the United States, and crucial to patriotism. 
Peace Democrats incessantly defended their continued party adherence, claiming that ‘it 
is a misguided zeal which supposes a man, in order to be loyal to his country, must give 
up all his political views,’ that ‘we believe that we can best promote the interests of our 
country by preserving our time-honored organization,’ and that ‘there is nothing 
																																								 																				
30 Ibid., p. 9. 
31 On the expansion of the federal government during the Civil War see, Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee 
Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1869 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in 
Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); William J. Novak, ‘The 
Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,’ American Historical Review Vol. 115, No. 3 (June, 2008), pp. 752–
72. 
32 Weber, Copperheads. 
33 Baker, Affairs of Party, p. 55; Silbey, The Partisan Imperative, p. 99. 
17	
	
incompatible between politics and patriotism.’ 34  Moreover, the Copperheads viewed 
secession as a legitimate protest against an increasingly aggressive, and sectional, anti-
slavery Republican party. Because of this, the Peace Democrats regarded the Civil War 
as a conflict that should be resolved through peaceful negotiation and a guarantee of the 
future of slavery. 
In May 1861, T. J. Barnett, a peace advocate and a Democratic insider in the 
Department of the Interior, wrote to Samuel L. M. Barlow, a New York lawyer and 
leading Democratic party strategist, to shed light on how he viewed the conflict. As a 
typical conditional, Barnett believed that ‘whilst I see war before us, I have an unfaltering 
faith that its only result will be that which would now be accomplished by peaceful’ 
means. Under no illusions about the strength of the peace movement however, Barnett 
stressed that there was an irresistible pressure across the North to ‘crush out the 
Rebellion,’ and only through a concerted Democratic assault on public opinion could 
peace be brought about.35 He believed that while the North supported the war in the 
aftermath of Fort Sumter, public opinion would soon turn against the conflict, and ‘an 
opposition which shall appeal to the conservatism of the nation in aid of measures’ 
different from those pursued in the early stages of the war, would be able to bring about 
an honourable peace agreement.36 As Barnett rightly gauged, public opinion in 1861 made 
peace impossible so soon after the outbreak of war and, for the moment, the Peace 
Democrats would have to acquiesce in the War Democracy.  
The onset of civil war initiated a conflict within the Democracy for control of the 
national party. The exodus of southern Democrats who had long dominated the party, 
started a scramble for power among northern Democrats, which has been overlooked by 
scholars. The forces unleashed by secession fundamentally fractured the Democratic 
party, and brought about a temporary partisan realignment that was manifested within a 
struggle over loyalty and nationalism. Moving forward, War and Peace Democrats would 
experience war in contrasting ways that not only forced them to reevaluate their 
partisanship, but began a twenty-year struggle for the party to return to power. 
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 Greenbacks, Emancipation, and Individual Liberty, 1861–1863 
 
 Political conflict in the North during the Civil War was characterised by two 
overarching debates. Firstly, Americans wrestled with the role of partisan politics during 
the war, and secondly, over the conduct of the war. Amidst the patriotic outpouring of 
anger at the Confederacy’s revolution against the Union, the anti-partisan Unionism 
espoused by War Democrats was intimately connected to the success of the Union armies. 
In the first year of the Civil War, the arguments of these War Democrats and their new 
Republican allies undoubtedly trumped the Peace Democrats’ calls for conciliation. 
When confronted by the economic and physical costs of waging a protracted war 
however, northern citizens were drawn to the scepticism of the Peace Democracy.  
 Despite the vast material resources of the Union, the federal government received 
limited revenue from taxation, and as the costs of the war spiralled, Congress was forced 
to look for alternative means to fund the war. Despite having introduced the first ever 
income tax, raised customs duties, and placed regressive taxes on goods throughout the 
North, it soon became clear that Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase’s assessment 
of the costs of war would need to be amended.37 With New York Democrat August 
Belmont in London, Chase hoped that the banker could help him to secure funds for the 
war. While Belmont was the Rothschild’s’ American agent, the New Yorker was unable 
to persuade the British to grant an American loan.38 As specie reserves dwindled and 
popular sentiment grew against further tax increases, by December 1861 the Lincoln 
administration was forced to look for alternative methods to cover the ever-increasing 
costs of war.39 In this volatile situation, the Lincoln administration took an unprecedented 
step and printed paper money to remedy the Union’s financial woes. 
 When Congress passed the First Legal Tender Act on February 25, 1862, issuing 
$150 million of United States notes to cover the war bill, Democrats did not see eye-to-
eye about the measure. While the majority of Democrats accepted the need for the nation 
to resort to such measures to ensure the future of the Union, many Peace Democrats and 
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eastern hard-money advocates regarded the act as ‘wrong in principle and fraught with 
the most pernicious consequences.’40 During the war, most Democrats largely viewed 
greenbacks as an unfortunate necessity, but come 1865, the party would become severely 
split over the future of paper money in the nation. Unbacked by specie, greenbacks caused 
major divisions within the party and opened a debate both about the future of American 
currency and economy, and whether Democrats would conform to Jacksonianism after 
the war.41  
 Racism had always been a defining feature of the Democratic party. As racial 
prejudice became more acute among nineteenth-century Americans, the Democracy’s 
virulent racism had become a haven for those who believed that African Americans were 
naturally incapable of citizenship.42  This Democratic ideology, as Jean Baker called 
‘conservative naturalism,’ dictated Democrats’ opposition to any and all measures that 
threatened to change the legal status of black Americans.43 The onset of civil war raised 
the spectre of emancipation, and when the Republicans took their first steps towards legal 
interference with slavery, the Democrats’ appeals to northern racism took on an added 
resonance. 
On April 16, 1862, President Lincoln signed the Immediate Compensated 
Emancipation Act ending slavery in the District of Columbia. Prior to this the 
administration had endorsed a policy of confiscating Rebel slaves as a military necessity, 
while leaving slavery untouched in the loyal states. Congress’ decision to end slavery in 
the Capital would, however, change the meaning of the war forever. In the House of 
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Representatives, Democratic Congressman William A. Richardson of Illinois 
proclaimed: 
 
there is a manifest anxiety, an overweening desire, a persistent purpose 
upon the part of the prominent members of the dominant party in this 
Government, to place upon terms of equality and make participants with 
us in the rights of American citizenship an inferior race. The negro race, 
which is incapable of either comprehending or maintaining any form of 
government- by whom liberty is interpreted as licentiousness- is sought to 
be exalted, even at the cost of the degradation of our own flesh and blood.44  
 
An avowed white supremacist and Peace Democrat, Richardson drew upon a long history 
of embedded racial ideology and political discourse that, during the antebellum era, had 
designated liberty and citizenship as strictly the domain of white men. Richardson’s 
response to the Lincoln administration’s moves towards emancipation was typical of 
Peace Democrats who felt that the Republicans’ true intentions were coming to the 
surface. The attitudes of War Democrats towards the administration’s action were, 
however, worrying for the president. 
 While War Democrats were willing to support Lincoln’s policies to save the 
Union, many were unable to compromise over questions of race. In New York City, where 
the party had not had a prominent party organ since 1860, Manton Marble, a conditional 
Peace Democrat, established a new Democratic newspaper, the New York World. Marble 
represented the majority of Democrats in supporting the administration as long as the war 
was prosecuted through constitutional means, and was quick to rebuke the anti-war 
assertions of unconditionals such as Richardson, Clement Vallandigham, and George H. 
Pendleton. ‘Rebel at Heart should be printed on their brow,’ he averred ‘so that they 
should be known to all men for just what they are.’ 45 Yet Marble by no means supported 
moves towards emancipation. On August 19, he lambasted the abolitionists, insisting that 
‘what the country needs in the present emergency is not that the President shall descend 
into the same arena with Greeley and Phillips, but he shall act the part of a firm and far 
seeing statesman.’ 46  The prospect of emancipation aroused not only hostility from 
Democrats based on conceptions of the relationship between race and citizenship, but also 
raised questions about the future of labour in the North. Democrats argued that freedom 
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for slaves would disrupt the whole American economic system, undermining the role of 
white wage labourers in the North. The Democratic press gorged upon fears of abolition 
in the hope that the prospect of northward migration of freedmen would ramp up feelings 
of ‘negrophobia’ among the white working classes, and dissuade the Lincoln 
administration from pursuing the abolitionist agenda.47  
For many conditionals, the president was dangerously overstepping his 
constitutional remit and electoral mandate by interfering with slavery in the District of 
Columbia. Lincoln had, after all, run on a platform in 1860 that committed him to a policy 
of non-interference where slavery currently existed, and this new move was a gamble. By 
turning the war for the Union into a war for emancipation, Lincoln pushed many War 
Democrats away from the wartime Union party alliance, and back into the rank-and-file 
of the Democracy. As rumours of a pending proclamation of emancipation spread in the 
aftermath of the Compensated Emancipation Act, commitment to the conflict began to 
wane, and Democratic fortunes started to turn. Despite their anger at southern 
Confederates in seceding from the Union, most northerners held racial prejudices that the 
Democrats were quick to exploit during the 1862 midterms.48 In early September, the 
Democratic nominee for governor of New York, Horatio Seymour, addressed a crowd in 
Albany. He argued that the abolitionism of the Lincoln administration strengthened the 
Rebels, and kept ‘alive the flames of civil war.’49 In the face of a stalling Union military 
campaign and the ever-increasing likelihood of emancipation, public support for the war 
dropped considerably as the nation entered the fall. 
 As the 1862 elections rapidly approached, the Democrats found themselves in a 
far stronger position than many could have anticipated at the start of the year. Rising 
inflation coupled with high taxes increased economic stress on northerners who saw little 
progress in the Union war effort. Rumours of a federal draft were met with disdain by 
																																								 																				
47 Illinois State Register, August 6, 1862; Rock Island Argus, Oct. 20, 1862; Bruce Tap, ‘Race, Rhetoric, 
and Emancipation: The Election of 1862 in Illinois,’ Civil War History 39.2 (June, 1993), p. 105; V. Jacques 
Voegeli, Free but Not Equal: The Midwest and the Negro during the Civil War (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1967); Dell, Lincoln and the War Democrats, p. 165. 
48 Baker, Affairs of Party, esp. pp. 212–61; George Frederickson, The Black Image in the White Mind (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1976); Gary Nash and Richard Weiss (eds.), The Great Fear: Race in the Mind of 
America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); Forrest W. Wood, Black Scare: The Racist 
Response to Emancipation and Reconstruction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Mach, 
‘Gentleman George’. Throughout the Civil War, the Democrats published a wealth of pamphlets that 
appealed to racial prejudice. See, for example, John H. Van Evrie, Negroes and Negro ‘Slavery:’ The First 
an Inferior Race: The Latter its Normal Condition (New York: Van Evrie, Horton & Co., 1861). 
49  Public Record: Including Speeches, Messages, Proclamations, Official Correspondence, and other 
Public Utterances of Horatio Seymour; From the Campaign of 1856 to the Present Time (New York, 1868), 
pp. 52–4. 
22	
	
many white northerners who were not willing to fight a war to abolish slavery. Moreover, 
the rise in political arrests amid the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus casted serious 
doubts over the Lincoln administration’s handling of the war.50 Capitalising on the drift 
of public opinion against the administration, and with the Preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation announced on September 22, Democratic charges that the Republicans 
needlessly endangered the civil liberties and lives of American soldiers gained traction. 
When Americans made their way to the polls, many were deeply disenchanted by the war. 
The Democrats overturned many of their congressional defeats of 1860, and gained seats 
from the Republicans across the Midwest where the Copperhead movement was 
notoriously strong. In the disgruntled urban centres of New York and Philadelphia, 
Democrats did equally well and even ousted the House’s incumbent speaker, Galusha A. 
Grow, from Congress. To Democrats, the results confirmed that the coming of the 
Emancipation Proclamation would be the death-knell of the Republican party in the 
North.51 As the year ended, the Republican party had taken a serious blow, and with 
emancipation on the horizon, the country appeared to enter a state of ‘political frenzy.’52  
 Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, issued on January 1, 1863, 
changed the nature and legacy of the war forever. Democrats immediately attacked the 
proclamation, claiming that the ‘pretense put forth by Mr. Lincoln’s apologists to screen 
him in this violation of the Constitution is that the proclamation is a belligerent act and 
finds its justification in the laws of war.’ To them, by subverting states’ rights to federal 
domination, the proclamation was ‘equivalent to a dissolution of the Union.’ 53  In 
announcing emancipation, Lincoln created a much stronger and unified peace movement 
than had existed before, and this became apparent almost immediately. The divisive 
impact of the proclamation paved the way for an exodus of Democrats and Republicans 
from their parties’ ranks. The anti-war assertions of Peace Democrats had already pushed 
many Democrats, such as Benjamin Butler and John A. Logan, into the Republican camp, 
and the proclamation forced many others to reconsider their partisanship.54 While the 
realities of this partisan reconfiguration would not be fully realised until well into the 
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Reconstruction period, the experience of war and emancipation was crucial to the newly 
emerging partisan landscape.  
Anti-administration Democrats were able to increase their support by connecting 
Republican policies to a wider attempt of the Radicals to impose racial equality on the 
nation. Democratic charges against the Lincoln administration had changed little 
following the announcement of emancipation, but that proclamation seemed to give the 
charges greater weight. Publications such as a pamphlet entitled ‘Emancipation and its 
Results’ argued that emancipation would lead to ‘crime, pauperism, immorality, poverty, 
and misery.’55 Democratic assertions that the administration’s real intent was abolition 
were legitimised, and rendered more plausible. 
  Democratic activity undoubtedly changed after Lincoln’s proclamation of 
emancipation. Fearing the prospect of racial integration, Democrats furiously attacked the 
Republican administration for transforming a war to save the Union into a war to end 
slavery.56 As northern party competition over the conflict’s nature intensified, Republican 
charges of Democratic disloyalty became even more vociferous than before, and 
defending one’s patriotism became a particularly laborious task.57 On February 7, Samuel 
J. Tilden, a lawyer from New York who had served as a Democrat in the state assembly 
in the 1840s, rejected as inaccurate the New York Evening Post’s report of a Democratic 
meeting in the city. In his letter to the paper, Tilden bemoaned the fact that ‘there are few 
journals in this city in whose columns, during the present civil war, can not be found 
invocations to violence against dissentients from their opinion.’58 Tilden had become tired 
of the persistent accusations of treason and disloyalty on both sides during the war. While 
he opposed the administration, he believed strongly that an opposition party had a crucial 
role to play in any war and that the sensation created by journalists continued to serve no 
positive purpose to the situation.59 The New Yorker’s views perfectly encapsulated the 
attitude of northern wartime Democrats who refused to sideline their partisanship. For 
these Democrats, loyalty to the Union and loyalty to the administration were not mutually 
exclusive. In opposing Lincoln’s wartime policies, Democrats believed that they were 
acting as loyal citizens by holding a president to account who, they argued, was 
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subverting the Constitution. By acting as defenders of the Constitution, Democrats argued 
that it was through their partisanship that they were protecting the civil liberties of 
Americans who would otherwise be blinded by a dishonest Republican administration 
that was willing to subvert the Constitution.60  
The Democratic press campaigned vociferously against what they viewed as 
arbitrary arrests and the spread of a ‘military despotism’ across the North that deliberately 
attacked Democrats.61 In September, Marble bemoaned the suspension of habeas corpus 
that had led to the arbitrary arrest of many Democrats, including himself, who had written 
against the Lincoln administration. He asserted that ‘the abuses of power to which the 
administration resorted … made a loyal man fear that they who are for the time the 
custodians of our liberties were faithless to those liberties, and needed themselves to be 
guarded and watched.’ 62  The endurance of the Jacksonian commitment to a strict 
construction of the Constitution and the protection of personal liberties, informed the 
Democratic response to the suppression of the press and anti-war demonstrators. It proved 
to be a rallying cry for the party throughout 1862 and 1863.63 For Marble, and other 
Democrats, the unconstitutional methods to which Lincoln had resorted had justified their 
decision to turn against the Union party. They now urged northerners to place their faith 
in the Democracy, as the only ‘legitimate, orderly, constitutional method by which these 
follies and crimes … could be checked, and the government saved in its integrity, in its 
freedom and purity.’64  
Anxiety over the suspension of personal rights reached a climax in the first half 
of 1863. On May 5, Clement L. Vallandigham, an Ohio congressman widely regarded as 
the leader of the Copperhead faction of the Democracy, was arrested by the US military 
for expressing sympathy for the rebellion. Responding to Vallandigham’s arrest, Senator 
George E. Pugh of Ohio averred that while he did not agree with Vallandigham, it was 
important to allow open debate among the people to hold the administration to account.65 
While Pugh’s appeal was ignored, and Vallandigham was subsequently exiled to the 
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Confederacy, the Ohio Senator had voiced the concerns of many Democrats. Through the 
Vallandigham case, the issues of loyalty, freedom of speech, and government centralism 
all converged to show how divided the northern home front had become. In a turn of 
fortunes for Vallandigham, the Ohio Democratic Convention nominated him as their 
candidate for Governor in July. In his acceptance letter, Vallandigham claimed it was in 
‘vain to invite the states and people of the South to return to a Union without a 
constitution, and dishonored and polluted by repeated and most aggravated exactions of 
tyrannic power.’66 The Ohioan believed that the Republicans, through their support of 
Lincoln, had ‘justified his outrages upon liberty and the Constitution; and whoever gives 
his vote to the candidates of that party commits himself to every act of violence and wrong 
on part of the administration which he upholds.’67 
Democrats undoubtedly regarded political conflict on the home front as a partisan 
war, and this was no more evident than in the administration’s use of arbitrary arrests. 
Democrats bemoaned the fact that ‘the only sufferers, so far, have been Democrats. 
Indeed, the very purpose for which the establishment of martial law is sought … is to 
destroy the Democratic party.’68 Furthermore, they lamented the fact that for all those 
Democrats who had joined the army, and devoted themselves to saving the Union, the 
party was constantly disparaged as unpatriotic. They argued that it was not they who had 
desecrated the constitutional rights of citizens, but that the Republican administration 
through the use of ‘lawless violence’ and  ‘unconstitutional and arbitrary acts’ had 
disregarded the nation’s founding principles.69 
In July, opposition to the administration spilled out onto the streets in New York 
City, as Irish citizens protested the commencement of the federal conscription act. While 
the riots highlighted popular discontent with the administration’s policies, Republicans 
cast the violence as a Democratic plot to attack the buildings of leading Republican 
newspapers and intimidate supporters of emancipation.70 The Daily Illinois State Journal 
insisted that the violence had been ‘the legitimate results of the teachings of such 
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unpatriotic and disloyal men as Fernando and Ben Wood.’ 71  Angered by these 
accusations, the New York World asserted that such attempts ‘to infect the public mind 
with the idea that the recent riots were in pursuance of a deliberate plot, secretly concocted 
between the rebel government and northern Democratic leaders… [are] doing their 
malignant upmost [sic] to hector and provoke the Democratic party, and especially the 
Irish population, into violent opposition to the federal government, and to incite the 
government and the soldiery to shoot them with as little compunction as they would mad 
dogs in the streets.’72 The World denied Republican charges that Democratic Governor 
Horatio Seymour had wrongly ordered the militia out of the city at the request of Abraham 
Lincoln, and that their charges that New York City stood at the centre of a ‘Democratic 
plot against the national cause,’ were simply a partisan ploy to weaken a resurgent 
Democracy.73  
The reality was that the draft riots were not part of an elaborate Democratic plot 
against the administration, and were a disaster for Peace Democrats whose depiction as 
traitors to the Union was further consolidated in the aftermath of the disorder. The New 
York violence had spontaneously occurred as the reaction of working class New Yorkers 
against the provisions of the Enrollment Act, but leading Peace Democrats had 
contributed to popular discontent with the draft through their incessant attack on 
emancipation. In fact, Democrats lamented the extent of violence in the city. In a letter to 
Ohio congressman Samuel Sullivan Cox on July 14, George B. McClellan deplored the 
fact that ‘no one seems to know whether the disturbance is at an end or not – God help 
our poor country! I sometimes almost despair when I see so few who really comprehend 
the state of affairs! The Govt must come back to the true & original issues before it can 
hope to have the support of the great mass of the people – & without their cordial support 
I see but little hope for ultimate success.’74  
 If partisanship had been suppressed during 1861 and 1862 by an antiparty 
nationalism, this trend had been reversed by 1863. While pro-administration Democrats 
continued to exalt that ‘Party names and political designations … should never be heard 
of in a moment in civil warfare,’ partisanship became the outwards basis of politics after 
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emancipation.75 This was a fact embraced by many Democrats who had attempted to 
avoid party politics during the national crisis. In a letter to Pennsylvanian Democrat 
Charles J. Biddle of October 12, 1862, McClellan wrote that ‘It has been my earnest 
endeavor, heretofore, to avoid participation in party politics & I had determined to adhere 
to this course … but it is obvious that I cannot long maintain silence under such 
misrepresentations.’76 With eyes turning to the presidential election due to take place in 
November the following year, partisan activity started to supersede antiparty action as 
both Republicans and Democrats sought electoral victory. 
 
Reconstruction and the Election of 1864  
  
In the House of Representatives on February 27, 1864, Congressman John R. 
Eden of Illinois gave reasons for opposing the plan outlined by Abraham Lincoln in his 
Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction of December 8, 1863. The president had 
declared that once ten percent of a state’s voters had taken an oath of allegiance to the 
Union, and elected a loyal state government, the latter would ‘be recognized as the true 
government of the State.’77 Eden denounced the requirement for Confederates to take an 
oath of allegiance, and attacked the administration’s policy of arbitrary arrests, the 
suspension of habeas corpus, and unprecedented taxation, and questioned that ‘If you 
[Republicans] are not for the Union as it was, what sort of Union are you for? Is it the 
Union as it ought to be for which you are fighting? Pray tell the country, ye pure and 
unconditional Unionists, who can’t endure the Union as our fathers formed it, what sort 
of Union you will form? Is it a Union without States, without habeas corpus, without trial 
by jury, without free speech, without a free ballot!’ 78  Eden saw the Reconstruction 
proclamation as an attempt to erect unnecessary barriers to reunion that would only serve 
to create hostility between the North and South. In contrast, he stressed that despite their 
disagreements over the conflict, Democrats all remained dedicated to the preservation of 
the Constitution as it existed before the war. To Eden, the approaching presidential 
election would decide whether the Union would ‘compel the entire population of the 
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South to surrender all rights of person and property into the hands of the Abolitionists, or 
whether, under Democratic rule … the Southern people shall … return to the Union upon 
fair and equitable terms under the Constitution.’79  
The year 1864 began with a sense of reflection for many Democrats. Faced with 
the prospect of a presidential election, party members could not help but be reminded of 
the devastation of their party’s last national convention. Believing that little had happened 
since to strengthen Democratic supporters’ faith in the party’s ability to defeat the 
Republicans, one depressed New Yorker described the Democracy as being ‘in a state of 
hopeless disintegration.’80 Yet party members had reasons to feel positive. Public opinion 
of the Lincoln Administration had been in steady decline throughout 1863 and as a result 
Democratic assertions that the war could have been avoided had Republican leaders been 
‘larger men than they are,’ resonated with voters.81 
With Reconstruction on the horizon, the Republicans, under the guise of the Union 
party, nominated Tennessee War Democrat, Andrew Johnson, as President Lincoln’s 
running mate. Johnson, renowned for his stubborn and tactless political style, perfectly 
fit the Union party’s aspirations to appeal to dissatisfied Democrats to begin the process 
of reconciliation. Upon receiving the nomination, Johnson hoped to win over Democrats 
who were simultaneously reluctant to endorse Lincoln’s Reconstruction plans, and 
disillusioned by the Peace Democrats. Johnson claimed that: 
In accepting this nomination … I cannot forego the opportunity of saying to 
my old friends of the democratic party proper, with whom I have so long 
and pleasantly been associated, that the hour has now come, when that great 
party can justly vindicate its devotion to true Democratic policy and 
measures of expediency. The war is a war of great principles. It involves the 
supremacy and life of the Government itself … In a great contest like this 
for the existence of free government, the path of duty is patriotism and 
principle.82 
 
By appealing to patriotism, Johnson echoed the declarations of other War 
Democrats throughout the war. In July, Johnson ‘called upon his hearers to bear 
witness to the course he had pursued – he had been a Democrat – was still a 
Democrat – believed this was, and ever would be a great Democratic Government, 
while there was a patriot’s arm left to raise in its defense – a Government 
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established by the apostle of freedom and liberty, Thomas Jefferson, and upheld by 
the unswerving sage and true patriot, Andrew Jackson.’ 83  Like his pro-war 
Democratic supporters, Johnson had not forgotten to make his partisan affiliation 
known. Democrats who supported the administration found it necessary not simply 
to stress that their loyalty lay with the Union via an antiparty nationalism, but also 
to aver that this action did not make them Republicans.   
In response, anti-administration Democrats scoured their ranks for a candidate to 
take the fight to the Republicans. A frontrunner soon emerged. While Horatio Seymour’s 
success in being elected governor of New York put him in the national spotlight, most 
Democrats believed that ‘no name is mentioned in connection with the Democratic 
nomination … save that of Gen. McClellan.’ 84 In spite of the over-caution that led to 
Little Mac’s dismissal as commander of the Army of the Potomac in late 1862, 
McClellan’s concern for his troops made him popular with many soldiers, and his belief 
that a peaceful solution to the war could be found elevated his stock among Democrats. 
While rumours circulated of an attempt by the Copperheads to pass a peace platform with 
a peace candidate, the bulk of the party recognised the importance of the army vote and 
the political capital that a War Democrat brought to the party.85  As the Democratic 
convention approached, however, rumours began to emerge that party managers intended 
to delay the meeting until later in the summer.  
Since General Ulysses S. Grant had been named general-in-chief, the Union army 
had made significant progress and by late spring talk had turned to the possibility of an 
early surrender of Confederate forces. Hoping to capitalise on the swelling popularity of 
the general, many Democrats suggested delaying the party’s convention until late August 
to keep open the possibility of a Grant Democratic candidacy.86 When the decision was 
made public in late June, Democrats split over the decision. While many believed it to be 
an astute political move that allowed the party to remain flexible in its approach to the 
upcoming presidential contest, not all felt similarly.87 Dean Richmond, the chairman of 
the Democratic National Committee believed that the whole party was united against the 
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Lincoln administration and that the longer the campaign progressed without a Democratic 
candidate in the field, the wider splits would grow.88  
 The convention’s delay appeared to yield some benefits for the Democrats. The 
Overland Campaign, that saw Grant pitted against General Robert E. Lee, had stagnated 
at Petersburg claiming over 80,000 lives in the process, raising doubts over the likelihood 
of a swift Union victory.89 Yet Democratic acclamations for peace discussions were 
quelled by Republican attacks on the Democracy’s so-called disloyalty. Republicans 
asserted that prominent Democrats were members of pro-Confederate organisations like 
the Knights of the Golden Circle that sought to undermine the Union war effort.90 Despite 
this, Democrats remained positive over the prospects for the coming election. They 
observed that ‘Old Abe is quite in trouble right now,’ and that the Democracy, by 
nominating a ‘strong Union man’ had a real opportunity to defeat the Republicans and 
take charge of Reconstruction.91 To do so, however, it was critical for the Democrats to 
secure the correct candidate. With Grant fully committed to the Union war effort, 
McClellan became the overwhelming favourite for the Democratic nomination. Leading 
party strategists highlighted the critical role the army vote would play in the election. 
They believed that Little Mac’s influence and standing among the soldiers meant that ‘no 
one but McClellan can control any large portion of the army vote,’ and with any other 
nominee ‘we lose the support of tens of thousands of honest Republicans who will support 
him.’92 With McClellan at the head of the ticket, therefore, War Democrats and moderate 
Peace Democrats, believed that the party would be able to ensure the support not only of 
Union soldiers and the unity of their party, but a measure of bipartisan support that, 
without the votes of a solid Democratic South, was essential to electoral victory. 
When delegates to the Democratic National Convention met at the Amphitheatre 
in Chicago on August 29, they exuded optimism.  Confident that a McClellan nomination 
																																								 																				
88 Dean Richmond to Marble, June 16, 1864, Marble Papers. LOC; David H. Williams to Barlow, June 23, 
1864, Barlow Papers, HL; Fernando Wood to Barlow, June 15, 1864, Barlow Papers, HL. 
89 Gordon C. Rhea, Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26–June 3, 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2002), pp. 359–62. 
90 George W. Bickley to Marble, Aug. 1, 1864, Marble Papers, LOC. On the Knights of the Golden Circle, 
see, David C. Keehn, Knights of the Golden Circle: Secret Empire, Secession and Civil War (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2013). 
91 Cyrus H. McCormick to Marble, Aug. 17, 1864, Marble Papers, LOC; J. W. Rathburn to Marble, Aug. 
11, 1864, Marble Papers, LOC. 
92 Barlow to Marble, Aug. 21, 1864, Marble Papers, LOC; David H. Williams to Barlow, Aug. 27, 1864, 
Barlow Papers, HL; Benjamin Stark to Barlow, Aug. 21, 1864, Barlow Papers, HL; Barlow to Marble, Aug. 
24, 1864, Marble Papers, LOC; Joel Parker to George B. McClellan, Aug. 27, 1864, George B. McClellan 
Papers, LOC. 
31	
	
would secure victory in November, party delegates hoped that factionalism would not 
ruin the party’s chances. Calling the convention to order, August Belmont addressed the 
Democratic assemblage saying that ‘four years of misrule, by a sectional, fanatical and 
corrupt party, have brought our country to the very verge of ruin.’ He asserted that ‘We 
are here not as war democrats, nor as peace democrats, but as citizens of the great 
Republic, which we will strive to bring back to its former greatness and prosperity, 
without one single star taken from the brilliant constellation that once encircled its 
youthful brow.’93 Hope for a united convention, however, quickly dissipated. In the days 
leading up to the meeting, rumours had spread of a movement among Copperheads to 
place a peace man at the head of the ticket. When New York governor Horatio Seymour 
declined the opportunity, the Peace Democrats rallied behind former Connecticut 
governor Thomas H. Seymour. An ardent peace advocate who had become a leading 
voice against the Republican administration in his state, Seymour held little realistic 
possibility of securing the nomination. Leading War Democrats however were worried 
about the rising peace sentiment among the delegation, noting that ‘the Vallandigham 
spirit is rampant.’94 Their fears were finally realised when Vallandigham was placed on 
the Committee of Resolutions, condemning any hopes of a moderate platform to the past. 
With Vallandigham its scribe, the Chicago Platform of 1864 was a concoction of 
disparate Democratic ideals that highlighted the fractured nature of the wartime 
Democracy. While the platform reflected the general discontent felt by Democrats 
towards the Republican administration and its use of ‘extraordinary and dangerous 
powers not granted by the Constitution,’ the hard-line stance that demanded ‘immediate 
efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities,’ went further than most Democrats, including 
McClellan, were willing to accept.95  When coupled with the convention’s choice of 
Ohioan Peace Democrat, George H. Pendleton as McClellan’s running mate, spirits were 
dampened even further. Pendleton, a typical midwestern Jacksonian Democrat, had been 
an advocate of peace and held a particular distaste for the industrialists of the East.96 His 
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inclusion on the ticket was a major setback for Democrats who hoped to create bridges 
between the party and conservative Republicans, and it was only because of an even 
greater discontent with the Lincoln administration’s domestic policies, that the party 
endorsed the East-West ticket. 
Democrats across the nation deplored the outcome of the convention, and stressed 
that if McClellan were to accept the nomination based on the adopted resolutions, it would 
give currency to ‘the standard of [his] enemies.’97 Most took aim directly at the cessation 
of hostilities clause that would cut off support from conservative Republicans, and hoped 
that McClellan could address some of these concerns in his letter of acceptance. 98 
Moreover, delegates who had attended the convention noted the difficulty they had in 
creating the platform. Amasa Parker, a delegate from New York, wrote to Barlow in early 
September that ‘you do not know the difficulty we had in modifying [the platform] to its 
present shape … but the whole thing can be made right by Gen. McClellan’s letter of 
acceptance.’99 Similarly, William Cassidy wrote that ‘we may have altered the platform 
at Chicago … but it would have involved a fight and probable rupture.’100 Thus, while 
many Democrats were angered by the platform, its passage was the result of attempts to 
hold the party together. The party had entered the convention optimistic about the 
upcoming election, yet the events that transpired in Chicago clearly demonstrated to 
Democrats how fractured their party had become.  
Having eagerly awaited McClellan’s letter of acceptance, Little Mac’s response 
to the nomination split unconditional and conditional Peace Democrats.101 In the letter, 
McClellan acknowledged that as ‘soon as it is clear, or even possible, that our present 
adversaries are ready for peace upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the 
resources of statesmanship practiced by civilized nations, and taught by the traditions of 
the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure 
such peace, reestablish the Union, and guarantee for the future the Constitutional rights 
of every State.’102 The general made no mention of emancipation, and noted that ‘The 
Union is the one condition of peace. We ask no more,’ pleasing the conditionals who were 
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insistent on reunification.103 The Republicans immediately jumped on the inconsistencies 
in McClellan’s and the Democracy’s nomination and platform, and urged voters not to 
endorse the contradictory patchwork of policies that the party had created at Chicago (see 
Figure 1.1). 
 
 
Figure 1.1– ‘Marvelous Equestrian Performance on Two Animals,’ Harper’s Weekly, Oct. 8, 1864 
 
 Throughout the canvass, Union party members attacked the Democrats’ loyalty. 
In July, Andrew Johnson denounced the Democrats for being ‘nothing more nor less than 
sympathizers with the rebellion – men who would not hesitate to unite with our enemies 
to destroy our Government. In words and deeds they are the most dastardly cowards the 
world ever knew. They must and will be put down, and the stigma of infamy will rest 
upon them.’104 In response, Democrats sought to turn the tables on their opponents by 
casting Lincoln and the Republicans as ‘disunionists of the North’ who were only 
interested in freeing the slaves and not saving the Union.105 More than anything else, the 
Democrats appealed to white supremacy to bolster support for the party. They made 
frequent racial appeals to voters ‘who believe that this is a white man’s government – that 
white men shall rule it, and that a white man, no matter how poor or low his condition … 
is as good as any negro in the land, will vote for McClellan and Pendleton on the white 
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man’s ticket.’106 Referencing what would later be uncovered as a hoax by two Democratic 
journalists, Democrats accused the Republicans of advocating ‘miscegenation.’107 In the 
Columbia Democrat, a poem was published that made allusions to a future under the 
Republicans in which white daughters would be used to breed a new race. The poem read:  
 
Duty to God and to civilization, 
Calls for a social reorganization, 
Give us a race with a little more vigor, 
Give us a race with a little more nigger … 
Give up your darling to some negro beauty; 
Give your fair daughters like angels that are 
Beautiful, lovely, for black men to share.108 
 
Democrats further argued that emancipation would lead to the loss of northern white 
workers’ jobs as former slaves would move North to search for work. They claimed that 
the Republicans had no interest in improving the lives of white northerners, and were 
instead seeking to ‘rob the white man of his property and bestow it on the negro.’109 The 
Democratic appeal to northern racism could not, however, trump the Republicans ability 
to cast the Democracy as the party of treason.  
By mid-late 1864 the election had become a referendum on whether the war would 
be prosecuted to its end. The high hopes with which the Democracy had entered 1864 
faded as the General William T. Sherman pressed home his advantage in Atlanta. In the 
final analysis, the Democratic pursuit for peace was wholly dependent upon the fortunes 
of the Union armies. With defeats and large losses of life, the Democratic opposition did 
well, but by the end of 1864, the Democrats saw their support wane. The party lacked 
control of its own destiny and the results of the election showed this.110 Lincoln won the 
presidency by 212 Electoral College votes to just 21, and George McClellan garnered just 
45% of the popular vote, a figure that would only be lower during the catastrophic 
Democratic campaign of 1872. Upon hearing of the defeat, McClellan wrote to Samuel 
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L. M. Barlow, ‘For my country’s sake,’ he said, ‘I deplore the result … I have sent my 
resignation and have abandoned public life forever – I can imagine no combination of 
circumstances that can ever induce me to enter it again … I am sure that when the future 
has made things more clear & has applied the sad test of experience to the principles of 
the two parties, that our position in defeat will be more enviable than that of our 
antagonists in success.’111 In defeat, the Democracy seemed shattered. The party had to 
shake itself off and consider what direction it would take next. 
 With the end of the war and the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, the Democracy 
was given an unlikely and unforeseen lifeline in the shape of a new president, Andrew 
Johnson. Partisans sensed the opportunity and began to lay their plans in anticipation of 
the reconciliation of the northern and southern wings of the party. On April 21, 1865, a 
week after John Wilkes Booth had shot Abraham Lincoln, Harry C. Page of the New 
York State Committee of the War Democracy wrote to Andrew Johnson about his hopes 
for the Tennessean’s presidency. Page suggested appointing more War Democrats to his 
cabinet, pointing to John A. Dix, Edwards Pierrepont, and Francis B. Cutting as prime 
candidates, stating that ‘[a]s our leader and standard bearer we look to you to guide the 
political future, confident that your abilities, policy and statesmanship will not only guide 
the country safely on its road to great prosperity, but that a regenerated, liberty-loving 
and redeemed Democracy, with you as their chosen chieftain, will control the destinies 
of the Republic for years to come.’112 The Democrats hoped that in Andrew Johnson, they 
had found a ‘second Andrew Jackson,’ who could lead the party into a new era of political 
dominance.113 Whether they had, only time would tell. Despite the Democracy’s poor 
showing in the November election, the party entered Reconstruction with a rejuvenated 
sense of optimism in their new president and the return of their southern brethren to the 
national party. 
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Chapter Two 
‘One Country, One Flag, One Union of Equal States’: Andrew Johnson, National 
Unionism, and the Politics of Reconciliation, 1865–1868 
 
As soldiers from across the Union began the long journey home from the 
amphitheatres of war, Americans witnessed first-hand the devastation of the conflict. 
Hundreds of thousands of young men lay in unmarked graves, once prosperous cities 
stood in ruin, and the nation mourned for the loss of their president. With the end of the 
war came the realisation that somehow, out of this bleak and desolate landscape, the 
Union would have to be rebuilt. How this would happen, however, only time would tell. 
After the tragic death of Abraham Lincoln, the task of Reconstruction fell at the feet of 
Andrew Johnson, a southern Democrat who had been born into poverty in North Carolina, 
and was the only southern senator who had not resigned his seat to join the Confederacy 
in 1860. Despite his staunch Unionist past, many northerners felt uneasy about how 
Johnson would reconcile the former Confederate states with the Union, and what form 
Reconstruction would take. 
The transition from civil war to peace was a chaotic, and often violent process that 
simultaneously threatened the survival of both political parties and challenged the 
fundamental principles of the American republic. Scholars of the early Reconstruction 
period have characterised the Democratic party as principally concerned with ending 
Republican military rule in the South, and restoring ‘white man’s government,’ yet they 
have been unable to sufficiently explain the inconsistencies and developments of 
Democratic ideology and policy between 1865 and 1868.1 Rather than remaining rooted 
solely in white supremacy and anti-centralisation, the Democratic party passed through a 
turbulent period of uncertainty and inconsistency that answered few questions about the 
party’s future. Amidst a genuine belief that a major partisan realignment was on the 
horizon, Democrats wrestled with their partisanship and struggled to create a coherent 
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vision for the party in post-emancipation America. The Democracy that fought the 1868 
election was one that appeared remarkably backwards and unchanged by the upheaval of 
civil war; however, Democrats learned crucial lessons about the political uses of white 
supremacy, the power of Civil War memory to undermine their message, and the binding 
force of the institutional memory of their own party. Each of these lessons would serve 
the party until the end of the century. 
 In recent years, scholars have shed light on the development of sectionalism and 
the intricacies of reunion and reconciliation in the postbellum world, but have not yet 
grasped the complexities Democrats faced throughout this process.2 During the early 
years of Reconstruction, Democratic strategy was far from a straightforward espousal of 
white supremacist ideology. While racism helped to bind Democrats together, it was not 
enough to repair the trauma of the Civil War. Rather, the party’s dedication to ensure a 
lasting reunion of North and South produced diverse visions of party strategy among 
Democrats. While race became crucial to electoral strategy, it was reconciliation with 
southern whites that was the central object of the party. Race and reconciliation had an 
intimate relationship with the Democratic party during Reconstruction, and directed party 
policy between 1865 and 1868. In 1866 this desire for reconciliation pushed Democrats 
into an alliance with Andrew Johnson and conservative Republicans and, following its 
demise, Democrats attempted to utilise white supremacy to restore the party to its 
antebellum dominance. Ultimately, neither of these strategies would prove successful for 
Democratic resurgence, but laid the foundations of the party’s future course. Democrats 
rarely saw eye-to-eye over how the party should address Reconstruction, yet nearly all 
believed that reconciling northern and southern Democrats would pave the way for a 
return to national ascendancy. 
 
Presidential Reconstruction and the Birth of National Unionism 
 
 When Andrew Johnson took over from his predecessor on April 15, 1865, the 
Tennessean remained guarded about his views on Reconstruction. Rather than provide a 
clear indication of his intentions, the new president cryptically declared that ‘any policy 
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which may be pursued by me in the administration of the Government … must be made 
by the acts as they transpire. The only assurance that I can give now of the future, is by 
reference to the past.’3 In the immediate aftermath of Abraham Lincoln’s assassination 
by a southern Confederate, and at a moment when reunion was at the top of the nation’s 
political agenda, Johnson’s candid approach was no surprise. Sectional animosity had 
reached a crescendo in April as northern Democrats and Republicans stood united in grief. 
Newspapers reported that ‘it is clear as day that the real origin of this dreadful act 
[Lincoln’s assassination] is to be found in the fiendish and malignant spirit developed and 
fostered by the rebel press,’ and that ‘the demand for the punishment of the rebel leads 
will be too strong for resistance.’4 In this environment, and as a southern Democrat, 
Johnson’s decision not to announce his plans for Reconstruction was predictable. The 
assassination of a northern president by a Confederate sympathiser did not exhibit the 
existence of a reconciliatory spirit among southerners, and this greatly conflicted with 
Johnson’s desire for a speedy restoration of home-rule and congressional representation 
to the former Confederate states. 5 
Having spent the last four years ferociously undermining the wartime Republican 
administration, Peace Democrats were forced to consider the consequences of their 
wartime actions. The Republicans had been able to cast them as traitors to the Union and 
Democrats carried this branding into Reconstruction. Democratic defeats in 1864 and the 
subsequent passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in January 1865 had settled any doubts 
about the future of slavery in the United States, and northern Democrats now faced the 
daunting task of repairing their broken party. Of the few positives the Democracy could 
take from the events of the last year, the accession of a Jacksonian Democrat from 
Tennessee to the presidency was the most prominent. Johnson’s inauguration filled many 
party members with a renewed sense of hope that a swift and lenient Reconstruction 
policy could lead to the ‘restoration of the “Era of good feeling”’ among Democrats.6 Yet, 
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the presence of a Democrat in the White House was not sufficient to unify the party, and 
wartime resentments between War and Peace Democrats stood firmly in the way of 
consolidation. In an editorial in The Old Guard, a Peace Democratic magazine, Charles 
Chauncey Burr advocated the exodus of War Democrats from the party organisation, 
arguing they should ‘drop the name of Democrat altogether, and to go over in name where 
he has gone in sympathy and acts.’ 7  Burr, like many former Peace Democrats, was 
unwilling to forgive War Democrats who supported a Republican administration that had, 
in their eyes, disregarded the Constitution through their support of an abolitionist crusade 
that suppressed free speech and undermined civil liberties. With no civil war to define 
factions, Democrats split between straight-out Democrats (composed principally of 
former-Peace Democrats) and accommodationist Democrats (composed of former-War 
Democrats, and ex-conservative Republicans who had switched allegiance to the 
Democracy). 
Regardless of factional alignment, Democrats recognised Andrew Johnson’s 
strategic value and wrestled for the ear of a ‘second Andrew Jackson,’ who could secure 
a lenient policy for southern restoration.8 Determined to marginalise the influence of 
straight-out Democrats on Johnson, however, accommodationists sought to ensure the 
president would continue his wartime affiliation with the Union party and ‘look upon 
[Reconstruction] as a question for the Legislative power exclusively.’9 What Democrats 
did not account for, was that while the president was eager to avoid a programme of 
Radical Reconstruction that seemingly threatened an amicable restoration of the Union, 
he felt equal contempt for former-Peace Democrats who he believed had betrayed the 
nation during the Civil War.  
On May 29, President Johnson announced his plans for southern restoration by 
signing the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction. Informed by Lincoln’s Ten 
Percent Plan, the proclamation reflected Johnson’s belief that the abolition of slavery 
would not usher in a new era of American citizenship. Rather than allowing the Radical 
Republicans to dictate the terms of surrender and southern restoration that would 
invariably give the freed-slaves political rights and representation, Johnson was 
determined to ensure that white men would retain control of government in the South. 
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The proclamation granted amnesty to all persons who participated in the rebellion, barring 
high-ranking Confederate officials, restored all rights of property except slaves, and 
appointed provisional governors to overlook the process of southern reintegration. 
Johnson wanted to ensure the leaders of the rebellion were held to account, but his 
overarching desire to ‘ameliorate and alleviate the condition of the great mass of the 
American people,’ meant that he would not endorse black equality at the expense of 
risking the loyalty of the southern masses to the Union.10  
Two days later, Johnson met with General John A. Logan to secure the support of 
a figurehead of the Union war effort. Much to Johnson’s relief, Logan immediately 
congratulated the President on his conservative policy, claiming that with the end of the 
war, a period of ‘reason and conciliation’ had opened.11 While Radical Republicans were 
angered by the president’s lenience, Logan agreed with Johnson’s opinion that ‘there is 
no such thing as reconstruction. These States have not gone out of the Union, therefore 
reconstruction is not necessary. I do not mean to treat them as inchoate States, but merely 
as existing under a temporary suspension of their government, provided always they elect 
loyal men.’12 That Logan represented a significant cohort of former Democrats who had 
converted to Republicanism during the war was no coincidence. Johnson appealed to 
converted Democrats who had become influential among conservative Republicans in 
order to create a bridge between what he saw as natural allies; the accommodationist 
Democrats and conservative Republicans. Johnson believed black equality would be a 
barrier to reconciliation, and sought to avoid a Reconstruction that would inaugurate 
racial equality and force ‘revenge revenge revenge’ to take root in the hearts of southern 
whites.13 Instead, the president hoped to create a new party situated in the middle-ground 
of politics that would sideline both the Radical Republicans and former Peace Democrats. 
 During the summer of 1865, the desire for the creation of a new national coalition 
dominated the strategy of accommodationist Democrats. While recovering from a 
particularly energy-sapping bout of typhoid fever, the now sixty-five-year-old Daniel S. 
Dickinson wrote to Andrew Johnson on the condition of parties in postbellum America. 
Dickinson claimed that ‘For all practical political purposes, in the next national campaign, 
the present organizations are of little consequence. They will, or rather the popular 
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elements of which they are composed will, be disintegrated and reformed.’14 The New 
Yorker believed that old-line Whigs in the Republican ranks would seek to ensure the 
survival of the Union party, while the War Democracy would look for ‘a new healthy 
organization.’15 This, however, would not be the present Democratic party, which would 
‘fall from inherent weakness’ as ‘the memories of the last four years are too vivid’ for it 
to be resurrected.16 The sentiments of Dickinson confirmed Johnson’s view of party 
politics in the postwar Union. The issue of loyalty had conditioned the political culture of 
the Civil War-era United States, and this continued to echo throughout the Reconstruction 
era.  
At the same time, former Peace Democrats such as Clement Vallandigham, 
Horatio Seymour, and Benjamin Wood hoped that the new president could revive the 
broken Democracy. The enduring memories of the treasonous action of the party during 
the war, however, rendered such a path untenable.17 Despite the attempts of Democrats to 
distance themselves from the war, the Republicans hastened to remind the public of their 
opponents’ treachery. The New York Times noted that ‘unfortunately for the Democratic 
party, character does not change with circumstance … The Democratic party was false 
to the country during the war for its salvation. Because of that unfaithfulness, the people 
threw it to the dust … It cannot regain the public confidence short of the impossible feat 
of resolving itself out of its personal identity.’18 Irrespective of claims of Democratic 
organs that ‘The loyalty of the Democratic party needs no defence,’ embedded memories 
of the war continued to lend saliency to Republican attacks.19 Northerners had just fought 
and died for the Union and they would need convincing that Democrats who had opposed 
the war would not try to reverse the military results of their sacrifice.  
After a summer that had seen the new president issue an unprecedented number 
of pardons to former-Confederates, embittered Republicans denounced Johnson’s 
lenience and latched upon the president’s ties to the Democracy. In October, Secretary of 
the Treasury Hugh McCulloch delivered a speech in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and claimed 
that ‘It will thus be seen that President Johnson’s views upon the deep lying, fundamental 
question on which a policy of reconstruction must be built, are precisely those of the 
																																								 																				
14 Ibid., p. 615. 
15 Ibid., p. 615. 
16 Ibid., p. 615. 
17 Silbey, A Respectable Minority, pp. 184–5; Mach, ‘Gentleman George’, p. 116. 
18 New York Times, Sept. 7, 1865. 
19 New York World, Nov. 7, 1865. 
42	
	
Democratic party.’20 Moreover, the Radicals were wary of the new president’s attempts 
to create working coalitions between conservative Republicans and the Democrats. In 
June, Charles Sumner expressed his concern to Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase that 
Johnson’s attempts to bridge the parties were ‘splitting our party’ and warned that ‘if he 
does not stop soon, he cannot stop this side of the democrats.’21 What Sumner did not 
account for, however, was the extent to which Democrats were split over Johnson’s 
Reconstruction policy, and how this would hamper the potential primacy of the 
Democratic party. While some Democrats urged the president to ‘not flinch a hairs 
breadth from his policy of restoration,’ and stand on the ‘patriotic ground’ that would 
carry the country in future elections, others were wary of Johnson’s intentions.22  
In July, George Ticknor Cutis, a lawyer, author, and Democrat from Boston, 
warned Manton Marble that if Johnson were to ally with the Democracy, it would lead to 
‘the sacrifice of great principles’ as the president was ‘entirely in the hands’ of 
Republicans like Stanton and Seward.23 By the end of 1865, therefore, the president stood 
on hazardous ground. While he hoped to create a bridge between disaffected conservative 
Republicans and moderate Democrats, two points of dissension stood in his way. While 
his lenience towards former Confederates attracted Democrats eager for their former 
partisans to rejoin the party, conservative Republicans were uneasy with the support that 
former Peace Democrats gave Johnson. Conversely, straight-out Democrats were wary 
of Johnson’s wartime support of the Republicans, and this hindered any formal alliance 
between themselves and the new president. 
In late 1865 and early 1866, the reconvened Republican-dominated Congress 
moved to put an end to Johnson’s liberal use of presidential pardons that had brought 
many leading former Confederates back into public life. Under the president’s May 
proclamation, southern legislatures had passed ‘Black Codes’ that sought to restrict the 
movement of freedmen through vagrancy laws, control black property-owning rights, 
prevent African-American weapon possession, and stop former slaves from assembling 
in public. In essence, southern whites were able to reinstate white supremacy. 24  In 
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response, Radical Republicans pushed through Congress an updated Freedmen’s Bureau 
Bill that extended the life of the agency and protected former slaves’ rights to land 
ownership and contract negotiation, and a new Civil Rights Bill that granted citizenship 
to freed blacks. Together, these two bills represented the Republican vision of 
Reconstruction that Johnson had been determined to avoid. Democrats immediately 
denounced the Republican party as a ‘sectional, party machine, which looses [sic] sights 
of the interests of the whole country.’25 The president swiftly vetoed both bills, and 
claimed that ‘it is unwise and dangerous to pursue a course of measures which will unite 
any large section of the country against another section of the country.’26 While Radical 
and many moderate Republicans put a premium on securing freedmen’s rights that would 
lay the foundations for a southern Republican party, conservative Republicans and 
accommodationist Democrats were unwilling to extend the suffrage if it threatened the 
peaceful restoration of the Union.27 Democrats such as Jeremiah Black and Orville H. 
Browning exalted that the Freedmen’s Bureau veto ‘has made millions of good hearts 
glad and grateful for it has saved the nation,’ and that had the bill ‘been put into operation, 
the restoration of the unity and harmony of our unhappy Country would, thereby, have 
been made impossible’ by substituting ‘a military despotism for constitutional 
government.’ 28  While Congress overrode the president’s vetoes, Johnson’s actions 
allayed the doubts of many Democrats. 
By the summer of 1866 the Democrats had reached a pivotal moment in deciding 
what role they would play in supporting the president’s reconciliatory National Unionism. 
Accommodationist August Belmont wrote to Samuel Barlow that ‘the Union Club takes 
the wind out of our sails and it is now for us to decide, whether we will join in their action 
and then give up the National Democratic organization … For my own part I want only 
to do what is best for our country and what will most effectively kill the Radicals in and 
out of Congress and … restore the Union.’29 Democrats displayed a varying degree of 
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willingness to work with conservative Republicans to subdue Radicalism. 
Accommodationists were willing to form a new party under the National Union banner, 
as long as it remained conservative in its appeal and principles, while straight-out 
Democrats viewed National Unionism as a rhetorical tool that could rebrand the 
Democracy, ensure a lenient Reconstruction, and propel the Democrats back to power. 
Throughout June, Johnson held two meetings to organize a National Union convention in 
the build-up to the fall congressional elections. Present at the meetings were leading 
conservative Republicans and Democrats, including James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin, 
Orville Browning of Illinois, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, Edgar Cowan of 
Pennsylvania, James Dixon of Connecticut, Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch, 
and Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana.30 This bipartisan gathering set the date for the 
convention as August 14, and the National Union movement seemed well placed, with its 
strong support among Democrats and Republicans, to establish a working electoral 
alliance to curtail the Radical Republicans.  
 
The Failure of the National Union Movement 
 
In July, National Unionists gathered in conventions across the nation to appoint 
delegates to represent the states at the planned National Union Convention in 
Philadelphia. Despite Johnson’s appeal for the selection of conservative Republicans and 
former War Democrats, a few troublesome selections were made that held the potential 
to disrupt the proceedings and moderate image of National Unionism. From New York, 
Fernando Wood was chosen as a delegate, while in Ohio Clement Vallandigham was also 
selected. As two archetypal Peace Democrats during the war, Wood and Vallandigham 
represented everything that Johnson had tried to distance the National Union movement 
from. Regarded as two of the most despised Democrats by Republicans, Vallandigham 
and Wood held the potential to dissuade conservative Republicans from both attending 
the Philadelphia Convention and endorsing any moves towards creating a new party.31 
As the convention drew closer, concerns about Vallandigham continued to grow. 
Alexander Randall, a former Whig from Maryland, remarked that ‘our people shrink from 
contact with him … The fellows doctrines now are not so bad, but his name is damnation 
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… The only importance his being here can have is to frighten off, at the fall elections, 
men whose votes we want.’32 The threat Vallandigham and Wood posed to the National 
Union movement highlighted the difficulty the Democratic party had in throwing off its 
wartime stigma as a band of treasonous Confederate sympathisers. And while National 
Unionists were aware that Johnson would ‘rely mainly upon the support of the 
Democratic party in its contest with the Radicals,’ the success of the movement depended 
on its branding as a Unionist coalition.33 Yet National Unionists had more than rogue 
Democrats to worry about. As news of Clement Vallandigham and Fernando Wood’s 
selection as delegates to the National Union Convention spread, racial violence erupted 
in New Orleans. 
In the Crescent City in May 1866, Republican Governor James Madison Wells 
reconvened the 1864 Louisiana constitutional convention in July at the Mechanics 
Institute. The Republicans hoped to introduce a black suffrage clause into the state 
constitution, but the convention quickly descended into anarchy. In the days leading up 
to the meeting, funeral notices had been posted around the city declaring that ‘niggers and 
half niggers should be wiped out’ and that ‘No man should come out the convention 
alive.’ 34  As a large, predominantly black crowd congregated outside the Mechanics 
Institute on July 30, the newly elected Democratic mayor, John T. Monroe, ordered the 
city police to break up the Radical convention.35 By the time federal troops were finally 
deployed to quell the violence, forty-four blacks and three whites lay dead in the street.  
The rosy picture that the National Union movement painted of the postwar world 
was greatly eroded by the events that unfolded across the South during 1866. Mayor 
Monroe’s actions were dictated by his hatred for Republican wishes for black suffrage. 
His dispatch of white policemen against the Republican convention not only rekindled 
memories of the barbarity of war, but also highlighted the continuing partisan conflict 
over Reconstruction policy. Reports of southern violence clearly demonstrated the 
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partisan and sectional basis of the violence: ‘Hays’s brigade [the city police] will all be 
there, and will clean out those damned Yankees.’36 To worsen matters for reconciliatory 
National Unionists, many New Orleans citizens had walked around the city wearing 
badges and cheering in support of Jefferson Davis and Andrew Johnson.37 The violence 
and proclamations of New Orleans’ citizens not only exemplified the continuing sectional 
animosity in the postwar United States, but the conflation of pro-Davis and pro-Johnson 
chants tainted National Unionism with the same treasonous image of the Confederacy.   
On August 14, the National Union project came to its climax. As delegates 
paraded through the streets of Philadelphia, the spirit of reconciliation with which the 
movement had been born was evident to all there to witness it. As they entered the 
convention hall, Union General Darius N. Couch of Massachusetts linked arms with 
South Carolina Governor James L. Orr in a spectacle truly representative of the spirit of 
National Unionism. As Orr and Couch entered the hall, the audience rose to their feet in 
rapturous applause as simultaneous renditions of the Star Spangled Banner and Dixie rang 
out.38  
Once the delegates returned to their seats, the Democratic Chairman of the 
Convention John A. Dix rose to deliver his opening address. Beginning with the bold 
claim that ‘no body of men has met on this continent under circumstances so momentous 
and so delicate since the year 1787,’ Dix laid out the central aims of the National Union 
movement.39 Committed to a firm stance on states’ rights, and the execution of President 
Johnson’s Reconstruction policy, Dix called upon the delegates to ‘present to the world 
an example worthy of imitation, not a mere Utopian vision of good Government, but the 
grand old reality of better times … one country, one flag, one Union of equal States!’40 
Following Dix’s lead, James R. Doolittle claimed that ‘If [the citizens of the United 
States] could have seen – as we saw – Massachusetts and South Carolina, by their full 
delegations, coming arm in arm into this great Convention, if they could have seen this 
body … melting to tears of joy and gratitude to witness this commingling, there could be 
no struggle at the polls in the coming election.’41 Celebrations of sectional reconciliation 
saturated the proceedings of the Philadelphia convention, and echoed the policies put 
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forward by Andrew Johnson over the preceding months. The delegates claimed that 
Congress had denied white southerners of their right to be represented by refusing to 
allow southern representatives elected in late 1865 to take their seats, and hoped that 
National Unionism would play a vital role in the new postbellum political order.42 
In the aftermath of the convention, the grand display of sectional reconciliation 
filled Democrats with the enthusiastic belief that National Unionism would be a success. 
As convention delegates returned to Washington, President Johnson ‘hailed their work as 
the “Second Declaration of Independence from the tyranny of an oligarchy,”’ as ‘the 
whole country was electrified by accounts with which the papers teemed of a 
reconciliation and paternal embrace in the City of Brotherly Love between South Carolina 
and Massachusetts.’43  The success of the National Union Convention was, however, 
evidently limited. While the Republican New York Tribune incorrectly claimed that there 
was ‘absolutely no popular support for the … Convention outside the ranks of the 
Rebellion of the South and the Peace Democracy of the North,’ the paper provided some 
remarkable insight into the limiting effect of partisanship on the National Union 
movement.44 The Tribune reported that ‘the leaders of the movement, both Democratic 
and Republican, hesitate at’ the creation of a third party, and it was this inability to create 
a new national party that underpinned the eventual failure of the National Union 
strategy.45 With a substantial amount of bipartisan support, the creation of a new national 
party would have made sense for the majority of delegates at the convention. 
Unfortunately for the National Unionists, however, this bridge never materialised. Rather, 
it was the leadership of Andrew Johnson that the National Union coalition placed its faith 
– faith that would soon become evident, was misplaced. 
Following the reconciliatory acclamations of the National Union Convention, 
Andrew Johnson sought to capitalise on what he perceived to be a widespread desire for 
a swift Reconstruction. Having been invited to Chicago to lay the cornerstone of a 
monument dedicated to the late Democratic senator Stephen Douglas, Johnson extended 
his visit to campaign in the fall elections. Despite the appeals of many Democrats to 
reconsider his decision to take part in the Douglas dedication due to the ‘bad passions of 
many disaffected’ towards the President’s administration, Johnson ignored the warnings 
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and left Washington for the Northeast.46 Johnson’s ‘Swing Around the Circle’ began with 
a resoundingly successful tour of New York. Throughout the state, crowds responded to 
the president’s reconciliatory speeches with rapturous applause. Combining strong 
Democratic support in New York City with moderate Republicans in upstate areas, New 
York was in the heartland of National Unionist support, and the success of his tour came 
as no surprise.47 As the President and his entourage composed of National Unionists 
James Doolittle, William Seward, and John A. Dix, entered the Midwest however, the 
tour took a turn for the worse. 
On September 3, Johnson delivered the same speech in Cleveland that he had 
given throughout New York. Instead of enthusiasm the president was met by heckles and 
remarks about the violence in New Orleans. 48  While outbursts by the crowd were 
insignificant, Johnson was dragged into a deeply damaging public debate. In a remarkable 
exchange over calls to ‘Hang Jeff Davis,’ Johnson replied ‘Hang Jeff. Davis? Hang Jeff. 
Davis? Why don’t you? ... I have heard the remark made in this crowd to-night, “Traitor! 
Traitor!” … I want to know when, where and under what circumstances Andrew Johnson, 
either as Chief Executive, or in any other capacity ever violated the Constitution of his 
country?’49 Johnson’s anger continued to grow. Unable to control himself, he proclaimed 
that:  
 
If I was disposed to play orator, and deal in declamation, here to-night, I 
would imitate one of the ancient tragedies we have such account of – I 
would take William H. Seward, and open to you the scars he has received. 
I would exhibit his bloody garments and show the rents caused by the 
assassin’s knife … Yes, I would unfold his bloody garments here to-night 
and ask who has committed treason? I would ask why Jeff. Davis was not 
hung? Why don’t you hang Thad. Stevens and Wendell Phillips?50 
 
Johnson had not only spoken in a way that was regarded as distinctly un-
presidential, but his attack on leading Radical Republicans highlighted both his 
Democratic background and his commitment to white supremacy. At the centre of 
Johnson’s Reconstruction were not loyal freedmen but treasonous whites: ‘there are many 
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white people in this country that need emancipation. Let the work of emancipation go on. 
Let white men stand erect and free.’51  Johnson’s racial prejudice was no surprise to 
Americans, but the animosity and indignity of the president’s actions severely 
undermined the fraternal and conciliatory spirit of National Unionism. The Tennessean’s 
outburst in Cleveland made him grossly unpopular with the Republicans, and with this 
dramatic loss in popularity, the National Union movement crumbled. 
As the fall elections approached, Democrats hoped to hijack National Unionism 
and use its emphasis on reconciliation and bipartisanship for their own gain. New York 
Democrats called for a Conservative Union state convention to be held in Albany to 
provide nominations for the state elections. Held on September 11 and 12, the convention 
was composed of nearly equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans, including 
Thurlow Weed and the Chairman of the National Union Convention, John A. Dix. Similar 
to the National Union Convention, matters of state policy were not put on the New York 
meeting’s agenda, and the construction of the platform was placed under the guidance of 
Democrats Samuel J. Tilden, Sanford E. Church, and Manton Marble.52 Under the guise 
of National Unionism, the New York Democracy fiercely advocated the nomination of 
Democrats to all major state offices, and despite the efforts of Republicans to secure the 
nomination of the more moderate former-War Democrat John A. Dix as governor, the 
Democratic majority secured the nomination of the straight-out Sanford E. Church.53 
While the National Union Convention in Philadelphia had been marked by apparently 
genuine bipartisan action, the Albany Convention showed Democrats’ enduring devotion 
to their party.54 On October 6, the New York Times disparaged the actions of New York 
Democrats, stating that ‘the whole spirit and purpose of the Philadelphia Convention was 
repudiated and condemned,’ and that delegates to the Albany Convention ‘deliberately 
sacrificed the principles of the [Philadelphia] Convention … [and] made every interest 
and every principle subordinate and secondary to the reorganization and reconstruction 
of the Democratic Party … in spite of their pretended adherence to the National Union 
movement.’55 
When the fall elections arrived, one thing had become clear: for most northern 
Democrats the perpetuation of their party was a superior cause to National Unionism. 
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Andrew Johnson’s catastrophic ‘Swing Around the Circle’ campaign brought the 
National Union Movement to a sudden and abrupt end. As conservative Republicans lost 
faith in the movement, Democratic strategists came to the fore and dictated National 
Union nominating conventions across the North. Despite the flexibility of Democrats, 
National Union-endorsed Democratic candidates fared poorly in the fall elections. The 
Republicans trounced the Democrats, increasing their majority in the House of 
Representatives from 97 to 126 and in the Senate from 28 to 46. John A. Dix, War 
Democrat and Chairman of the National Union Convention in Philadelphia, wrote to 
Andrew Johnson and blamed defeat in New York on the ‘selfishness and folly of the 
democratic managers.’56 With Andrew Johnson’s fall from grace, and the subsequent 
demolition of National Unionism, wartime antiparty rhetoric began to dissipate, partisan 
divisions solidified, and the accommodationist Democrats found their dominance in the 
party leadership under threat. 
 
The Emergence of the Straight-Out Democrats, 1867–1868 
 
Looking back at the 1866 elections, Democrats were conflicted over the future 
course of the party. While straight-out Democrats claimed that ‘the cause of the defeat of 
the Democratic party … is because it has not been true to the Democratic principle,’ 
accommodationists believed that further obstruction to Radical Reconstruction would 
spell disaster for reconciliation and that it would be ‘wiser not to stem an overwhelming 
current but rather to use it, and control it … for the welfare of the country.’57 James 
Gordon Bennett, editor of the New York Herald and supporter of the National Union 
strategy, adhered to the latter view. By accepting congressional Reconstruction, and with 
a Democratic Unionist at the head of the party, Bennett argued that the Democrats would 
stand a good chance of winning the presidency in 1868. For Bennett, the Democratic party 
stood at a crossroads, that if negotiated incorrectly, would see it ‘gone like the old whig 
party, never to rise again.’58  
The defeat of National Unionism diminished the influence of accommodationists 
in the Democracy’s national leadership, and legitimised the assertions of straight-out 
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Democrats who contended that only by remaining committed to the party’s founding 
principles could the Democracy end Radical rule. Democrats turned from the 
bipartisanship that had dominated the recent campaign, and embraced a racialised policy 
of restoration. The annual Democratic Almanac reflected this turn from 
accommodationism, and asserted that the ‘future task of the Democracy is to undo all the 
work of the negro party … It can restore State sovereignty and White supremacy. It can 
restore law to its powers over military despotism … In a word, it can restore the 
government to the free foundations from which it has been dragged by the Abolitionists.’59 
Over the following two years obstructionism would become the standard Democratic 
response to congressional politics. Advocates of obstructionism and accommodationism 
continued to battle over Reconstruction policy but by 1868, party unity was dependent on 
a shared commitment to the reestablishment of white supremacy in the South.  
After their widespread victories in 1866, the Republican majority believed that 
Johnson had no mandate to block congressional Reconstruction, and Democrats had little 
faith that the president would stand in the Radicals’ way. In a letter to Barlow, John 
Nugent wrote that ‘should the President stand absolutely in the way of the Radicals in 
hindering the accomplishment of any measure they should deem necessary to the 
perpetuation of their power, then they would certainly get rid of him. But at present the 
President is powerless … as long as this state of things continues, I don’t think they will 
seriously trouble Johnson.’60 Regardless of Johnson’s loss of popularity since September, 
Democrats still hoped that the president could stop what they viewed as a vengeful policy 
on the part of the Republicans. On January 4, 1867 Democratic Senator Reverdy Johnson 
of Maryland urged Congress to embrace a reconciliatory stance towards the South and 
lamented that the spirit of the Republicans showed that ‘generosity, forgiveness, mercy, 
pardon are no longer to be our policy.’61 He hoped that by appealing to a congressional 
desire to finalise Reconstruction the country could avoid a destabilising policy. Northern 
Democrats had frequently used symbolic gestures of reconciliation to argue that the South 
had accepted the military results of the war, and the Maryland senator was no exception. 
Johnson claimed that at a dinner he had attended, Robert E. Lee’s son had refused a toast 
to the fallen Confederacy. Instead, the young man had stood up and eagerly proclaimed, 
‘we now have but one flag, and that is the flag of the whole country, the glorious old Stars 
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and Stripes. I can recognize no other, fight for no other, and drink to no other.’ 62 
Democrats such as Johnson were acutely aware of the importance of reintegrating white 
southerners into the party and regain supremacy in the South, and hoped to promote this 
objective through a strategy that propagandized southern Unionism. 
The day after the Maryland senator’s impassioned speech, President Johnson 
vetoed the District of Columbia Franchise Law. Ignoring the advice of accommodationist 
Democrats, the president declared that the bill was an ‘arbitrary exercise of power’ that 
‘would engender a feeling of opposition and hatred between the two races, which … 
would prevent them from living together in a state of mutual friendliness.’63 While the 
bill was restricted to the capital, it would set a precedent for black suffrage throughout 
the nation. Johnson argued that bestowing the ballot upon a class of citizens ‘wholly 
unprepared by previous habits and opportunities to perform the trust which it demands’ 
would reduce the country to a state of ‘anarchy and despotism’ where the black vote 
would be controlled by the corrupt.64 For Johnson and the straight-out Democrats, the 
only way to ensure a lasting reunion was for them to take a stand against Republican 
Reconstruction in order to restore the faith of southern Democrats in the party’s ability to 
safeguard white supremacy. 
In February 1867 congressional Republicans embarked on a legislative 
programme that laid the foundations of an expansive reconstruction of southern politics 
and government. The Military Reconstruction bill proposed to divide the South into five 
districts, each under the control of a military governor. From the moment the bill hit the 
floors of the Senate and House of Representatives, Democrats scoffed at the measure, 
viewing it as a Republican attempt to place the South under a military despotism. They 
denounced it for showing no desire for restoration or harmony, and insisted that it 
originated from ‘the desire of gain, the desire of power, or the spirit of revenge.’65 Yet 
despite almost unanimous opposition to the bill, Democrats showed little unity over how 
their party should reassert its antebellum dominance. 
On February 15, Senator Thomas Hendricks of Indiana proposed an amendment 
to the Reconstruction bill. Focusing on the question of black male suffrage, Hendricks 
advocated removing the universal suffrage clause from the bill, and replacing it with an 
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impartial suffrage provision that would decrease the number of black voters.66 Not only 
did this proposition appeal to accommodationist Democrats who hoped that a flexible 
approach would enable the southern states to regain their congressional representation 
and Electoral College votes before 1868, but it also gained the support of conservative 
Republicans. 67  However, not all Democrats endorsed this course of action. Willard 
Saulsbury Sr. of Delaware declared that he was so ‘utterly opposed to this bill … that I 
cannot allow myself to vote for any of the proposed amendments to it … The passage of 
this bill … is in my judgment, as we heard this afternoon, the death-knell, not only of the 
Republic, but of civil and constitutional liberty in this country. I cannot touch it in any 
shape, form, or fashion, or have anything to do with trying to amend it.’68  
Despite the differing strategies of accommodation and obstruction, a desire for 
restoration and reconciliation underpinned the behaviour of all Democrats. Those who 
urged accommodation hoped that Reconstruction would be palatable both to southerners 
who sought a quick reintegration into the Union, and to northerners who demanded the 
South paid for their treason. That a desire for reconciliation dictated the actions of 
congressional Democrats was exemplified by Reverdy Johnson’s last minute decision to 
support the bill. Despite having been strongly opposed to the measure, Johnson belatedly 
declared his willingness to ‘acquiesce with the majority in anything that held out a hope, 
however faint, of accomplishing that object [restoration].’ 69  In this way, northern 
Democrats viewed themselves not simply as ‘defenders of the South’ during 
Reconstruction, but also as the true protectors of the Constitution and reunion.70 
When Congress voted to override Andrew Johnson’s veto of the Military 
Reconstruction Act on March 2, 1867, Sanford E. Church, a New York congressman, 
wrote to Samuel J. Tilden to express his concerns over Johnson’s leadership. He wrote 
that Johnson ‘now trembles for fear of impeachment, and will … give the radicals all the 
offices in hopes thereby to propitiate them and prevent impeachment. But they will 
impeach him … They know that he is cowardly and will not fight, and they will for that 
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reason go to the extreme.’71 As congressional Reconstruction was rolled out into the 
South, underlying factional struggles over party leadership began to bubble over. 
Believing that the capital-poor Midwest and South shared common interests on 
economic policies, George H. Pendleton saw an opportunity to push influential hard-
money advocates such as Belmont and Seymour out of the national leadership, and propel 
the emergent soft-money leaders, including himself, into these vacant positions. With 
failing harvests and a spiraling economy, the Midwest and South faced distinctly different 
problems from the industrial centres of the Northeast. To ease the pressure of rising 
transportation costs, Pendleton suggested that the government-issued wartime bonds 
should be repaid in greenbacks. In turn, the national banks could withhold $400 million 
of these bonds to accumulate interest that would be used to repay the federal debt over 
the following sixteen years. By also continuing high tax rates and decreasing federal 
spending, the resulting inflation could help to rebuild the southern economy.72 Eastern 
Democrats, however, believed the plan was anathema. For hard-money men such as 
Belmont, the federal government had a moral responsibility to repay wartime bonds in 
gold. These hard-money Democrats despised inflationary measures and campaigned 
vociferously for specie payments to be resumed as soon as possible. This sectional 
division between East and West over finance not only split the 1868 Democratic National 
Convention, but also remained a major influence on Democratic politics until the end of 
the century.73 With state elections looming the national party buried splits over financial 
issues and focused on the connected issues of white supremacism and reconciliation. 
By the summer of 1867, moderate and conservative Republicans had begun to 
clash with the Radical leadership over the growing centralising tendencies of the party, 
to which Democrats reacted by emphasising their Jacksonian commitment to limited 
federal government. In early 1867, moderate William Pitt Fessenden and Radical Charles 
Sumner squared off over the Military Reconstruction Act. Fessenden believed the 
Republican party should have been trying to admit the South through a policy that 
‘sustained the North’s wartime triumph without excluding the embittered ex-
Confederates.’74 Despite the senator’s eventual support of the bill, continuing factional 
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disputes among the Republicans over black suffrage and Reconstruction policy weakened 
the party and would have major political consequences by the end of the decade. 
Throughout the 1867 state campaigns, Democrats successfully appealed to white 
supremacy and opposition to centralisation in order to exploit the growing tensions within 
the Republican ranks and deliver much-needed electoral victories for the party. In Ohio, 
a referendum on African American suffrage rights was rejected by the people, and the 
Republicans were quick to blame the defeat on the Democracy’s ability to play upon the 
racial fears of the population.75 Confidence in the party’s racial strategy was further 
bolstered as reports of Democratic gains in Connecticut, Ohio, and Pennsylvania in 
October quickly spread to the delight of Democratic supporters who rejoiced that the 
results showed that ‘the People intend this to be a White Man’s Government.’76 In quick 
succession, Democratic victories were also declared in New York, New Jersey, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin, and were promptly hailed as evidence that the party’s appeal 
to racial fears would return the party to national power. In the South, the Democratic press 
exalted that the ‘conservative good sense of the Anglo Saxon … have at length come to 
the rescue,’ and that ‘the white race is to govern the American Union … It means that the 
recent elections of radicals and negroes in the South are a fraud and an outrage, and that 
the whole infamous farce will be set aside.’77 The results bolstered the ex-Confederates’ 
belief that 1868 would deliver the Democracy to power and bring an end to Republican 
rule. Straight-out Democrats hoped that their adoption of a less accommodating approach 
to Reconstruction following the disaster of National Unionism would restore the faith of 
white southerners in the party’s ability to protect their interests. Their obstructionism had 
built the foundations for the party’s reunion, but they needed a presidential candidate who 
could rally the support of the East, the West, and the South. 
To nominate a unifying candidate, Democrats would have to negotiate the tricky 
factional disputes that had split the party for eight years. Leading straight-out Democrats 
asserted that former-War Democrats ‘may divide … those who stood together in the years 
of trial and of trouble,’ but that the party ‘must [now] associate without reference to their 
position during the war’ and that ‘if we are to have harmony at all, the war and all 
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questions relating to it … must be absolutely ignored.’78 For the party to be successful in 
1868, straight-out Democrats believed that the party had to nominate someone who had 
stuck with the party throughout the crisis.79 Furthermore, Seymour was worried about the 
threat that came from Pendleton, who he believed was betraying the party’s Jacksonian 
heritage by campaigning for the continued circulation of paper money. In response, he 
organised a meeting of New York’s leading Democrats, including Sanford E. Church, 
William Tweed, and John T. Hoffman, that solidified the state party against Pendleton in 
an attempt to block the Ohioan’s bid for the presidency and to stop the national party from 
standing on a heretical soft-money platform.80 
Instead, eastern Democrats sought to make the restoration of the South to 
Congress and opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment the foundation of the party’s 1868 
bid for the presidency. Governor William Bigler of Pennsylvania wrote to Tilden in 
February 1868 suggesting that Seymour stood a good chance of the presidential 
nomination, but the party had to avoid economic issues. Bigler was not alone in his fear 
that Pendleton had ‘started an issue on which we cannot unite … [and] cannot be made a 
leading issue.’81 Other northeastern Democrats agreed with the governor, and regarded 
the currency question as a ‘sharp double edged affair’ that threatened party unity and 
undermined their ability to oppose ‘ultra radicalism.’82 Rather, Bigler contended that 
‘[t]he restoration of the ten absent States to the Union, with the rights and privileges of 
the other States, and with their local governments in the hands of their white population, 
must be the absorbing question. All else must be subordinate and secondary.’83 Tilden felt 
similarly. He believed that the restoration of white supremacy was the key issue in the 
coming election and that ‘[o]n no other question can we [the Democratic party] be so 
unanimous,’ and that the party’s position ‘must be condemnation and reversal of negro 
supremacy.’84 Rather than drag the party into a factional dispute over hard and soft money, 
Tilden advocated ‘a general attack on the prodigality and corruption of the present 
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governing power’ that could help the Democrats regain the respectability they had lost 
through the Civil War.85 
By March 1868, the Democracy stood in a precarious position. Despite the party’s 
gains in state-level elections in 1867, translating these into national victories was a much 
more difficult prospect. Tilden and Seymour hoped that New York Democrats would take 
the lead in opposing soft-money Pendletonians, but fellow New Yorker Francis Kernan 
urged the state convention to not ‘lay down anything like a platform of principles; leave 
this to the national convention.’86 Kernan’s strategy to delay the announcement of the 
New York Democracy’s policies showed the perilous state of the party and the growing 
rifts between eastern hard-money men and midwestern soft-money advocates. What the 
party could agree on, however, was that Republican misrule had plunged the country into 
a crisis where constitutional liberty and the peace and prosperity of the nation were being 
subverted to ensure black civil and political rights.  
 
The Election of 1868 
 
Having lost faith in the ability of Andrew Johnson to unite the party and deliver it 
to power in 1868, Democrats nonetheless supported the president against Republicans 
who were becoming angered by his obstructionist stance towards Reconstruction. 
Republican opposition to Johnson had been steadily growing since 1866 and after he 
suspended Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in the summer of 1867 and attempted to 
bypass the Command of the Army Act, Congress initiated impeachment proceedings.87 
Johnson, however, adhering to his Democratic beliefs in state power and white 
supremacy, despised what he saw as a despotic attempt to enforce black equality on the 
people of the South. Impeachment proceedings however brought to an abrupt end any 
distant hope the president had of re-election in November. Out of the impeachment crisis, 
however, rose an unlikely candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination. Chief 
Justice Salmon P. Chase, a Republican who had campaigned vociferously for freedmen’s 
rights his whole career, had been instrumental in President Johnson’s acquittal. Hopeful 
that Chase could lure Republicans who had stood against impeachment, 
accommodationist Democrats believed that the Chief Justice’s support of black political 
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equality would blunt Republican attacks on their party. By adopting a plank in the 
Democratic platform that gave the states power on the black suffrage question, moderate 
Democrats hoped to attract Chase to the party.88  
Numerous prominent Democrats, from both straight-out and accommodationist 
factions, backed Chase’s bid for the nomination, and with Seymour publicly vowing that 
he would not accept the party’s nomination, Chase appeared to be a viable option. In May, 
Hiram Barney, a lawyer and Democrat from New York, wrote to the Chief Justice that 
neither the midwestern soft-money Democrats nor eastern hard-money Democrats ‘would 
submit to a candidate from the other,’ and that a Chase nomination would make the 
Democratic ticket more attractive to Republican supporters.89 Gerrit Smith, a prominent 
former abolitionist who had become a prominent supporter of sectional reconciliation and 
had helped Horace Greeley to put up the bail for Jefferson Davis’s release from Fortress 
Monroe, wrote on June 12 that he would ‘rejoice to see the Chief Justice in the Presidency 
… if contrary to my expectations, the Democrats shall have the wisdom to nominate the 
Chief Justice. I shall prefer to vote for the Democratic Candidates.’ 90  Like other 
northerners, Smith clamoured for a speedy end to Reconstruction and blamed continued 
sectional conflict on partisan politics and argued that in their eagerness to keep the 
Democrats out of power, the Republicans had lost sight of the true aim of 
Reconstruction. 91  More surprisingly, however, former Confederate General John B. 
Gordon backed Chase. While Gordon believed that the Chief Justice was ‘not by any 
means the favorite of our people … The South can’t afford to go into the contest, with the 
sole object of saving honor. We must get rid of military Gov’t, without bringing upon us 
a worse one.’92 The former general’s willingness to acquiescence in the choice of the 
northern Democracy was an accurate reflection of the state of the party. Both southern 
and northern Democrats had come to terms with the shift of power in the party, and the 
national leadership expected southern whites to fall in line behind whatever candidate 
they chose.93  
On an ‘intensely hot’ July Saturday in New York, Tammany Hall was packed full 
of spectators eager to find out who would face General Ulysses S. Grant in November. A 
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large crowd stood outside trying to gain admittance to the convention and the city police 
guarded the doors to keep order in the street. At twelve minutes past noon, August 
Belmont called the convention to order and said  
 
the American people will no longer remain deaf to the teachings of the 
past. They will remember that it was under successive democratic 
administrations … that our country rose to a prosperity and greatness 
unsurpassed in the annals of history … they will not calmly stand by to see 
their liberties subverted, the greatness of their country undermined, and 
institutions bequeathed to them by the fathers of the republic wrested 
before them. They must see that conservative and national principles of 
liberal progressive democracy are the only safeguards of the republic.94  
 
Democrats hoped that the Committee on Resolutions led by Manton Marble could 
compose a platform that would appease both accommodationists and straight-outs. While 
the platform accepted that ‘the questions of slavery and secession’ had been answered 
and appealed to all conservatives ‘to whatever party they may have heretofore belonged’ 
to help end Radicalism, it also demanded the ‘immediate restoration of all the States to 
their rights in the Union,’ a thorough reform of the administration, universal amnesty, 
state control of suffrage laws, and ‘the abolition of … all political instrumentalities 
designed to secure negro supremacy.’ 95  The platform reflected how straight-out 
Democrats had stolen the initiative from accommodationists after the 1867 victories and 
made overthrowing the Radicals and reinstating white men’s government the cornerstone 
of the Democracy.96  
With the victory of the straight-out Democrats in establishing the party’s platform, 
attention turned to the presidential nomination. While the hard-money men had managed 
to keep Pendleton’s Ohio Plan out of the platform, stopping his nomination proved a more 
difficult task. Democrats had speculated over the party’s candidate for nearly a year by 
the time the convention arrived, and the party seemed no closer to uniting behind a 
candidate in 1868. While many accommodationists favoured Chase, straight-out 
Democrats scorned the idea as ‘not only … a crime, but a blunder that would ensure the 
election of Grant.’ Conversely, soft-money midwesterners urged hard-money 
																																								 																				
94 Baltimore Sun, July 6, 1868. 
95 Schlesinger (ed.), History of American Presidential Elections, Vol. III, p. 1272. 
96 Silbey, A Respectable Minority, pp. 206–7. 
60	
	
northeasterners to ‘yield [their] prejudices’ and accept Pendleton, while a minority of 
delegates even advocated the nomination of George McClellan.97 
Bolstered by his solid support among midwestern delegates, Pendleton emerged 
as the frontrunner during the early ballots as northeastern Democrats fractured. New York 
delegates supported Sanford E. Church, the Pennsylvania delegation chose Asa Packer, 
while General Winfield Scott Hancock, James Doolittle, and James E. English received 
some disparate support.98 As the convention progressed, however, the party split between 
Pendleton, Thomas A. Hendricks, and General Hancock, with none able to garner the 
two-thirds required for the nomination. Following the eighteenth ballot, Pendleton finally 
threw in the towel, leaving it a two horse race between Hendricks and Hancock. Still the 
party could not reach a decision. During the twenty-second ballot, General Alexander 
McDowell McCook of Ohio rose and called for the nomination of Horatio Seymour, ‘a 
man whom the Presidency has sought, but a man who has not sought the Presidency … I 
believe it is the solution which will drive from power the Vandals who now possess the 
Capitol of the nation.’99 Seymour rose in response, thanked the Ohioan for his kindness, 
but replied saying ‘I could not receive the nomination without placing, not only myself, 
but the great Democratic party, in a false position.’100 Following Seymour’s refusal, 
Clement Vallandigham rose and passionately announced that ‘in times of great public 
exigency, and especially in times of great public calamity, every personal consideration 
must be yielded to the public good … Ohio will not accept his declination, and her twenty-
one votes still stand recorded in his name.’101  
One after the other, all state delegations rose and changed their vote to Seymour. 
In a dramatic turn of events, the New Yorker received the unanimous consent of all 
Democrats. He was joined by Missourian and former general Francis P. Blair, Jr., a 
wartime conservative Republican who had gained notoriety for suggesting that the only 
way to restore constitutional government was to void the Reconstruction acts, remove the 
military presence from the South, and ‘disperse the carpetbag Southern governments, and 
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allow the white people to reorganize their own governments.’102 The 1868 Democratic 
convention clearly showed that the party had shifted from the pragmatic 
accommodationism that had directed efforts to align the party with National Unionism in 
1866. The party’s hard stance on questions about black citizenship and voting rights made 
the restoration of white supremacy central to its electoral strategy, and this was bolstered 
by attacking the supposed corruption and military despotism of the Republicans. Heading 
into the 1868 contest, the Democratic message was a clear one: white man’s government 
and constitutional government. 
In late August at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, Union General William 
S. Rosecrans met with Robert E. Lee to discuss southern restoration. Former leading 
Confederates, including Alexander Stephens and P. G. T. Beauregard, accompanied the 
two generals who wanted to convince northerners that the South was ready to return to 
Congress and to end Reconstruction. Rosecrans, a plain-spoken Democrat from Ohio with 
a disdain of Grant, wrote to Lee that ‘We know that the interests of the people of the 
South are for law and order ... I believe … that if the people of the Southern States could 
be at peace, and their energy and good will heartily applied to repair the wastes of war … 
they would soon … establish public confidence in our political stability … and assure for 
themselves and the whole Nation a most happy and prosperous future.’103 Rosecrans 
hoped that the former leaders of the Confederacy would be restored to positions in the 
South’s political elite, from where they could ‘employ, protect, educate, and elevate the 
poor freedmen.’104 The Union general asked Lee to respond by expressing the views of 
leading men of the South on the proposition he made. Rather, Lee wrote that ‘The great 
want of the South is peace. The people earnestly desire tranquility, and the restoration of 
the Union … They desire relief from oppressive rule. Above all they would appeal to their 
countrymen for the reestablishment in the Southern States of that which has justly been 
regarded as the birthright of every American – the right of self-government.’105 
The meeting of two high-profile Democrats, one northern and one southern, 
exemplified the Democratic focus on reconciliation during the 1868 canvass. Hoping to 
induce a groundswell of popular calls for the immediate restoration of the South to 
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Congress, the White Sulphur meeting was hailed throughout the North by the Democratic 
press, but derided by Republicans. Wary of the true purpose of the meeting, the 
Massachusetts Spy wrote that ‘there is mischief in this gathering’ and that those present 
would ‘undoubtedly discuss treason.’106 Gerrit Smith wrote to Lee in September with a 
sense of regret that two men who he had held in high regard both advocated a return to a 
racially oppressive society.107 Similarly, the New York Tribune attacked Rosecrans for 
having ‘no hesitation in saying that the negroes should not vote’ and that the so-called 
White Sulphur Manifesto was an ‘anti-negro, Copperhead production, intended to bolster 
up Seymour and Blair, defeat Grant, and float the ex-Rebels of the North and the South 
into power.’108 The meeting reverberated with Democrats, but its desire for a restoration 
of ex-Confederates to leading political positions undermined the message of 
reconciliation. In the lead up to the presidential election this spectacle swelled support for 
the Democracy in its traditional base, but made the party appear dangerously 
unresponsive to the altered political and social realities wrought by the Civil War. 
The campaign run by the Democracy in 1868 was one of the most overtly racist 
in American history. As the Democratic press lambasted the Republicans for seeking to 
impose ‘negro supremacy,’ horrific racial violence tore through the South. Coinciding 
with the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan in Tennessee, violent white supremacist groups 
formed throughout the ex-Confederate States, all with the intention of murdering African 
Americans and their white allies who supported black equality. Organisations such as the 
Knights of the White Camelia of Louisiana targeted Republicans, black and white, forced 
freedmen to vote the Democratic ticket, and brutally attacked African American women 
throughout the South.109 The violent actions of southern whites dramatically reduced the 
chances of Democratic victory in November. Reports of southern violence saturated the 
northern Republican press, giving the lie to Democratic assurances that southerners had 
accepted the military results of the war. Republicans chastised the ‘Ku-Klux Democracy’ 
whose ‘mission is to secure Democratic victory by the murder of Union men,’ and insisted 
that the failure to impeach Johnson had ‘encouraged them [Democratic terrorists] to come 
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out boldly and murder Union men in open daylight!’110 The Republican press further 
sought to link all northern violence with the Ku Klux Klan, casting such attacks as 
evidence of the Democracy’s and Seymour’s treason.111 The claims of the Democracy that 
the South held no resentment over the outcome of the war and the end of slavery paled 
before the racial violence that beset southern freedmen. Peace and reconciliation to many 
northerners seemed a distant dream. 
Utilising ‘Bloody Shirt’ rhetoric, the Republican press successfully characterised 
the Democratic campaign as a desperate attempt to return to antebellum race relations and 
reinstate as leaders the men who had torn the Union apart.112 Accompanied by the overt 
racism that vice presidential candidate Frank Blair espoused on the campaign trail, the 
Democratic reconciliatory focus was blurred, and by mid-October many Democrats had 
lost faith in the ability of the Seymour-Blair ticket to deliver victory. As the campaign 
stalled, Marble of the New York World wrote that mistakes had been made in the adoption 
of the party platform and that the party should replace Seymour.113  Yet the editor’s 
suggestion to change candidates did not receive unanimous support from all party 
members, who believed ‘changing the candidates will only make defeat more certain and 
more terrible,’ and that ‘if we back down our candidates, or withdraw of their own accord, 
our party is utterly ruined.’114 The call for Seymour’s replacement never materialised, but 
the cataclysmic decline of the Democratic campaign highlighted the weakness of the party 
in the early years of Reconstruction. Despite its ability to survive and unify behind a 
desire for reconciliation, the resilience of Civil War memories in the northern public mind 
had a debilitating impact upon the Democracy’s strength at the national level. Victories 
in the state elections of 1867 showed the party could compete locally, but when the nation 
was called to choose a new leader, the Democracy’s tainted past held it back. Republican 
bloody shirt rhetoric was a strong tool: memories of Democratic wartime treason and the 
Confederacy’s strong Democratic links made party recovery a long way off. Despite this, 
the Seymour-Blair ticket ran surprisingly well, accumulating 45% of the popular vote and 
																																								 																				
110 Dauphine, ‘The Knights of the White Camelia,’ p. 174; Cincinnati Daily Gazette, July 13, 1868; Troy 
Weekly Times (NY), July 11, 1868; J. W. Sumner to C. P. Kirkland, July 24, 1868, Horace Greeley Papers, 
LOC. 
111 New York Tribune, August 19, 1868. 
112 See, New York Tribune, August 4, 1868; New York Tribune, August 20, 1868. 
113 C. W. M. to Marble, Oct. 14, 1868, Marble Papers, LOC; James F. Noble to Marble, Oct. 16, 1868, 
Marble Papers, LOC; New York World October 15, 1868; New York Times, October 16, 1868. 
114 Brinton Cox to Marble, Oct. 16, 1868, Marble Papers, LOC; Edward Hamilton to Marble, Oct. 16, 1868, 
Marble Papers, LOC; Charles J. Rogers, Oct. 17, 1868, Marble Papers, LOC. 
64	
	
improving on the party’s showing in 1864.115  The Democratic party had taken steps 
towards recovery, but this was only the start of a long, and arduous journey back to 
national ascendancy.
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Chapter Three 
 
 ‘A Remarkable Sacrifice of Prejudice’?: The New Departure and the Failure of 
Liberal Republicanism, 1868–1872 
 
 
 In mid-December 1868, a little over a month after Ulysses S. Grant was elected 
president, the Democratic Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, John B. Baldwin 
wrote to his friend and regular correspondent, former Confederate general Jubal A. Early, 
that he had felt ‘badly cheated by the Northern Democrats.’1 Baldwin had supported the 
Constitutional Union party in 1860, and despite his displeasure with the Democracy’s 
campaign in 1868, he did not ‘believe in third parties, or conservative parties, or built 
parties … [but] I am disposed to hold on to the Democracy now that I have joined them.’2 
While leading Democrats such as Samuel J. Tilden and Augustus Schell believed that the 
course the party had taken in 1868 had ‘vindicated its principles, preserved its honor and 
won the respect and confidence of the people of the United States,’ the manner of 
Seymour’s defeat posed challenges to the party leadership.3   
If Grant’s election demonstrated the Democracy’s need to legitimise itself in the 
eyes of northern voters, the party’s response to defeat took a variety of forms that 
nonetheless followed distinct patterns of behaviour established in the Johnson years. All 
northern Democrats agreed firstly, that, due to the strength of the Republicans in reviving 
the loyalty issue, they could not be successful if Reconstruction and freedmen’s rights 
continued to dominate political debate. Secondly, they agreed that the ‘living’ issues of 
amnesty, civil service reform, and economics were crucial to the party’s resurgence. 
Nationally, however, Democrats remained deeply divided over how the party should end 
Reconstruction. Attitudes towards developing a national strategy to combat Radical 
Republicanism did not follow sectional lines, but rather reflected individuals’ willingness 
to sacrifice party principle for political expediency. In this context, the emergence of the 
Liberal Republicans highlighted the underlying conservatism of the middle ground of 
American politics in the late 1860s. Scholars have, however, sidelined Democrats in 
favour of exploring Republican factional conflict and the waning of Radical 
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Reconstruction.4 Of the historians who have assessed the reasons Democrats joined with 
the Liberal Republicans, most have asserted that while desires for sectional reconciliation 
and a shared hatred of Grantism pushed some northern Democrats to support Horace 
Greeley in 1872, the vast majority of Democrats were unwilling to vote for the well-
known antislavery editor. 5  The significance of the Liberal Republican years to the 
Democracy’s resurrection, however, has been either undervalued or overstated. 6 
Lingering doubts among conservative Republicans and former War Democrats about the 
future composition of the American party system continued to shake public confidence 
in the Democracy, and pushed the party into its coalition with the Liberal Republicans. 
Paradoxically, it was the strength of partisan identity and memories of past party conflict 
severely undermined the potential success of the Democrats’ fusion strategy. While the 
outcome of the 1868 election placed accommodationist Democrats in a strong position to 
succeed in creating a bipartisan alliance, 1872 would mark the beginning of the 
Democracy’s move away from accommodation as a political strategy and towards a 
reconfiguration of the party to fit the realities of post-war America. 
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The New Departure 
 
Following Grant’s landslide victory, few knew what stance the Union commander 
would take on Reconstruction. On January 7, 1869, James Gordon Bennett voiced the 
concerns of Republicans and Democrats alike when he wrote in his New York Herald that 
Grant ‘gives no opinions and answers no questions concerning his Cabinet or his policy 
… His resistance excites suspicion, and his political antecedents are conservative.’7 The 
incoming president’s campaign message of ‘Let Us Have Peace’ in fact led many 
Democrats to believe that Grant’s administration would not be radical, but would usher 
in a ‘real and true conservative era.’8 Democratic and proto-Conservative newspapers 
hoped the new administration would usher in a ‘New Departure’ for the nation.9 But rather 
than being the conservative that Democrats hoped he would be, Grant strictly upheld the 
southern Republican governments and proved to be a perennial thorn in the side of the 
party.  
Armed with the knowledge that the incoming Fortieth Congress would bring a 
greater proportion of Democrats to the House of Representatives, the Republican majority 
introduced a new constitutional amendment to secure black voting rights.10 Republicans 
viewed African American suffrage as the final step of Reconstruction; they expected 
enfranchised blacks to protect their own civil liberties without needing further federal 
military intervention. For the Democrats however, federal control of suffrage rights 
subverted the Constitution. In the Senate on February 6, 1869, the former Republican 
James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin condemned the amendment as a dangerous attack on the 
nation’s federal system.11 He argued that congressional Republicans’ attempts to dictate 
voter qualification made the amendment ‘a proposition not to amend, but to revolutionize. 
It is not in the way of improving and upholding, but in the way of upturning the 
foundations of the system, and of destroying the very spirit which gives it life.’12 James 
A. Bayard resolutely supported Doolittle’s attack on the Republicans’ proposal. If 
adopted, he said the amendment ‘subverts the system of government organized by our 
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ancestors, and converts a confederated Republic into an elective despotism.’13 In doing 
so, Bayard suggested that the proposed amendment threatened electoral meltdown by 
conferring the vote on an ‘inferior race’: 
 
It will be a dangerous experiment to make upon the patience of the country 
through an amendment to the Federal Constitution which abrogates the 
constitutions of at least ten States of the Union against the Consent of their 
people by the faithless betrayal of trust by their representatives. Though 
this great wrong may be perpetrated those faithless representatives both 
here and in the State Legislatures may yet find that it is the last drop in the 
cup which will cause the waters of bitterness to overflow.14 
 
Echoing the sentiments of congressional Democrats, the Democratic press denounced the 
amendment as an attempt to ‘revolutionize the government’ and to ‘place the white people 
under the domination of persons of color’ – one that would succeed only in agitating the 
South further and prevent ‘co-operation between the two races which is so essential to the 
success of industrial enterprises in the Southern States.’15 The majority of southerners 
believed suffrage should only be granted to freedmen if it was accompanied by universal 
amnesty and the re-enfranchisement of ex-Confederates. Yet, when the amendment made 
no mention of amnesty or re-enfranchisement, they were outraged that ‘no effort is made 
to repeal the obnoxious laws which deny the right of suffrage to thousands of the best 
men in the country,’ and that ‘the enfranchisement of the white man is to be a subject for 
future consideration, to be granted only in case it shall not interfere with Radical and 
negro supremacy.’16  
Despite southerners’ anger at the amendment, the response of northern Democrats 
to the measure failed to bolster the faith of white southerners in the party. Southern 
Democratic newspapers continued to remind their readers that many northern Democrats 
during the war had ‘sustained and cheered on the ruin [of the South] … applauded the 
illogical and unprincipled course of the radical party [and] could not see that a war of 
coercion waged against free States was a breach of the Constitution.’17 Furthermore, the 
southern press argued that northern voters had shown no willingness to reach across the 
bloody chasm the previous November, when ‘They had it in their power … by the 
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peaceful instrumentality of the ballot, to place the safety of the nation in the hands of 
those, who, whatever may have otherwise tarnished the reputation of the Democratic 
party, had always respected the Constitution.’18 
Despite the relative success of the unifying message of white supremacy in the 
1868 canvass, Democrats across the nation were disappointed with the party’s showing 
in the election. The straight-out Democrats who had taken control of the party following 
the downfall of National Unionism in 1866, had been instrumental in directing the 1868 
campaign, yet their failure to devise a successful national strategy provided the 
accommodationists with another opportunity. It was, however, at the state level that 
moves towards a new Democratic strategy were first made. At the Connecticut 
Democratic State Convention in January 1869, incumbent governor James E. English was 
renominated at the head of the state ticket on a platform that marked the state party’s 
break from past strategy. While not a typical accommodationist platform that sought to 
create a bipartisan coalition, the Connecticut platform called for the acceptance of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments as the final basis of Reconstruction.19 In the 
aftermath of the 1868 defeats, Connecticut Democrats saw little benefit in pursuing a 
policy that continued to oppose Reconstruction. Rather, they acquiesced in the 
Reconstruction settlement in the hope that their party could end military involvement in 
the South. 
Shortly after the announcement of the Connecticut platform, Virginia Democrats 
put forward their vision of a New Departure. Since 1865, Democrats in the Old Dominion 
had managed to avoid the Republican governments typical of the former Confederate 
states by unifying the conservative elements of the state in bipartisan alliances. In doing 
so, Virginia had a unique experience of Reconstruction. The strength of the antebellum 
Whigs there became immediately apparent between 1865 and 1867, and the success of 
Democrats in working with conservative Republicans and former Whigs demonstrated 
the viability of the fusionist strategy.20 On February 12, 1869, however, the Richmond 
Whig and Advertiser advocated a new direction for state politics, claiming that ‘We have 
tried to mend our condition by opposing negro suffrage, by braving Congress, by trying 
to re-establish and reinstate the Federal Constitution, as it stood before the war, by raising 
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up a native white party to array itself against all other parties … What have we gained by 
all this?’ The editorial concluded that  ‘We have spent four years in beating the air, and it 
is time that our talents and energies were turned upon other and more useful objects.’21 
The Whig was an advocate of the recently inaugurated ‘New Movement’ in 
Virginia, a coalition of Republicans, ex-Whigs, and Democrats that was firmly in line 
with the partisan flexibility that characterised the early Reconstruction years. Virginia 
Democrats such as ex-Confederate general William T. Mahone, George W. Bolling, and 
J. F. Slaughter viewed the New Movement as an opportunity to seize the middle ground 
of Virginia politics and avoid ‘negro rule on one side or military rule on the other’ by 
maligning conservative Democrats and Radicals in the state.22 Democratic advocates of 
the New Movement tended to hold interests in the industrial economy of Virginia, most 
commonly through railroads; Mahone himself was the president of the Atlantic, 
Mississippi, and Ohio Railroad, and believed that disenchanted Democrats could exploit 
Republican factionalism to shed the state of radicalism.23  
In early 1869, however, the New Movement only consisted of a small cadre of 
individuals who had little hope of defeating the incumbent Governor Wells. Factional 
conflicts within the Virginia Democracy split the state’s white vote between the 
accommodationists’ candidate, the conservative Republican Gilbert C. Walker, and the 
straight-out nominee, former Confederate Colonel Robert E. Withers. With both Withers 
and Walker in the race, the New Movement had little hope of piecing together a majority 
among the electorate. Mahone believed that there was a good chance of defeating the 
Republican Wells if the straight-out ticket was removed from the race, and held the 
potential to negotiate an alliance. Due to his Democratic antecedents, Mahone held 
influence within the party as a friend of the chairman of the Democratic State Committee, 
Robert Ould. Moreover, during his time as president of the Atlantic, Mississippi, and 
Ohio Railroad, Mahone had become friends with many of the state’s leading conservative 
Republicans. In April 1869, he discussed the idea of removing the Withers ticket from 
the race. By the end of the month Ould and the state committee had acquiesced, despite 
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the opposition of conservative Democrats. With Withers out of the race, the fusionist New 
Movement carried the gubernatorial race in July and elected Walker.24 
As 1869 progressed, the fusionist strategy employed by Virginia Conservatives 
spread through Mississippi, Texas, and Tennessee. In each of these southern states, 
fusionist Democrats created alliances with moderate and conservative Republicans to 
elect generally conservative Republican candidates to end Radicalism.25 Inspired by the 
actions of Mahone and his innovative Democratic allies in Virginia, Ohio Democrats 
embarked on their own New Departure, albeit not through bipartisan alliances. Entering 
election season in 1869, the Ohio Democracy sought to shed the burden of disloyalty and 
simultaneously promote the sectional reconciliation for which so many northerners 
yearned. In July the party nominated ex-Union general William S. Rosecrans for 
governor. While Rosecrans did not carry the same gravitas as a Grant or a Hancock, he 
nevertheless fulfilled the criterion of loyalty having handed Clement Vallandigham over 
to the Confederacy for exile and had worked tirelessly for sectional reconciliation since 
Appomattox.26  Rosecrans proved to be an astute nomination. The New York Herald 
proclaimed ‘a great step forward by the Ohio Democracy,’ ‘a stroke so bold as to be 
startling,’ and a ‘remarkable sacrifice of prejudice. Democrats hoped his nomination 
would provide ‘a bridge on which tens of thousands of Ohio citizens can easily pass over 
into the Democratic party.’27 As momentum gathered for the New Departure it appeared 
that the Democracy had stumbled upon a viable electoral strategy. 
Hoping that the Pennsylvania Democracy would follow Ohio’s lead by adopting 
New Departure politics, the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune appealed to Democrats of 
the Keystone State to ‘display equal flexibility and wisdom’ by ‘taking advantage of the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the new administration which prevails among the 
Pennsylvania Republicans.’ 28  Against the will of the growing influence of the New 
Departure Democrats, however, the Pennsylvania Democracy adopted a platform that 
‘might have been accepted by the Party before a gun had been fired by Southern 
Confederates.’29 Democratic hopes were further dampened when Rosecrans declined the 
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nomination for governor of Ohio. While the general was in agreement with the principles 
of the Ohio platform, Rosecrans could not ‘in justice to his creditors’ afford the canvass, 
and nor was he a resident of the state since he had moved to California.30 Instead of finding 
a similar replacement, however, Ohio Democrats replaced the general with George 
Pendleton. In doing so, the Ohio Democracy made it clear that their ‘new departure’ was 
purely rhetorical and fundamentally different from the attempts of accommodationists to 
create bipartisan alliances. In this context, the New Departure took two forms: firstly, 
through the guidance of accommodationists, it sought to create genuine working 
relationships with conservative Republicans to overturn Reconstruction; secondly, under 
the rhetorical guise of the New Departure, straight-out Democrats nominated symbolic 
candidates to stand on Democratic platforms that avoided the issue of race. The 
transitional state of national politics in the late 1860s afforded the Democracy an 
opportunity to push politics in a new direction away from Reconstruction and towards 
economic issues and civil service reform. Yet the refusal of many Democratic leaders to 
accept universal manhood suffrage and civil equality for African Americans contributed 
significantly to the party’s lengthy stay in political limbo. The nomination of candidates 
such as Pendleton not only demonstrated the party’s inability to move forward, but also 
helped Republicans by reviving ‘the political issues of the past ten years.’31  
 
Political Violence and African American Suffrage, 1870–1871 
 
To complicate matters for New Departure Democrats who insisted the party had 
accepted the results of the war, the violent actions of southern whites contradicted such 
claims. Southern white terrorism was characterised by its distinctive targeting of 
freedmen and white Republicans who sought to prop up Reconstruction governments in 
the South. While Klan-like groups had no official ties to the Democracy, their victims 
held a distinct political loyalty. Remembering the violence that terrorized Rutherfordton, 
North Carolina, J. B. Carpenter, the clerk of the superior county court and newspaper 
editor, remarked that in a county where the Republicans held two to three hundred 
majority, every instance of reported violence was perpetrated ‘because they [the victims] 
were republicans, and they must quit voting the republican ticket.’32 The widespread 
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disenfranchisement of former Confederates was a point of deep frustration for southern 
whites. They regarded federal control of suffrage laws both as an affront to the 
constitutional rights of the states, and an example of Republican partisan manipulation. 
In the face of humiliating black and Yankee rule, southern whites turned to extra-legal 
violence to redeem their section by restoring their dominance over the recently 
emancipated slaves.33   
While southern violence clashed with the professions of New Departure 
Democrats that the party had turned over a new leaf, lack of faith in the national 
Democracy and growing dissatisfaction among moderate and conservative Republicans 
with Grantism, had created an environment in which belief in genuine party realignment 
was widespread. Yet despite the growing influence of the accommodationists, many 
Democrats still retained their strict constructionist sentiments and opposed suggestions 
that the federal government had the authority to legislate on suffrage rights. If the 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment was not bad enough for Democrats, federal 
intervention in the South continued as the Republican Congress passed three 
‘Enforcement Acts’ throughout 1870 and 1871 to subdue southern racial violence.34 The 
passage of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Acts only added to the 
Democrats’ conviction that the Republic was in danger of being overthrown by power-
hungry Republicans in Washington.  
Pennsylvanian Richard Vaux expressed his views on the political situation to John 
White Stevenson soon after the passage of the Enforcement Acts. Clearly angered by the 
acquiescence of accommodationist Democrats, Vaux deplored the attempts to reorganise 
the party and was particularly angered by how ‘some weak kneed filles talked about the 
“Colored Vote.” I never will agree to take it, never … Military despotism and 
congressional usurpation, and the frauds used to pass their so called amendment can never 
be accepted by the Democracy – never!’35 
But while straight-out Democrats such as Richard Vaux remained staunchly 
opposed to black suffrage, others were increasingly convinced that the party had to accept 
the Fifteenth Amendment and its consequences to ensure the Democracy’s return to 
power. In June, Montgomery Blair, a recent convert to the party, wrote to his friend and 
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regular correspondent, William Lockhart, on the issue of freedmen’s suffrage. Blair noted 
that the freedmen’s ‘vote in our elections is decreed by a power we cannot resist and it 
must tell in political results for good or for evil.’36 While Blair believed that ‘[t]he African 
race will never attain equality … because this is our natural clime, and that superiority is 
confirmed by possessions and by immemorial inheritances of civilization, of systems of 
government and of education,’ he also recognised that a ‘refusal on our part to acquiesce, 
is precisely what the opponents of free government desire. It will produce a Union of the 
freed race with the minority of the white race, enabling that minority to govern the whole 
country and … this will prove fatal to the South and to the Constitution.’37 Although Blair 
considered African Americans to be racially inferior, he believed the Democracy had to 
try to harness their votes for political advantage. If they could not, Republican despotism 
was sure to continue to subordinate southern whites.  
The conflict within the Democratic ranks over the issue of African American 
suffrage highlighted the fractured nature of the party and the divergence of opinion on the 
party’s future. While Democrats retained a distinctly white supremacist ideology 
throughout Reconstruction, the party demonstrated an attitude towards race that was more 
variegated than historians have previously suggested. 38  Racism was undoubtedly an 
important ideological glue that held the party together in the postwar years, but the 
difference of opinion highlighted by Blair and Vaux was typical of Democratic 
divergence over the future of the freedmen in the nation. 
 
The Missouri Plan and the Emergence of the Liberal Republicans, 1869–1871 
 
Throughout Reconstruction, the ‘convergence’ of conservative Republicans and 
accommodationist Democrats had presented a number of opportunities for bipartisan 
action, but the reluctance of both factions to set aside their partisan identities was an ever-
present barrier to such coalitions. By 1870 growing opposition to Grant’s administration 
within the Republican ranks had led to the emergence of a dissident faction of ‘Liberal’ 
Republicans. Angered by the president’s reluctance to advocate universal amnesty and 
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restore suffrage rights to the former Confederates, the Liberal Republicans had grown 
particularly tired of a Republican administration that appeared increasingly corrupt.39 
As Secretary of the Treasury George S. Boutwell sold government holdings in 
gold to reduce the American debt over the summer of 1869, two New Yorkers, Jay Gould 
and James Fisk, set about a scheme to corner the gold market. With the help of Grant’s 
brother-in-law, Abel Corbin, Gould manipulated Grant into appointing Daniel Butterfield 
as Assistant Treasurer. Butterfield subsequently provided the speculators with 
information and influence over the price of gold. With the price of gold skyrocketing as 
Gould and Fisk cornered the market, Grant ordered Boutwell to sell gold holdings in 
September and burst the monopoly. 40  While Grant was cleared of any wrongdoing, 
Liberals were uneasy about the president’s connection to the scandal. To make matters 
worse, reports of corruption among southern representatives who sold appointments to 
office-seekers, and of the New York Custom House officials who accepted bribes from 
whiskey distillers, all painted a picture of the declining morality of American politics. 
In Missouri in 1870, Liberal Republicans under the leadership of the German-
born Carl Schurz saw the fall elections as an opportunity to take control of the party and 
rid it of corrupt Grantism.41 The Missouri Democrats, however, believed that although 
they shared a common desire with the Liberals to rid the state of Radicalism, the Liberals 
would remain committed to their party as long as they risked losing control of state offices 
to Democrats. In an attempt to bring Republican fractures to the fore in Missouri, 
Democrats across the state endorsed a policy of neutrality in the hope of electing a Liberal 
Republican ticket. The Democratic paper, The Weekly Caucasian, reported that while it 
had opposed political neutrality before, by 1870 it was ‘the only policy that is left us!’ 
The paper elaborated on its decision to support neutrality by asking its readers, ‘What 
chance have we of electing a Democratic ticket in the State? Ninety-thousand of our 
citizens, the wealth, the intelligence, the decency of Missouri, utterly disenfranchised … 
Let them [Republicans] alone; and each wing will have a ticket in the field. Then support 
the best; and there’s hope ahead! Nominate Democratic tickets; and you drive together 
… all the jarring, hostile elements of Radicalism.’42 In doing so, Missouri Democrats 
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hoped that by removing themselves from the race, nothing would stand in the way of a 
purge of Radicals. 
Much to the Democrats’ delight, the Liberals and Radicals arrived at the 
Republican State Convention in St. Louis with a renewed sense of conviction in their 
faction’s principles. And as the convention began, it quickly became apparent that the 
Republicans were bitterly divided over disenfranchisement and amnesty. While the 
Radicals sought to protect black rights and supported the incumbent Joseph W. McClurg, 
the Liberal faction, led by Carl Schurz, hoped that Benjamin Gratz Brown could defeat 
McClurg by placing reconciliation at the centre of the canvass. Despite the reforming 
message of the Liberals, the issue that ultimately split the party at the convention was that 
of the abolition of disenfranchisement measures in the state’s constitution. The Liberal 
Westliche Post reported that ‘By a vote of 439 against 342 they [Radicals] voted down 
the Republican principle of equal political rights of the whites and blacks. It followed 
necessarily that the Liberal Republicans in the convention separated themselves from the 
“clique” that has outraged the principles of our party.’43 As a result of the Republican 
fracture at the state convention, the Liberal Republicans assembled the following week, 
nominated Benjamin Gratz Brown for governor, and adopted a platform committed to 
ending corrupt Grantism and abolishing disenfranchisement measures in the state 
constitution. 
Remarkably, the Democrats’ policy of neutrality in Missouri had produced their 
desired result. Without the unifying factor of an opposing Democratic ticket, the 
Republicans had fractured at their state convention, handing the Democracy the chance 
to end the disenfranchisement of ex-Confederates in the state. The move had been 
particularly astute. Realising that their involvement in state races only led to a campaign 
that brought the memory of the party’s wartime record to the fore, Missouri Democrats’ 
refusal to run for key offices in 1870 fundamentally altered the nature of the campaign. 
By identifying a growing middle-ground in state politics, neutrality allowed the issues of 
amnesty, disenfranchisement, and corruption to dominate the campaign without raising 
the spectre of the Democracy’s war record.  
The Democrats therefore entered the election full of confidence that Liberal 
candidates would be elected in early November, and they were not disappointed. Brown 
comfortably defeated McClurg for the governorship by gaining over sixty percent of the 
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vote. In the congressional races, two Liberal Republican candidates were also elected to 
the U.S. House of Representatives, and the results were a significant victory for both the 
Democrats and the Liberal Republicans. In the aftermath of victory, the Weekly 
Caucasian proclaimed that, 
 
The result of our State election has given the final proof, if it was ever 
needed, of the sagacity of the Democracy in choosing the particular part 
that it should take in the State canvass … Every phrase of the canvass 
vindicated the prudence of the decision, and now the result of the election 
reveals the immense advantages that are traceable to it. The Passive 
Democracy won the triumph at every stage of the controversy between 
Brown and McClurg.44  
 
The Democracy fared well in the 1870 midterms outside Missouri, gaining 41 
seats in the House and 6 in the Senate. While the results owed to emerging charges of 
corruption surrounding the Grant administration, the Democracy’s focus upon issues of 
civil service reform, economics, and amnesty lent credence to the suggestions of 
accommodationist Democrats that an alliance with the Liberal Republicans would deliver 
national victories. Nationally, the Liberal Republican leaders’ turn against the 
protectionist policies of the Republican rank-and-file was critically important in bridging 
the gap between themselves and the Democrats. Many of them had joined the American 
Free Trade League in the years after the war, and there was a clear ideological crossover 
between hard-money Democrats and Liberals such as David Ames Wells, E. L. Godkin, 
and Charles Eliot Norton. 45  While Democratic opposition to congressional 
Reconstruction had caused many Liberals to remain stout defenders of the Republican 
administration, the Democrats’ acceptance of the new constitutional amendments under 
the New Departure allayed their fears.  
  
Democratic Factionalism and the Tweed Ring, 1871 
 
The success of the Missouri Liberal Republicans in 1870 gave the movement 
national exposure. For both anti-Grant Republicans and accommodationist Democrats, a 
Liberal-Democratic alliance offered the promise of an end to Radical rule, a reformed 
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federal government, and amnesty to former Confederates. Despite the success of political 
neutrality in Missouri, the Democrats remained bitterly divided over national strategy. 
The election of Frank P. Blair to the Senate in early 1871 bolstered the claims of straight-
out Democrats that an alliance with the Liberal Republicans would provide no significant 
political advantage and revitalised hopes of a ‘straight-out’ nomination in 1872. In 
January 1871 Alexander H. Stephens, a Whig before the war who would be elected to 
Congress as an Independent Democrat and a Democrat during Reconstruction, told 
Montgomery Blair that Frank Blair was ‘the man of the right gut and nerve as well as 
principles for a leader at this time of the true Democracy of our States.’46 Similarly, ex-
Secretary of War Gideon Welles noted that it ‘is a strong indication that the country is 
coming right.’47 For accommodationists, however, the election of a Democrat who had 
recently advocated the repeal of congressional Reconstruction and the return of political 
power to former Confederate leaders diminished the chances of a Liberal alliance. Manton 
Marble wrote that he did not ‘like to hear [Blair] magnify his Brodhead issues at the 
expense of the winning or at least adjutant issues of free trade and revenue reform.’48 
Similarly, William H. Bryant wrote to Manton Marble that while the New Departure was 
‘wise,’ loyalty to the party ‘is a difficult duty, when you can neither respect or admire the 
[legislative] men who hold power.’49 In an environment where many Liberal Republicans 
were increasingly worried that their party was ‘drifting into great dangers,’ the continued 
prominence of unreconstructed Democrats like Blair diminished the chance of a Liberal-
Democratic alliance. 
The fractious money debate provided even more potential to squander the chance 
of cooperation with the Liberals. The Liberals were ardent hard-money advocates and had 
recoiled at Pendleton’s recklessly inflationary ‘Ohio Idea’ in 1867.50 Regardless of the 
former-Copperhead Clement Vallandigham’s public acceptance of the Reconstruction 
settlement as the only logical course for the party, the Ohio Democracy’s reaffirmed 
commitment to soft-money angered northeastern hard-money Democrats who were aware 
of the Liberals’ disenchantment with Republicanism. Shortly after the announcement of 
the Ohio platform, August Belmont wrote to Marble that the ‘fearful greenback plank’ of 
the midwestern Democracy ‘was a fatal mistake in 1868 … but now it is actual suicide 
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[and] … if persisted in it will lose Ohio and the Presidency.’51 Attentive to Belmont’s 
fears, Marble quickly sent a dispatch to Ohio Democrat and ex-Union general, Alexander 
McCook, saying that he was ‘delighted with the platform of the “new departure” as a 
return of reason and sound common sense.’ However, he urged McCook to distance the 
party from greenbackism by writing that ‘unless we can prove to the American people 
that we intend to accept the Government as it will be handed to us, without disturbing the 
political and financial situation, otherwise than by placing them on a sounder basis 
through the reduction of taxes, the establishment of a Revenue tariff, and the strict 
limitation of federal power under the Constitution as it stands now, we can never hope 
for their votes.’52 Democrats agreed that no other economic issues than the repayment of 
the national debt and the currency issue were ‘of such vital importance to the people of 
the South, and West,’ but they could not unite over how to solve the question of 
resumption, and this planted seeds of doubt among the Liberals.53 
The New Departure fractured the Democrats over more than currency, and opened 
conflicts within the party over their public stance on the Reconstruction amendments. 
Party members unanimously accepted that the Thirteenth Amendment had settled the 
future of slavery in the Union, but they were much less unified in their response to the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. Despite the severe fractures over economic policy, 
however, there still existed issues that all Democrats could agree on. When the 
Pennsylvania and Ohio State Executive Committees committed themselves to protecting 
‘equal rights to all persons under [the Constitution], without distinction of race, color, or 
condition,’ it became clear that the New Departure would not have a unifying influence 
on the party.54 Democrats immediately deplored that accepting the Fifteenth Amendment 
was ‘a bitter pill’ to swallow that had ‘greatly disorganized our party in many localities.’55 
The praise that New Departure Democrats heaped on the adoption of state platforms that 
accepted the constitutional amendments was a miscalculation. The mass of Democratic 
voters remained deeply opposed to black suffrage, and saw the New Departure as an 
abandonment of the party’s stand over the past six years for ‘white man’s government.’ 
While northern Democrats were split over the proposed new direction, southern 
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Democrats were more unified in their condemnation of their northern brethren’s 
willingness to acquiesce in the Fifteenth Amendment. The Democratic candidate for 
lieutenant governor of Kentucky, John G. Carlisle, disparaged the reasoning behind the 
New Departure that by accepting the amendments, issues of race would be left in the past. 
Rather, Carlisle argued that ‘instead of withdrawing them as subjects of political 
discussion, it will give them far more prominence than they ever had heretofore.’ He 
claimed that the New Departure would not allow the party to move beyond ‘dead’ issues 
of suffrage and civil rights because ‘they present real living issues, in which the people 
feel a very deep interest.’56 
If Republicans faced difficult questions over corruption, the Democrats were by 
no means clean themselves. By 1871 William ‘Boss’ Tweed’s notorious New York 
machine held most of the chief positions in the city, including the mayoralty, 
superintendent of police, and city comptroller. The Tweed Ring had long been accused 
of widespread corruption, but had become an institution in the city, with prominent 
Democrats such as Samuel J. Tilden, John T. Hoffman, A. Oakley Hall, and Peter B. 
Sweeny, all having been key members of Tammany Hall. By mid-1871, the Tammany 
machine showed no signs of slowing down and continued to spread its influence over the 
city, making millions of dollars by selling construction contracts, inflating rental costs for 
government buildings, and through building public works. But revelations of Tammany’s 
fraudulent actions and its reluctance to risk alienating its Irish Catholic supporters were 
about to trigger the machine’s decline.57 
On July 8 the Republican New York Times published the first of two exposés of 
the ring that claimed that ‘the facts [this article] contains will be treasured up as a part of 
the accumulated mass of official corruption which is being piled up against the Tammany 
Ring, and which is destined, at no distant day, to descend like an avalanche upon their 
heads and crush them beneath its weight.’58 The article made various charges against the 
Ring’s use of public funds in construction, and the inflation of rental costs for armouries 
throughout the city at the expense of the taxpayer.59 Accusations of this ilk were nothing 
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new to New Yorkers, but as the scale of the frauds were uncovered throughout a series of 
editions, it became clear that Tweed would be unable to escape reprisal. 
The timing of the Times’ exposé was critical. At the beginning of July, New 
Yorkers were preparing for the annual parade of Irish Protestants’ celebration of William 
of Orange’s victory at the Battle of the Boyne. In the 1870 parade, Irish Catholics had 
interrupted the celebrations by attacking the Protestants and killing eight in what the New 
York Evening Post remembered as ‘one of the most brutal and inexcusable riots New 
York has ever seen.’60 New York authorities were worried about a similar recurrence in 
1871. In the days running up to the Orange Day Parade, the Superintendent of the Police, 
James Kelso, cancelled the march ostensibly out of concern for the safety of Irish 
Protestants. The local press immediately condemned the action. The New York Herald 
proclaimed that Superintendent of Police James Kelso had ‘dragged the magnanimity of 
the metropolis into the dust’ and had ‘violated the rights of the innocent’ by cancelling 
the parade.61 Bowing to increasing pressure, the ban was lifted, and when the parade 
began, 1500 policemen and five regiments of the National Guard protected it.  
As the parade set off from Lamartine Hall on July 12, the streets were full of 
expectant onlookers. Almost immediately the Protestant paraders were pelted with bricks 
thrown from the crowd, and the police and National Guard reacted by charging the rioters 
and violently dispersing the rioting Catholics. By the time the violence was quelled, sixty 
people lay dead in the streets of New York. In the days that followed the Irish Catholics 
were resoundly condemned by Republican organs such as The Nation and Harper’s 
Weekly, and the anti-Tammany Apollo Hall Democrats who called for the city to stop 
pandering to Irish Catholics. 62  Tammany and Tweed, however, were aware of the 
importance of the Irish vote to electoral success and refused to denounce the riot.  Further 
diminishing Tweed’s position in New York on July 29, the New York Times released a 
special supplement that detailed all the corrupt dealings of Tammany, including records 
of millions of dollars’ worth of repairs and alterations to the city’s new courthouse. The 
paper distributed hundreds of thousands of copies and Tweed’s corruption quickly 
became a national scandal. As public opinion turned against Tweed, Democrats began to 
distance themselves from the coming storm. 
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Samuel J. Tilden, the chairman of the New York Democratic State Committee, 
was the lead player in the ring’s downfall, and this propelled him into the national 
spotlight. As a business-oriented Democrat with a penchant for reform who had contacts 
in the railroad industry from his time as a lawyer, Tilden would come to have a profound 
influence on the national Democracy in the mid-1870s. His advocacy of the antebellum 
Democratic Young America movement demonstrated his commitment to industrial 
development, but his break in national politics came in 1871, when he was instrumental 
in exposing the Tweed Ring.63  On September 7, the Committee of Seventy, a body 
appointed following a meeting of the city’s elite at the Cooper Union in August, met to 
begin the investigation into Tweed and his accomplices. Typical of the pro-reform 
sentiment that was bringing the Democrats together with the Liberal Republicans, the 
Committee appealed to ‘citizens of both parties to save us and the State from the 
possibility of another such degradation as has fallen on all of us … No private business, 
no partisan end, can be so important to any right-minded citizen as the plain duties that 
are thrown on him by recent deplorable revelations.’ 64  Almost immediately, the 
Committee, led by Tilden and his reliable Democratic allies, began to purge the city’s 
government of its corrupt individuals, replacing them with elites whom they trusted to 
restore the respectability of City Hall.65 
In the immediate aftermath of the Tweed scandal, the Democratic party leadership 
recognised the profound impact of the events of July 1871 on national politics. The 
revelations of Tammany’s corruption solidified reform as the key issue in the 1872 
election, playing into the hands of New Departure Democrats who looked to the Liberal 
Republicans to form an alliance. With just over a year until the presidential election, 
Democrats turned their attention to who would lead the party in 1872.  
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The Failure of Liberal Republicanism, 1871–1872 
 
Preliminary discussions about the party’s presidential nomination suggested that 
General Winfield Scott Hancock was the favourite to lead the Democracy in 1872. As the 
Union general who had repulsed Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg in 1863, Hancock was 
not only immune to Republican accusations of disloyalty, but he appealed to the 
considerable veteran vote that had exerted a significant influence in propelling Grant to 
the presidency in 1868. Hancock’s war record was undoubtedly important to Democratic 
supporters. In July 1871 W.W.H. Davis, the publisher of the Pennsylvanian Doyleston 
Democrat, noted that ‘if we run a candidate on his military record alone, Grant will not 
overshadow him … I know of no other man, civilian or otherwise, whom I could support 
with greater pleasure than Hancock.’66  
Continued factional conflict between accommodationist and straight-out 
Democrats, however, ensured that the party struggled to find any consensus over 
candidates for the nomination. While both accommodationists and straight-outs used New 
Departure rhetoric, the conflict over the party’s presidential nomination highlighted the 
conflicting interpretations over party strategy. Straight-outs such as Gideon Welles 
viewed the New Departure as less a sacrifice of party principle, than a necessary change 
in candidates. Rather than running former Peace Democrats such as Seymour for office, 
Welles argued in favour of Unionists such as Hancock. Writing to Montgomery Blair, 
Welles explained that ‘[in] n most cases they [accommodationists] raise points of 
difference among friends instead of uniting them. Some of the old politicians – Seymour 
and Pendleton and others –, fancy they can strengthen themselves, and gather new 
followers by erecting a new standard, creating new tests, which tend to promote factions, 
often at the expense of principle.’67 Welles argued that the New Departure should ‘be on 
the candidate rather than the question,’ to ensure the party remained rooted in its 
Jacksonian ideals.68 Welles was not alone in stressing the party’s need to remain true to 
its Jacksonian past. Alexander Stephens insisted that ‘it is a matter of the utmost 
importance that the Democracy at the North … shall not commit themselves to’ a new 
doctrine, but rather ‘take no step backwards. Let them not lower their flag in the face of 
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the enemy – this is the great point. Let them present a bold front against centralism and 
usurpations of all sorts without specifications.’69 
Not only did the party face difficulties in finding a candidate who could bring 
northern accommodationists and straight-outs together, but Democrats also had to find a 
candidate who could bring the northerners and southerners together. In March, William 
H. Worthington, the editor of the Mississippi Columbus Democrat, wrote to potential 
Democratic candidate William Allen of Ohio, noting that ‘Mr. Pendleton was a favorite 
with us Southern Democrats,’ but his yielding to the New Departure was emblematic of 
the ‘main cause of our present weakness and demoralization.’70 Worthington added that 
Mississippi Democrats would not ‘under any circumstances, support a “new departure” 
Democrat.’71 Manton Marble told Montgomery Blair that while there appeared to be no 
model candidate available for the Democracy in 1872, the real problem lay in the lack of 
the ‘courage’ of the Liberals ‘to cut loose and burn the bridges’ with the main body of the 
Republican party.72 The struggle for control of the Democratic party continued well into 
1872, when, at long last, the Liberal Republicans began to show more willingness to split 
with the Republican party. 73  As a result, and with the Democrats unable to reach 
consensus over their presidential nomination, the Democracy looked to the Liberal 
Republican convention to decide how it would move forward. 
In early 1872 the Liberal Republicans went into their national convention with the 
hope of nominating a candidate who would meet their reform credentials and appeal to 
the Democrats. Because the brains behind the Liberal Republican movement, Carl 
Schurz, was unable to run for the nomination due to his German birth, the Liberals hoped 
that Charles Francis Adams, son of ex-President John Quincy Adams, could secure the 
nomination. Factional disputes, however, coupled with Adams’s reluctance to be put 
forward for the nomination, resulted in the surprise nomination of New York Tribune 
editor Horace Greeley with Missouri governor Benjamin Gratz Brown as his running 
mate.74  
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Greeley’s nomination was a catastrophe for the Liberals. The editor had been a 
long-time adversary of the Democratic party and upon hearing of Greeley’s nomination, 
Manton Marble noted despairingly that ‘of course no Democrat can or will endorse 
Greeley … If Greeley accepts and Democrats nominate Adams it [an Adams-headed 
Liberal Republican ticket] might win, but a straight out Democratic nomination is 
inevitable.’75 Other Democrats agreed, believing that endorsing the nomination would be 
‘unwise and dishonest.’76 Not only did Greeley’s past record alienate the Democrats, but 
his support of a protectionist tariff contradicted the views of leading Liberals such as 
Wells, Godkin and Schurz.77 Any hope the Liberals had in gaining the support of the 
Democrats therefore rested solely on Greeley’s postwar efforts to engender sectional 
reconciliation including having helped pay Jefferson Davis’ $100,000 bail. Whether the 
Democrats would endorse Greeley at their national convention at Baltimore was a 
different question. 
On July 4 in Baltimore, the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 
August Belmont, opened the proceedings of the National Convention with an assessment 
of the previous four years. He declared that his prediction at the party’s last national 
gathering in 1868, that ‘the election of General Grant would result in the gradual 
usurpation of all the functions of the Government by the Executive and by Congress, to 
be enforced by the bayonets of a military despotism,’ had been clearly demonstrated by 
the Enforcement Acts, southern corruption, and the continued disenfranchisement of 
white southerners.78 Furthermore, Belmont urged delegates to accept Greeley as the 
party’s candidate. Despite the Tribune editor’s past opposition to the Democracy, 
Belmont concluded that Greeley represented ‘the national and constitutional principles of 
the Cincinnati platform … and … if elected, he means to carry them out honestly and 
faithfully.’ 79  Belmont continued that ‘However much you might desire to fight the 
coming battle for our rights and liberties under one of the trusted leaders of the 
Democratic party, it will become your duty to discard all considerations of party tradition 
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… You must remember that you are here not only as Democrats, but as citizens of our 
common country, and that no sacrifice can be too great which she demands at your 
hands.’80 With Belmont’s appeals to the delegates to acquiesce in the accommodationist 
strategy, the convention nominated James R. Doolittle to serve as the president of the 
convention. 
Doolittle began his speech by describing the Liberal Republican success in 
Missouri, the movement’s spread nationally and the nomination of Greeley on the 
Cincinnati platform.81 Like Belmont, Doolittle urged Democrats to accept the Liberal 
Republican nomination and platform. This action, he said, meant: 
 
no abandonment of what is true, of what is just, of what is good in human 
government … It means, no union of dead upon dead issues, but a union 
of the living upon the living issues of the present … It means justice, 
liberty, peace, loyalty, and good will; and gentlemen, for our whole 
country, East, West, North, and South, it means, instead of a war President, 
trained only in a military school … it means a peace President … trained 
in the ideas, acts, blessings, and republican simplicity of peace and 
universal freedom.82  
 
The accommodationist rhetoric of Belmont and Doolittle won over significant support at 
the convention. The Democrats nominated Greeley and adopted a platform that 
acquiesced in both the Missouri method and the New Departure. Their platform accepted 
the ‘equality of all men before the law’, the Reconstruction amendments, and demanded 
the removal of disabilities placed on ex-Confederates and a return to local self-
government.83 
Greeley’s nomination sent shock waves through the Democratic party. Democrats 
bitterly divided over the nomination of the editor, and many party members were 
astounded that the party would ‘commit such a contemptible, ignanimous [sic] and 
disgusting suicide’ by nominating Greeley.84 More than anywhere else, Democrats in the 
South were repulsed by the nomination. While the convention had placed a premium on 
Greeley’s reconciliationist credentials, southern Democrats simply responded with ‘I 
would like to know when he has shown it … Thousands and thousands of Democrats 
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throughout the nation will not vote for him.’85 While Greeley’s role in helping to free 
Jefferson Davis had won over some southerners, most could not accept that the party had 
endorsed its antebellum enemy.86 Rather than uniting the party, Greeley’s nomination 
only seemed to exacerbate divisions within the Democratic party. Opponents of Greeley 
blamed his nomination on the work of ‘Democrats who are cooperating to destroy the 
creed of Democracy,’ and that the attitudes of these ‘“Renegade Democrats”’ was 
‘monstrous’ and ‘not comprehensible except upon grounds alike mercenary.’87  
Upon hearing the news of Greeley’s nomination at Baltimore, Thomas F. Bayard 
echoed the accommodationist argument that, 
 
Whether I approve Mr. Greeley personally or no, whether he had or not 
been the steady and violent opponent of the political principles and 
measures which … I have been upholding … yet if he has become, with 
or against our action or wishes, the most likely or practical means of 
restoring a better condition of feeling in the North toward the South, and 
restoring security and justice to that oppressed region, I should feel myself 
as an American, without regard to the name of my party … compelled to 
assist in placing him in power.88  
 
Despite the acclamations of straight-out Democrats over the previous years, the most 
burning desire of the party was to ensure Grantism and Republican rule in the South were 
ended. In August 1872 Michael C. Kerr, the House minority leader in Washington, told 
Manton Marble that ‘if we secure victory this year, the future of the Democratic party and 
of true Democratic ideas may be fortunate and successful. If we succeed now, I think the 
effect will quite certainly be to enable us to absorb, to consolidate with ourselves … the 
great majority of the Liberal Republican element.’89 For men such as Kerr and Bayard, 
another defeat in 1872, ‘notwithstanding the sacrifices’ the party had already made, would 
be catastrophic for the nation.90 A full and final reconciliation between the sections was 
critical to the health of the party, and for many Democrats, sacrificing certain political 
principles to achieve this end was a necessary sacrifice. 
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Just as they had done at the time of the National Union Movement, Democrats 
hoped to use a third party movement as cover to return to power. In 1866 the fusion 
movement failed dramatically, but the legacy of the Democratic party’s involvement in 
National Unionism had left an impression that scholars have not yet acknowledged.91 Six 
years later many of the same Democrats who had been earnest supporters of National 
Unionism hoped that a growing desire for sectional reconciliation would allow Liberal 
Republicanism to be a success.92 Using the rhetoric of North-South amity that had been 
so prevalent in the National Union movement in 1866, the 1872 campaign adopted a 
similarly reconciliatory tone. While Democrats were quick to remind voters of the charges 
of corruption that plagued the Grant administration, Greeley’s campaign was permeated 
with the language of reconciliation. In many ways, the 1872 contest became cast as a 
conflict between two opposing personalities. Democrats emphasised Grant’s military 
background as one that conflicted with reconciliation. He was a war leader and Democrats 
pointed to federal intervention in the South over the previous four years to demonstrate 
his inability to achieve a genuine reconciliation. More positively, Democrats painted 
Greeley as a ‘philosopher’ who had worked for reconciliation since the war ended and 
highlighted his payment of Jefferson Davis’ bail bond to demonstrate that he was 
perfectly suited to peacetime leadership.93  
Greeley embarked on a nationwide tour in support of his candidacy. He delivered 
numerous speeches in which he discussed issues of reform, the tariff, and currency at 
length, but at the centre of all his appearances was his desire for reconciliation. Greeley 
often referred to the need to bury the issues of the past to achieve a genuine reconciliation, 
and ‘Let hatred and bitterness, contention and jealous perish forever.’94 Like Greeley, 
Democrats placed reconciliation at the forefront of their campaign. Speeches delivered 
by members of the national Democratic leadership stressed that the ‘reconciliation of all 
our people … must precede all other reforms’ and that a change of government in 
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Washington was necessary for ‘safety, for justice, for peace, for reconciliation in the 
South.’95 
As the October elections in Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania approached, 
Democrats and Liberal Republicans looked forward to testing the success of their alliance 
amid reports of the growing strength of the Liberal ticket in Pennsylvania.96 But fusion 
candidates did poorly in all the early elections. The Cincinnati Enquirer blamed the Ohio 
defeat on the inability to bring ‘a large number of the Greeley Republicans to the support 
of a ticket which they regarded as a Democratic one,’ while William Allen, a former 
United States senator, claimed that ‘thousands of Democrats absented from the polls … 
because a “straight-out” Democrat was not nominated.’97 Whatever reason Democrats 
gave for losses in October, the elections were a foreshadowing of what was to come.  
When election day arrived in November, many Democrats chose to remain at 
home. Despite Greeley’s busy campaign to emphasise his reconciliatory credentials, 
Democrats across the nation could not forget his Republican antecedents.98 In New York, 
Greeley received over 50,000 votes less than Seymour had in 1868, and in Pennsylvania 
this drop totalled more than 100,000 votes.99 Moreover, while Greeley managed to defeat 
Grant in Missouri, the margins of the New Yorker’s victories in Kentucky and Georgia 
were much narrower than four years earlier and he lost the key northern states of New 
York and New Jersey.100 In the end, Greeley suffered a convincing defeat, garnering just 
43.8 percent of the popular vote and carrying just six states. Underlying popular 
Democratic resentment towards Greeley however, was a resistance to acquiesce in New 
Departure politics. The New York Tribune editor and the Liberal Republicans monopolise 
the literature on the 1872 election while the Democrats are too often portrayed as reluctant 
participants with no strong candidate of their own.101 Instead, fusion-minded Democrats 
played an active role in creating the conditions for a Liberal-Democratic alliance by 
focusing on the reform issue, rhetorically accepting the Reconstruction settlement, and 
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emphasising reconciliation. Too many of the rank-and-file, however, were unwilling to 
accept African American suffrage. Across the North and the South, Democrats fractured 
over the party leadership’s adoption of accommodationism as the only way to overthrow 
Republican rule. Seen through this light, the defeat was as much the result of a popular 
rejection of the moderation of the Democracy’s leadership, as it was Democratic revulsion 
of Greeley. Looking back at the catastrophic campaign, Richard Vaux despaired for the 
future of a party that was fractured and broken. In a letter to the newly elected Kentucky 
senator John White Stevenson, he had one question: ‘What is to become of the 
Democratic party?’102 
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Chapter Four 
 Reorganisation, Resurgence, and Reconciliation: The Failure of Partisan 
Realignment and the Revival of the Democratic Party, 1872–1874 
 
 
As news of Grant’s re-election spread across the nation, accommodationists and 
straight-outs took different lessons from the election’s results. Straight-out Democrats 
were not surprised by the extent of Greeley’s defeat and hoped that the election would 
‘teach our friends a lesson’ about the viability of fusion. 1  Typically, the northern 
Democratic press argued that the reasons for Grant’s victory lay in the fact that Democrats 
had been reluctant to vote as a result of the party’s decision to support the Liberal 
Republicans, and this had doomed the party to defeat.2 Yet many party supporters, among 
them New Yorker William H. Bryant saw the defeat in a positive light. Bryant had been 
angered by the Liberal-Democratic coalition and believed that the defeat warranted no 
mourning. Rather, he asserted that the Democracy ‘retains a greater strength than all who 
saw our shipwreck could have believed.’3 The view that the party had not suffered as a 
result of the Liberal Republican fiasco, however, was not one commonly held by 
Democrats.  
On December 2, 1872 former Secretary of War Gideon Welles wrote to the 
accommodationist, Montgomery Blair, expressing his concern about the future of the 
Democratic party. Welles identified the Liberals as an important swing group in national 
politics and hoped that they could be incorporated into the Democracy but he worried that 
‘it will be difficult to say what will be the course of the shattered Democratic 
organization.’4 In the aftermath of the 1872 defeat, Democrats typically demonstrated a 
concern for the future of their party, and in December, Richard Vaux, wrote to Kentucky 
senator and former governor, John White Stevenson, and called for the national party to 
‘organize in defence of the doctrines of the fathers.’5 This feeling of pessimism was not 
unique to the North. The southern Democratic press reported that ‘the party of the 
Constitution, of Reconciliation and Reform has been routed … The Democracy made a 
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good fight; but … the political morning that broke bright and rosy, is over cast at midday 
by the clouds of disaster in the present, and the mists and doubts of forebodings for the 
future.’6  
Regardless of Democrats’ disappointment at the result, the party’s national 
leadership recognised that the party stood at a crossroads. Their failure at the last two 
presidential contests had demonstrated the weaknesses of the party’s two leading postwar 
electoral strategies. The defeat in 1868 highlighted that running a campaign founded in 
white supremacy would raise questions about the party’s disloyalty during the Civil War, 
while the accommodationist approach taken in 1872 had ignored the inherent strength of 
the Democracy’s partisan appeal. Henceforth party leaders would develop a coherent 
national strategy that capitalised on a turn in the fortunes of the nation’s economy, and 
laid the foundations for the party’s resurgence.  
 The years of 1872–1874 were of critical importance to the re-emergence of a 
strong national Democratic party. Scholars such as Heather Cox Richardson, Eric Foner, 
and David Blight have all pointed to the nation’s fall into an economic depression as 
critical to undermining the Republican government’s commitment to Reconstruction.7 
The Panic of 1873 fundamentally changed the political scene of the 1870s, and historians 
have rightly demonstrated that the economic depression allowed Democrats to exploit a 
public perception that African Americans were unwilling to work for their own 
prosperity, instead relying on government handouts.8 The assertions of scholars that the 
defeat of Liberal Republicanism and the Panic of 1873 combined to convince Democrats 
to return to the white-line strategy of the late 1860s, however, simplifies the Democratic 
response to these events. Rather than abandoning the lessons of the failure of their 
accommodation strategy, Democrats avoided formal alliances with the Liberal 
Republicans, but made the issues of civil service reform and free trade the central pillars 
of their party. In doing so, northern Democrats hoped that the similarities in worldviews 
between themselves and Liberals would help them to secure victories in northern states. 
In the South, however, white-line politics did become critical to Democratic success, 
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albeit through a different rhetoric than the late 1860s. Through the articulation of a 
sophisticated reconciliationist ideology that drew both upon the burgeoning Lost Cause 
movement in the South and northern Unionism, the Democrats were able to appropriate 
Civil War memory to their own advantage in the mid-1870s. This chapter examines how 
the Democratic party brought together the remnants of Liberal Republicanism and created 
a coherent national strategy between 1873 and 1874 that would end accommodationism 
and be the driving force behind the party’s eventual return to the White House in 1884. 
 
Southern Strategies and the Panic of 1873 
 
In the aftermath of the defeat of Liberal Republicanism and the death of Horace 
Greeley just three weeks after the election, Democrats responded to the reality of facing 
another four years of life under President Grant in different ways. To most northern 
Democrats, Greeley’s defeat demonstrated the party’s need to ‘resolutely clear away all 
the recent rubbish, and commence rebuilding the Democratic edifice … from the 
foundations so successfully laid in the days of the old Whig opposition.’9  Southern 
Democrats, however, did not so readily abandon fusion. In Louisiana and Mississippi 
during 1873, Democrats continued to actively pursue bipartisan alliances to overthrow 
Republican rule. In the Liberal Republicans, the Democrats had a natural ally to work 
with to attack Grantism and, could ill afford to cast aside a group of politicians who could 
appeal across the partisan divide. 
In New Orleans, the staunchly Democratic newspaper the Times-Picayune 
proclaimed that ‘no party ever arose in any country more completely justified by events 
than the Liberal Republican party of the North.’10 Rather than abandoning the Liberals, 
the paper proposed that Liberal Republicans and Democrats coordinate and place their 
desire to rid the country of corrupt Grantism above their partisan differences. The Times-
Picayune praised the Liberal Republican movement for having ‘seen the imperialism to 
which [centralisation] leads,’ and instead of blaming the Liberals for the defeat, the paper 
claimed that their loss in 1872 had been the result of ‘tricksters’ who had undermined the 
movement’s attack on consolidation.11 Instead, the Liberal Republicans and Democrats 
were encouraged to unite to ‘restore honest and economical government.’ In a bold 
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statement that underscored the Times-Picayune’s willingness to work with the Liberals, 
the paper asserted, ‘there can be no redemption without success; and those good intentions 
[of reform] … might as well be sold out wholesale to the boss contractor for completing 
the paving of a certain locality as to fight in the ranks of a minority.’12  
Writing to the ex-Confederate general and Democrat, Jubal A. Early, in 1873, 
P.G.T. Beauregard, a former general of the Confederacy asserted that ‘Like many others 
you think that we have time to wait and allow matters to adjust themselves … but I can 
assure you that we [ex-Confederates] have been “driven to the wall” and are now “on our 
last legs.”’ 13  Beauregard added that ‘No one can realize our sad distress unless he 
witnesses our condition; it makes one’s heart bleed to think of the poverty and ruin which 
are actually staring in the face most of our best people.’14 For both the Times-Picayune 
and Beauregard, the Democratic party was moving too slowly towards regaining power 
in the state. Supporters of fusion in the Pelican State tended to be business-minded 
conservatives who believed little progress was being made to cut taxation and ease the 
burdens of federal interventionism in Louisiana.15 And despite their continued adherence 
to the principles and doctrines of the Democracy, they believed that ‘neither the 
Democratic party nor any of its offshoots will do to rely on as a means of placing the 
political control of the State in the hands of its better class of citizens.’16  
The Times-Picayune’s rationale for fusion was significant due to its placement of 
party principles over institutional organisation. The paper wrote that ‘The Democratic 
party, must never yield its principles, or abandon its Party organization in maintaining 
them. It may waive the assertion of its principles, while acting with others on important 
measures of policy. It may join with others, in another Party organization, to accomplish 
great reforms … but it cannot abandon its principles, because without their predominance, 
there can be no permanent Government – no political liberty in the land.’ 17  Many 
Democrats in New Orleans believed that the overthrow of Radical Republicanism 
demanded immediate attention and that only by constructing a temporary fusion party 
could they overthrow Republican rule. Once this end was achieved however, many 
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envisaged that the Democracy would return to state power and constitutional government 
would be reinstated. 
Many southern states witnessed moves towards fusion in the aftermath of the 
Liberal Republican fiasco. After twelve years of electoral defeats, Mississippi Democrats 
coalesced under a new banner in the summer of 1873: the Conservative-Democratic Party. 
Supporters of the new party highlighted the diminishing influence of the Democracy in 
New England and the Midwest as a sign that it was in ‘too feeble a minority to entitle its 
acts to consideration.’ 18  They further pointed to declining Democratic majorities in 
Kentucky and Virginia as ‘signs of decay and disintegration of the Democratic 
organization’ to prove the Democracy’s incapacity to overthrow Republican rule. 19 
Crucially, like their Louisianan counterparts, these proponents of the Conservative-
Democratic party did not believe that Democratic principles had become outdated. 
Rather, they argued that a misplaced common belief resulting from Republican 
propaganda – that ‘the main purpose of the Democratic leaders is to undo the results of 
the war’ – was the main barrier to Democratic success. 20  To combat this, the 
Conservative-Democrats sought to replace the tarnished brand of the Democracy and 
revive Democratic doctrines under the guise of a new party that could bring Liberal 
Republicans and former Whigs into the party’s ranks. The new banner called for the strict 
construction of constitutional powers, home rule for the states, the supremacy of civil 
over military authority, the decrease of taxes, retrenchment, the end of federal land grants, 
and an end to corruption. It also accepted the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments.21 
In essence, the Conservative-Democratic Party was a reorganized, rebranded Democracy. 
The failure of Liberal Republicanism had a significant impact on how Democrats 
viewed the future of their party. While many southern Democrats looked to new party 
labels to overthrow Radical rule, most northerners believed that the result had taught them 
a different lesson. Defeat in 1872 revitalized the assertions of straight-out Democrats that 
the party could only return to power by adhering to long-held principles of strict 
constructionism, limited government, home rule, and most significantly, to the 
Democratic organisation itself. Yet no dogmatic programme had been established by 
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early 1873 for the party to implement on a national level. As a result, the 1873 electoral 
races held important consequences for the strategy of the party moving forward. 
In the Ohio State Democratic Convention, the party’s delegates nominated 
William Allen for governor and adopted a platform that attacked Republican corruption 
and attempted to make the return of home rule the central issue of the campaign.22 Allen, 
an old-line Jacksonian Democrat, represented everything that the Ohio Democracy 
wanted in a leader for the party. Born in North Carolina, he had moved to Ohio after his 
parents’ death in 1819, serving in the state legislature between 1833 and 1849.23  A 
supporter of popular sovereignty during the antebellum era and a Peace Democrat during 
the war, Allen’s return to politics after nearly twenty-five years symbolized the party’s 
attempts to return to the golden age of Democratic dominance. The Ohio return to 
Jacksonianism was hailed throughout the country as a sign that a ‘new morning has 
dawned for the organization … It is the only power, already organized and in readiness 
for action, to which the people can hopefully appeal for help in executing an urgent reform 
and rescuing the free institutions from ruin.’24  
The New York World claimed that the Democratic ‘party gives no symptoms of a 
voluntary dissolution,’ and that ‘the defence of the Democratic policy is, not that it is 
strikingly new, but that it is wise, that it is timely, that it is necessary.’25 Straight-out 
Democrats hoped that the party could harness the memory of its antebellum success to 
end the excesses incurred by the continuation of Republican rule. For them, widespread 
corruption, carpetbag rule, and continued federal intervention in the South placed not only 
personal liberties at risk, but also threatened the very existence of free government in the 
United States. At the heart of the issue were the disturbing centralising and consolidating 
elements of the Republican party. Yet, the biggest problem facing the Democrats in 1873 
was the ‘apathy’ of many Democratic voters following the 1872 calamity.26 To overcome 
this, northern straight-out Democrats urged a vigorous reorganisation of the party at the 
grassroots level and fell back upon traditional Jacksonian principles that invoked the 
institutional memory of the party. 
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Following the announcement of the Ohio platform, the Democratic State 
Committee of Pennsylvania rejoiced that ‘The Democracy all over the country are 
rallying for the old standard principles of the party’ and that ‘all that is now required to 
secure these triumphs and return to pure government, is a prudent and speedy organization 
of our party.’27 Party leaders urged county conventions to be called early and stressed the 
importance of appealing to conservative Republicans to bolster the Democratic vote. 
Having recognised the shared interests of free trade and reform between themselves and 
the Liberal Republicans, leading Pennsylvania Democrats encouraged party activists to 
be more assertive on the local level, to visit the homes of ‘every Democrat and Liberal 
Republican in their Townships respectively, urging each as far as possible to take an 
interest in the approaching contest on behalf of the Democracy’, and to ‘[e]ncourage those 
who temporarily left our ranks to return to our fold, and be especially attentive to such 
Radical Republicans as have become discontented with the wide-spread corruptions of 
the hour.’28  
Similar appeals to the Liberal Republicans were made throughout the country, 
from the calls of the New Orleans Times-Picayune for the formation of a fusion party to 
the New York World’s assertion that the party ‘holds out the right hand of a hearty 
fellowship to the Liberal allies who … are at one with us upon the living issues of the 
present hour.’29 In the end, the Democratic leaders hoped to reorganise the party ‘not by 
scattering and disbanding its elements, but by excluding foreign substances, attracting 
homogenous ones, and crystallizing them into a purer form with a cutting edge.’30 At its 
core, the Democratic reorganisation aimed to secure its traditional white, working class 
supporters, while also bringing the Liberal Republican element into a more consolidated 
party organisation. 
 Democratic attempts to reverse voter apathy relied heavily upon appeals to the 
party’s institutional memory. Leading party organs made frequent references to the 
principles they argued were embodied by the nation’s greatest men. Democrats deplored 
the rampant corruption that characterised government and urged a return to Jacksonian 
and Jeffersonian principles to solve the crisis. The Boston Post claimed that ‘Never more 
than now has the assertion and application of the old Constitutional principles supported 
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by Jefferson and Madison and the Democratic party in the zenith of its fame been 
demanded for the healing of the wounds of the nation.’31 Similarly, the New York World 
made explicit links between the party’s struggle with the consolidating Republicans, and 
the ‘monarchy-men, the centralizers, the corruptionists and the consolidationists whom 
Jefferson and his party encountered.’32 
Democrats highlighted the threat that corruption posed to the nation, a point that 
became even more pertinent in the aftermath of the Crédit Mobilier and Salary Grab 
scandals that came to light in September 1873. Party members campaigned against the 
circulation of an irredeemable currency, advocated the end of the National Bank System, 
the reduction of the protective tariff, the need for equal taxation, and the termination of 
government subsidies to private corporations.33 By focusing on issues that putatively 
demonstrated Republican consolidation, Democrats appealed both to their traditional 
working-class constituents, and middle-class Liberal Republicans to bolster their support. 
They identified governmental land grants to railroad corporations and taxation that placed 
a heavy burden on workers as class legislation that only benefitted the industrialists. With 
Democrats in both the North and South advocating principles and policies that focused 
on the Republicans’ allegedly unequal treatment of classes in the lead up to the 1873 
elections, there seemed to be a growing cohesion within the party. Voters, however, 
remained reluctant to place their faith in the Democracy.  
Despite the regularity of Democratic assaults on the allegedly rampant corruption 
and excessive spending that characterised the post-war Republican administrations, the 
nation had entered an economic boom following the Civil War and this diminished the 
impact of such accusations. Government subsidies since the end of the war had doubled 
the size of the country’s railways, significantly improving prospects for internal trade, 
opening up markets for western farmers, and filling the deep pockets of the nation’s 
leading industrialists. Fuelled largely by European investors, the railroad boom of the 
1860s and early 1870s had created a consensus among Americans that the burgeoning 
industrial economy of the United States would continue. This faith in the capitalist 
system, however, quickly came under heavy scrutiny. 
During the autumn of every year, currency held in the nation’s largest banks 
contracted quickly and significantly. Many local banks throughout the country deposited 
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their reserves in the New York banks year-round, yet annually recalled their deposited 
capital to aid the movement of crops harvested in the Midwest. This was usually of little 
consequence, but in 1873 European investors were losing confidence in the American 
railroad boom and choosing to invest elsewhere instead. When September arrived that 
year and the country’s local banks demanded the release of their reserves from New York, 
the surplus capital did not exist to cover the recall. Almost immediately banks began to 
fail to meet these seasonal demands, and on September 17, the largest bank in the country, 
Jay Cooke & Company, announced that it was suspending payments. Cooke’s banks 
closed in New York, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C., causing the failure of numerous 
other banks to fulfil payments. Soon after, the stock exchange plummeted and closed on 
September 20 for ten days. As the money markets plunged, some banks refused to accept 
greenbacks and insisted on payment in gold.34 The crash started the longest depression in 
U.S. history that, for many onlookers, cast significant doubt over the future of industrial 
capitalism in the United States. 
Scholars have posited that the financial crisis of 1873 not only turned the focus of 
many northerners away from Reconstruction in the South, but also held long-term 
consequences for the relationship between labour and capital.35 For Democrats, the Panic 
provided a reference point to demonstrate the outcome of Republican misgovernment and 
could be used to turn public opinion against Republican rule. 36  They charged that 
consolidation of the National Bank System and the profligacy of Republican financial aid 
to railroad corporations lay at the core of the financial crisis. Democrats were quick to 
cast themselves as the party of reform. They depicted themselves as the only politicians 
dedicated to the reduction of a bloated federal government that had plunged the country 
into an economic depression, one that, unbeknown to them, would last until 1878.  
In the aftermath of the Panic of 1873, the Democracy won significant victories in 
New York, Ohio, Maryland, Virginia, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, and Illinois. The New 
York World rejoiced, claiming that the successes were the result of a ‘steadfast adherence 
to the organisation, unflinching fidelity to the principles of the Democratic party,’ and 
that the secret to future success lay in the continuation of this strategy.37 While these 
victories had exposed weaknesses in the Republican party, continued success was not 
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guaranteed. Not only did the Democracy remain split over organisational strategy, but the 
Panic itself also threw the most significant division between Democrats into the open: the 
conflict over hard and soft money. Furthermore, the Democracy had still not formulated 
a cohesive or successful strategy to combat Republican ‘bloody shirt’ rhetoric. While the 
return of old-line Democrats such as George H. Pendleton and William Allen to the fore 
showed a willingness to invoke memories of the party’s Jacksonian heritage, Democrats 
were forced to confront the economic crisis in new terms, and create an equally potent 
political use of the enduring memory of the Civil War.38 
 
The Currency Question in Democratic Politics 
 
Ever since the passage of the first Legal Tender Act in 1862, Americans had 
clashed over the role of greenbacks in the national financial system. Introduced as an 
attempt to finance the ever-increasing expense of civil war, debates over when the nation 
would return to specie payments became more intense as each year of Reconstruction 
passed. Divisions over financial policy were never solely along partisan lines and 
consensus on the currency issue within the Democracy became particularly elusive. As a 
result, the real surprise of the 1870s was not that the currency issue led to the emergence 
of a significant third party in the American political system, but that a more fundamental 
partisan realignment did not occur.  
When Congress reconvened in December 1873, the economic crisis brought about 
by the banking crash was propelled to the centre of the national political landscape. For 
the rest of the 1870s, economic recovery would be the primary concern of Congress, and 
on January 20, 1874, John B. Gordon, Democratic senator from Georgia and one of 
Robert E. Lee’s principal commanders at the end of the war, delivered a speech in the 
Senate on the progress of agricultural development in his home state. Gordon spoke of 
the burdens placed upon farmers by their inability to acquire capital as ‘profits are year 
by year absorbed by others than the tillers of the soil.’39  The Georgian took aim at 
‘concentrated money’ held by a small number of capitalists that had led to high interest 
and a desperate lack of capital in the agricultural sector of the economy.40 For Gordon, 
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the central problem in the American financial system was the concentration of capital in 
the hands of a few wealthy citizens. He further linked his antimonopolist outlook to the 
Panic of 1873, claiming that the financial collapse was ‘but the legitimate outgrowth of 
the same fundamental evil [monopoly] which has bred and fostered all the other evils of 
which I have spoken’ and that ‘whatever loss of confidence there has been sir, has been 
the loss of confidence in the quantity and not in the quality of the money. If greenbacks 
had been as plentiful as confidence in greenbacks, we should have had far less of panic.’41 
Americans in the South and Midwest often complained about the lack of availability of 
specie, especially in rural areas. Typical of these complaints, A. Stolkly wrote to Thomas 
Bayard that ‘We must have currency, and enough of it to supply the requirements of 
business … Coin is out of the question … The want of a currency of equal value in all 
parts of the Union would, until the resumption of coin payments, be best supplied by the 
issues of the Govt (legal tenders).’42 
Congressman William S. Holman, a Democratic representative from Indiana, 
reinforced Gordon’s anti-monopolist outlook by claiming that ‘We are at the mercy of a 
few great capitalists … To reduce the currency to increase its value to that of gold would 
be a heartless despotism to which the country would not and could not submit.’43 Holman 
added that ‘I regret to reach the conclusion that the resumption of specie payments in this 
country is now at least impossible. It is not a question of money so much as it is a question 
of the weight of the public debt upon our industries.’44 Holman attempted to bolster 
confidence in paper money, stating that ‘The greenback is money in the sense in which a 
gold dollar is money, and both are made money by the same high authority, the only 
authority that in this country can make anything money, the law of the land … An act of 
Congress declares what is money; it stamps the money quality, the representative value, 
upon a bit of gold just as it does upon paper. There is no difference in that respect.’45 For 
soft-money Democrats such as Holman, it was not the physical representation of money 
that mattered, but simply that the correct legislation was enacted to make it legal tender. 
Moreover, the economic realities of the largely agrarian Midwest were pushing the 
Democrats into advocating for soft-money. In response to the economic depression, a new 
farmers’ organisation, the Order of the Patrons of Husbandry, or the Grange as it would 
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come to be known, had established itself across the region. The Grangers’ principal aims 
were to reduce the costs of transporting crops, reducing interest, and more generally 
relieve the economic burdens that the Panic of 1873 had wrought on farmers.46 As a result, 
they supported calls for increases in greenback circulation, and this gained traction among 
farmers, firstly in the Midwest, but also in the South. Amidst a growing support for the 
regulating of railroad rates and an expansion of the money supply, midwestern Democrats 
had little option but adopt a soft-money stance or risk losing the support of their worker-
constituents.47 The appeal of soft money Democrats like Holman and Gordon to those 
who had restricted access to capital drew upon a remarkably forward-thinking conception 
of money at a time when all major global powers adhered to the gold standard. These 
soft-money men held that the only way to ease the burdens of taxation and economic 
depression on their constituents was to curb the monopoly of interest of the industrial 
capitalists by improving access to physical capital.  
Hard-money Democrats had long viewed proponents of soft money as 
irresponsible and immoral, and to a significant degree the reason for their defeat in the 
presidential races of 1864 and 1868. 48  While these hard-money men still tied their 
economic arguments to currents of antimonopoly and class rhetoric to appeal to their 
traditional demographic constituents, they relied heavily on appeals to the institutional 
memory of the party to engender support for their financial vision for America.  
Hard-money Democrats regarded the institutional memory of their party as not 
just a potent political tool, but an important point of reference when discussing the 
Democracy’s future. Leading party activists lamented the inability of Democratic leaders 
to live up to the mantle of the party’s antebellum leaders. They had actively searched for 
a ‘second Andrew Jackson’ who would propel the party back to power for the first time 
since the war, and in the 1870s many continued to believe that ‘what most is wanting in 
the Democratic party is a bold, intrepid, wise and patriotic leader.’49 Yet attempts to 
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invoke memories of Jackson and Jefferson went far beyond simply trying to cast the next 
leader of the party in relation to these men. Rather, Democrats tried to make sense of the 
party’s fracture in 1860 and its current course. An editorial in the New York World in 
August 1873 claimed that it was the Douglas-Breckinridge split that was the point of the 
party’s disintegration and that this ‘should be borne in mind in any discussion of 
reorganization.’50 In discourse typical of the Reconstruction-era Democracy, the World 
asserted that ‘We must take the party as it existed in the days of Jackson and Van Buren, 
consider the causes of the split in 1860, and compare notes with facts as they now exist.’51 
In conclusion, the editorial called for Democrats not to forget the Liberal Republican 
disaster, but to ‘bid all wandering Democrats welcome – not asking where they have been 
… [and] bid all honest Republicans’ to ‘come under one head … the broad banner of 
Jefferson and a party that has a purpose higher than the greed of office.’52 As Democrats 
came to terms with the 1872 defeat, local factional disputes created a conflict between 
men who believed that the party needed to ‘return to the faith of its fathers,’ and those 
who sought to create temporary parties to defeat Radicalism. At the same time, the 
national Democratic leadership created a coherent narrative of a party that ‘by the sacred 
name and memory of Jefferson will repel the present assaults at the very root of our most 
cherished rights.’ 53  In doing so, Democrats hoped to draw upon their party’s past 
commitment to a limited federal government and laissez-faire economics in order to cast 
the party as one that favoured honest government.54 
During 1873 and 1874, Democrats frequently imagined how men such as Jackson 
and Jefferson would have reacted to the economic crisis. For hard-money advocates, this 
presented a clear opportunity; Jackson’s opposition to a centralized national banking 
system and advocacy of specie was a prime example of how Old Hickory’s legacy could 
be appropriated for the present political climate. Hard-money Democrats reminded their 
constituents that the ‘traditional policy of the Democrats is that of a currency redeemable 
in hard money’ and that any professed party member who did not proscribe to this view 
‘are not the party, and misrepresent its well-known and hitherto universally admitted 
tenets.’55 Moreover, they urged party supporters to become more active in their support 
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of the Democracy as ‘the grand fundamental principles of the Democratic creed [are] as 
vital now to the life of the republican as when first spoken by Jefferson,’ and stressed that 
‘the mission of the party of Jefferson, of Madison, and of Jackson has been to guard the 
people against the encroachments of unlicensed power.’56 By mid-1874, many believed 
that their appropriation of antebellum Democratic principles were having their desired 
effect, as ‘Jeffersonian Democrats’ had begun to exert more influence in Congress than 
the ‘weak backed [accommodationist] Democrats’ who had been so influential 
throughout Reconstruction.57 
The conflict within the Democratic party over financial policy was a deep-seated 
problem that many party leaders believed penetrated to the core of what the party 
represented. References to the party’s history were as much the result of factional conflict 
over leadership of the party than they were attempts to draw voters away from the 
Republican ranks. While Democrats in the postbellum era did seek a return to the 
principles of Jacksonian Democracy, the simultaneous desire of party leaders to move 
past dead issues and become the party of the future ensured that the party would not be 
able to return fully to its Jacksonian roots.58  
Desperate to ease the financial burdens on his constituents in the Midwest, George 
H. Pendleton was an ardent advocate of the greenback as a solution to the nation’s 
problems. Pendleton had long hankered for the presidency and hoped to achieve this goal 
through a thorough reorganisation of his party’s power base. With the advent of the 
money question to national prominence in 1873, he returned to the fray in the hope that 
he could shunt hard-money northeasterners from the party leadership and reestablish the 
national leadership under his directive in the Midwest.59 Pendleton’s attempts to remodel 
the Democracy on the foundations of the money question, while by no means 
unachievable, largely failed due to the party’s reluctance to clash publicly over the issue.60 
After fourteen years of deep factional conflict, sectionalism, and failed attempts at third 
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party movements, most Democrats sought party regularity and electoral success over the 
continuation of internal power struggles and any more Pendletonian ‘New Departures.’ 
 
Reorganisation, Resurgence, and Reconciliation: The Elections of 1874 
 
Following Democratic successes in the 1873 elections, party leaders turned their 
attention to the upcoming midterms in 1874. While the party had seen a remarkable 
reversal of its fortunes since the Liberal Republican disaster of 1872, reorganisation 
remained the prime focus moving forward. Central to Democratic resurgence was the 
‘redemption’ of southern states from Republican rule. The party devised various 
strategies to achieve this goal, from continuing its criticism of unjust Republican military 
despotism to the creation of White Leagues aimed at intimidating and discouraging the 
overwhelmingly Republican freedmen’s vote.61 Yet northern Democrats also faced tasks 
of their own. While the party was resurgent in crucial swing states such as New York and 
Ohio, Democrats in Republican strongholds such as Massachusetts sought a total 
realignment of party strategy at the grassroots level. Scholars have been reluctant to assess 
these local shifts, focusing more on southern ‘redemption’, Bourbonism, and the 
emergence of national leaders such as Samuel J. Tilden.62 Yet, the actions of Democrats 
in places such as Boston provide significant insights into the professionalisation of 
politics in the late nineteenth century.63 Moreover, understanding how Democrats were 
able to secure victories in Republican strongholds can provide a better sense of the 
success of different strategies. 
Despite the optimistic outlook of Massachusetts Democrats in 1873, widespread 
defeats that year forced the party to re-evaluate its strategy. Party leaders were 
disappointed by their failure to secure victories in Boston where, due to the significant 
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working-class and Irish-American population, they had hoped to run well.  At a meeting 
of the Boston Democratic City and Ward Committee, called in February 1874 to 
reorganise the party, prominent lawyer and Democrat, A. O. Brewster, proclaimed that 
‘the Democratic party in Boston has come to be a byword of reproach … Instead of 
fidelity to the truth and honor to principle, instead of manliness and straightforward 
dealing, it has from time to time gone off and allied itself with Liberal Republicans, who 
have cheated and defrauded it.’64 The root of Brewster’s disappointment with the party 
lay in the accommodationist arguments of the New Departure Democrats, and he urged a 
return to party antecedents. Brewster stressed the need for independent thought among 
Democrats that, coupled with party unity, would ensure the Democracy would ‘keep pace 
with the spirit of the age; to adhere with fidelity and honor to those acknowledged 
principles which Jefferson enunciated, and which will stand the test of party criticism for 
ages yet to come.’65 Brewster’s arguments were not strikingly new to the party in 1874. 
He appealed to the common feelings of unity and honor that were held together by a 
typical appeal to Democratic institutional memory. But it was in the words of Boston 
Democrat, Patrick A. Collins, that a new approach to local party organisation was to be 
found. 
Collins felt deeply aggrieved that the Republicans had managed to obtain control 
of Boston. For Collins, the reason for Democratic losses lay in the lack of grassroots 
organisation and activism in comparison to the more vigorous Republican local 
machinery. Collins noted that the city’s Democracy had ‘No headquarters; no continuous 
unity’ and that it was ‘every man for himself.’66 The result of this system, Collins argued, 
was ‘demoralization and defeat.’67 Instead, he suggested that, 
 
What we need is an organization comprising the best men in our party, with 
rooms open all year … I want an organization of our party right here in 
Boston that will crucify traitors, and not permit them to play false year after 
year; one that will work in the Wards not six weeks, not ten weeks, but 
fifty-two weeks in the year, if necessary.68  
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Collins’ vision for the Democracy reflected the growing professionalisation in politics 
during the nineteenth century that recognised the need for more centralised, rigorously 
organised parties that could no longer simply rely on the enthusiasm of constituents to 
race to the polls. He recognised that it was not simply newspapers that could engage the 
public and that a more concerted effort by the party hierarchy was needed to ensure party 
unity, discipline, and public enthusiasm. 
Over the following months, the Massachusetts Democratic party engaged in a 
vigorous reform of its organisation, establishing headquarters throughout the Boston 
wards, attacking the local and national Republican administration for widespread 
corruption, and appealing to constituents with hard-money arguments. The result was 
remarkable, with widespread Democratic victories in the congressional races and even 
the election of the first Democratic governor of Massachusetts since 1851. Speaking 
about the victory, Leverett Saltonstall, a victorious Democrat, said that ‘This is the 
proudest day of my life … It is a day for our country, it is a day for Massachusetts. It is 
almost too good … I feel that the party in possession, the Republican party, is gone; it is 
no use to talk of it in the future; its work is done and its day is gone, its own best men are 
disgruntled with it.’69 
Saltonstall’s assertion was shared by Collins, who went even further in predicting 
the future of party politics in the United States. He remarked that the victory ‘was 
something more than a Democratic victory. It was a revolt of conscience of the people of 
Massachusetts.’70 Collins recognised the limitations of the victory in that ‘the most we 
can do … for the next two years is to check bad legislation,’ but the ability of Democrats 
to win such significant victories in a Republican stronghold could not be ignored: 
 
[o]ur work is that of creating a new and irresistible party. The Republican 
party is broken up and destroyed beyond reconstruction … The question 
some time since was, what party should succeed it? There is no longer any 
question of that kind. The Democratic party is, beyond a doubt, to form the 
nucleus of the great reform party of the future which is to rule for twenty 
years to come.71 
  
On April 27, 1874 Congressman Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar of 
Mississippi delivered a eulogy in the House of Representatives for the late Massachusetts 
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senator, Charles Sumner. Lamar grew up in Georgia where he graduated from Emory 
College before moving to Mississippi to practice law. An ardent southern nationalist and 
earnest Democrat in his early years, Lamar was soon drawn into a career in politics, being 
elected to the House of Representatives in 1856 before becoming one of the most 
promising southern leaders of the Democracy and drafting Georgia’s ordinance of 
secession. Following the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter, Lamar raised and 
funded the 19th Mississippi Infantry Regiment, served as a lieutenant colonel, and was 
later appointed by Jefferson Davis as the Confederate minister to Russia. On his return to 
the South, he was disenfranchised under the Republicans’ Reconstruction measures, but 
continued to enjoy an active role in Democratic and southern politics, being a member of 
the Mississippi Constitutional Conventions in 1865 and 1868.72 By the mid-1870s, Lamar 
had become one of the most eloquent southern Democratic leaders. Despite his southern 
nationalist antecedents, he was at the forefront of attempts to ensure lasting reconciliation 
between North and South.73 In the aftermath of the Panic of 1873, and amidst the growing 
strength of the Democrats, Lamar used his eulogy on Sumner as an opportunity to further 
the aims of reconciliation. He claimed that southerners did not want to wipe out memories 
of the war, but ‘would rather that both sections should gather up the glories won by each 
section, not envious, but proud of each other, and regard them a common heritage of 
American valor.’74 The Mississippian hoped that future generations would speak ‘not of 
northern prowess or southern courage, but of the heroism, fortitude and courage of 
Americans in a war of ideas.’75 By invoking memories of the war in broad national terms 
that celebrated the sacrifices of both North and South, Lamar avoided raising differences 
between the sections that would threaten the return of Democratic power to the southern 
states.  
Lamar’s attempt to create a unifying message of reconciliation had mixed success. 
Both Republican and Democratic newspapers from Sumner’s home-state of 
Massachusetts praised the ‘progressive’ and ‘real reconstructionist’ Lamar for delivering 
not just a ‘generous and tender’ eulogy, but ‘the most significant and hopeful utterance’ 
from the South since the war’s end that demonstrated that ‘the war is indeed over, and 
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that universal amnesty is in order.’ 76 Despite receiving praise from some leading southern 
Democratic editors for the speech being ‘not merely a merited compliment to 
Massachussetts … but a peace offering from the South to the North’ that ‘will do much 
towards bridging the bloody chasm which has separated the two sections,’ Lamar’s praise 
of a man who had assailed the South his whole life angered as many southerners as it did 
reassure northerners.77 The Ouachita Telegraph condemned Lamar for celebrating a man 
who had ‘nothing … left on record … to show that he was even human in his feelings, 
unless it be that he was the champion of negro equality.’78 The response to Lamar’s eulogy 
demonstrated two important political realities to Democrats: firstly, that the rhetoric of 
reconciliation was growing in potency and that southern leaders such as Lamar were being 
successful in convincing northerners of the South’s willingness to place the conflict over 
slavery in the past; secondly, that reinstating white supremacy would be a crucial part of 
the South’s future. Southern Democrats, and northern Democrats for that matter, viewed 
America as a white man’s democracy. Even if the party emphasised matters of economy 
and reform, underlying these arguments was a deep commitment to racial inequality.  
While Lamar’s eulogy gained the praise of northerners and southerners for its 
reconciliatory message, violence across the South contradicted the congressman’s claims. 
After the massacre of 150 blacks, some of whom were Union veterans, by an armed band 
of southern Democrats led by the former Confederate Captain C. C. Nash at Colfax, 
Louisiana, in April 1873, Republicans’ waved the bloody shirt with extra vigour. 79 
Despite the actions of southern Democrats however, the northern press sought to distance 
the party from the actions. The New York World denounced the ‘excesses and outrages 
committed by the Radical negroes’ and claimed that the freedmen had ‘committed 
immeasurable outrages’ against local whites. 80  Moreover, Democrats condemned 
southern Republicans who had ‘relied upon Federal bayonets to protect them in their 
outrages and robberies in the South.’81 Scholars have shown meticulously how southern 
Democrats increasingly relied on the violent suppression of the Republican vote 
throughout the 1870s, but less attention has been given to the party’s northern editors 
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manipulated reports of southern violence to see them as Republican ploys. They argued 
that Republicans continually recounted ‘the imaginary outrages of the white leaguers,’ 
that were ‘paid by the secret fund of the republican party,’ and were influential in turning 
northern public opinion against Reconstruction and the Republicans.82 
With popular discontent growing towards Reconstruction, Democrats believed 
that ‘the time has come for us to be bold, [and] attack.’83 The main strength of the party 
lay in eroding public confidence in Republican rule. Democrats were quick to expose the 
pitfalls of extravagant Republican spending, while new corruption scandals seemed to be 
uncovered every week across the nation. In the House of Representatives on June 9, 1874, 
R. Milton Speer of Pennsylvania detailed the results of ‘carpetbag’ rule in Arkansas. 
Speer argued that the low level of violence there meant that there was ‘no ground … for 
plundering the Government … under the pretense of preserving the peace and protecting 
the negroes.’84 Speer detailed the situation in Arkansas where corrupt district court judges 
granted bail to prisoners who had committed capital offences and accepted bribes to 
include nolle prosequi in certain cases.85 Moreover, the congressman explained how US 
Marshal William A. Britton was able to claim over $100,000 for court costs between 
August 12 and November 9, 1872 for taking prisoners on Native-American land and using 
fake identities for deputies who would be paid for their work.86 Accusations of Republican 
misgovernment were commonplace in Democratic speeches, editorials, and pamphlets 
throughout 1874.  They had a significant impact in the aftermath of the crash of 1873 and 
national scandals.  
The campaign of 1874 marked a distinctive change in grassroots politics in the 
postbellum United States. Scholars have traced the emergence of southern White 
Leagues, local militias, and Red Shirts throughout the mid-1870s. The 1874 midterms are 
regarded as an important transition between the federal suppression of violence that had 
characterised southern Reconstruction up to that point and the decline of federal 
intervention in southern affairs as Reconstruction was dismantled.87 While ‘Redemption’ 
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varied to some degree in each state, nearly all followed a remarkably similar pattern:  
newspapers and Taxpayers’ Conventions stressed the need to overthrow an oppressive 
Republican regime; this resulted in the creation of white-line organizations throughout 
the state; Democrats then publicly professed their peaceful intentions while 
simultaneously violently intimidating black and white Republican supporters; finally, 
with a federal administration reluctant to deploy troops, violence would spread across the 
state with impunity resulting in Democratic victories.88  
Outside the South Democrats used similar condemnations of the Grant 
administration to secure victories. Party organs attacked the administration’s taxation 
policy on the grounds that it placed an unfair burden on the working classes. They also 
assailed excessive spending and support of private corporations, unconstitutional 
intervention in southern affairs, widespread corruption, and blamed the Panic of 1873 on 
Republican economic mismanagement. Congressional Democrats repeated the same 
accusations as party organs, claiming that the Republican ‘party has ceased to govern 
wisely, to advance; it is no longer progressive … and will surely die.’89 All these proved 
successful points of attack for the party as Democrats sought to turn public opinion away 
from the Republicans’ waving of the bloody shirt and towards examples of Republican 
misgovernment.  
In their state platforms, Democrats assailed the Republicans for inflaming racial 
relations, claiming that the new civil rights bill under discussion in Congress made a ‘war 
of the races’ imminent.90 Furthermore, they highlighted the familiar tropes of Republican 
corruption, the need to decrease taxation to ease burdens of the working classes, and the 
necessity of the protective tariff to be repealed.91 One issue that the party still could not 
agree on, however, was that of specie resumption. While Democrats such as Richard 
Vaux, Samuel J. Tilden, and Allen G. Thurman worked tirelessly to ensure hard-money 
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platforms were drawn up across the North, greenbackers led by George H. Pendleton 
sought the opposite. Vaux, in particular, was worried about the Midwest where leading 
Democrats including Pendleton, Thurman, Hendricks, and Voorhees were unable to 
‘harmonize either on principle or in effort.’92 
The 1874 elections demonstrated how far the Democracy had come in two years, 
but also raised warnings about the coherence of the national party. While Democrats 
managed to gain eight seats in the Senate, it was the House that saw the most dramatic 
change in its membership. When the 43rd Congress opened on December 1, 1873, the 
Democrats could claim just 83 congressmen in comparison to 200 Republicans. But by 
the time the 44th Congress began, 176 Democrats took their seats, 118 of whom did so for 
the first time.93 While the party saw significant gains in the South, picking up net gains in 
every southern state apart from Kentucky, it was in the North that the party saw its most 
significant swings.94 More important than how many seats the Democrats gained in 1874, 
was where they saw dramatic turnarounds in their electoral results. Firstly, not only was 
the party resurgent in states where it had historically been strong, for example in New 
Jersey where they gained four seats, but Democrats also made meaningful gains in 
Republican strongholds such as Massachusetts. Secondly, the party picked up its largest 
numerical gains in the strategically important states of national significance, in New 
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. In New York, not only did the Democrats gain a senator 
in Francis Kernan, but the party also picked up seven seats in the House of 
Representatives, a feat that was matched in Ohio. In Pennsylvania, however, where the 
Democrats’ alliance with the Liberal Republicans had resulted in the party’s largest defeat 
across the North in 1872, the Democracy gained thirteen seats in the House; the party’s 
biggest gain nationally.95  
For the Democratic party, these results were of national significance. The gradual 
return of southern states to Democratic control highlighted the growing confidence of the 
South in the national party to end Reconstruction and return white man’s rule. Over the 
following months, southern Democrats would call for the party to put up a united front. 
State-level fusion parties, such as the Conservative parties of Virginia, and the 
Conservative-Democrats of Mississippi, would continue to endure but, all fought for the 
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redemption of southern states from Republican rule, and the reinstating of the Democratic 
party and white man’s rule. Rather than pursuing fusion strategies, southern Democrats 
called for ‘a distinctive line of policy, Democratic in tone and tendency.’ They believed 
that the Liberal Republicans’’ natural place was in the Democratic ranks, and that ‘they 
will go there inevitably, if the Democratic party presents an unbroken front and genuine 
evidences of practical reform.’96 Crucially, for the first time since before the Civil War, 
the Democracy was also able to secure significant victories in the northern states. With 
three resounding victories in the key states of New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 
northern Democrats demonstrated that the Republicans were vulnerable to attacks on 
economic policy in the aftermath of the Panic of 1873, that northern voters were 
convinced by the Democratic portrayal of Republicanism as corrupt and in need of 
reform, and most significantly, that the party’s central message of the need for sectional 
reconciliation resonated with voters as never before. The Democrats were fortunate in 
1874 in that the economic depression lent credence to their arguments surrounding 
Republican misgovernment, but their castigation of the Republicans as corrupt partisans 
who were willing to defraud the American people and obstruct sectional reconciliation in 
order to hold onto power was a powerful message. The question remained whether the 
party could turn a midterm victory into a presidential success in 1876. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 A Democratic Crisis: The Disputed Centennial Election and the Third Party 
Challenge, 1875–1878 
 
 
On February 10, 1875 Congressman William M. Robbins of North Carolina 
reflected on the Democratic electoral victories of the past autumn. Proud that his party 
had managed to secure its first majority in the House since before the Civil War, he 
proclaimed that, 
 
The great North has seen through the mists of misrepresentation with 
which radicalism has so long hid the truth respecting the affairs of the 
South, and in the fall elections pronounced her emphatic condemnation of 
the men in power. We in the South understand what this means. It means 
that our fellow-countrymen of the Northern States are willing to trust our 
patriotic fidelity to the common country … and we look forward with 
confident anticipations to the achievement of a glorious victory by the 
conservative and Democratic voters of the North and South in the great 
contest of 1876, when a President who reveres the Constitution and 
respects popular rights shall take control of affairs, and the centennial of 
American Independence shall dawn upon our country happy and united, 
and our free Government rescued from the perils which now threaten it.1 
 
With this dramatic shift in electoral fortunes, Democrats viewed the 1876 election as an 
opportunity for the party to win back the White House. Yet, these hopes would not be 
realised and contested results led many to advocate armed resistance to the inauguration 
of another Republican president. While the centennial election did not lead to the outbreak 
of a second civil war, the actions of Democrats throughout the electoral crisis had 
significant repercussions for the party. The crisis of 1876–1877 kept the issue of civil 
service reform firmly in the national political arena, but the role played by leading 
Democrats such as Samuel Randall in enabling the Republican party to retain control of 
the presidency shook party supporters’ faith in the organisation, and resulted in 
widespread support for third-party movements. 
Michael Holt’s By One Vote remains the most comprehensive study of 
Democratic and Republican factionalism and the role of party leaders in solving the 
																																								 																				
1 Congressional Record 43rd Congress, Second Session, p. 37. 
115	
	
crisis.2 His central contention is that the Republicans’ victory in 1876 was a remarkable 
reversal in the party’s fortunes in the aftermath of the Democratic victories of 1874. 
According to Holt, the Democrats were well positioned for a return to the presidency in 
1876, but party leaders’ decision to focus on Republican corruption and civil service 
reform rather than providing an effective plan to solve the economic crisis was a strategic 
error.3 Contrary to the assertions of C. Vann Woodward that economic bargaining was at 
the core of the so-called Compromise of 1877, Holt joins Keith Polakoff, Michael Les 
Benedict, and Charles W. Calhoun in being sceptical of this thesis. 4  Holt adroitly 
demonstrates that it was northern congressional Democrats who helped to settle the 
electoral crisis of 1876-1877 rather than southern Democrats striking a bargain with 
Republicans for the promise of a southern railroad.5 Holt’s assessment of the disputed 
election is convincing but undervalues the importance of reform to the Democrats’ 
postbellum electoral strategy and the transitional moment during which the 1876 canvass 
took place. Economic policy had been a constant sticking point to Democrats who were 
enduring a deep-seated struggle over their party’s commitment to laissez-faire. Reform 
became emblematic of the Democracy’s opposition to Republican government and in 
1876 was the only issue that Democrats could create a coherent narrative around to 
portray their partisan enemies as obstructing sectional reconciliation and national 
prosperity. Other studies have paid attention to state-level contested electoral returns, and 
have placed the centennial election in the context of the end of Reconstruction and the 
return of white supremacist rule to the South.6 While it has been demonstrated that the 
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presidential election was a crucial moment in the downfall of Reconstruction and the 
return of ‘home rule’, the treatment of how 1876 influenced national party politics during 
the Gilded Age has suffered. However, scholars who have moved beyond 1877 have 
provided some significant insights into late-nineteenth century politics. Jerome 
Mushkat’s biography of New York Democrat and former mayor of the empire city, 
Fernando Wood, has shown how similar factional conflicts continued within the 
Democracy following 1877.7 Thomas Mach’s recent biography of George H. Pendleton 
has further stressed the idea of continuity through a focus on Pendleton’s aim of currency 
and civil service reform.8 This chapter views the events of 1876–1877 in the context of 
the Democracy’s transitional state, and demonstrates that the Democrats’ focus on reform 
in the centennial election was the logical result of the party’s postbellum crusade to 
overthrow Republicanism. Moreover, it asserts that the northern Democrats’ 
acquiescence in the decision of the Electoral Commission that found Hayes to be the 
victor, had detrimental consequences for the Democratic party that have not yet been 
addressed by historians. 
 
Race, Reconciliation and the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
 
The resounding success of the party in the 1874 contests galvanised Democratic 
assaults on Republican southern policy. Democrats hoped to use contested Louisiana 
results to help push the South towards a full ‘redemption.’9 They had seen great success 
in branding themselves as the ‘party of financial honor and financial integrity’ and the 
Republicans as the party of ‘corruption, fraud[,] … chicanery’ and ‘financial Ruin,’ and 
Democrats argued that federal intervention in the Louisiana elections was a desperate 
partisan attempt to unconstitutionally hold onto power in the Pelican State.10 Like the rest 
of the South, black and white Republicans in Louisiana had been the victims of violent 
																																								 																				
Presidential Election Commission of 1876 and 1877,’ International Review of History & Political Science 
Vol. 26, No. 3 (1989), pp. 38–52; Lee Scott Theisen, ‘A “Fair Count” in Florida: General Lew Wallace and 
the Contested Presidential Election of 1876,’ Hayes Historical Journal Vol. 2, No. 1 (1978), pp. 20–30; 
John C. Reid, ‘The New York Times and the Theft of the 1876 Presidential Election,’ Journal of American 
Culture Vo. 10, No. 2 (Summer, 1987), pp. 35–41. 
7 Mushkat, Fernando Wood, pp. 215–23. 
8 Mach, ‘Gentleman George. 
9 Harry T. Williams, ‘The Louisiana Unification Movement of 1873,’ Journal of Southern History Vol. 11, 
No. 3 (Aug, 1945), pp. 349–69; Michael Perman, The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, 1869–1879 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), pp. 137–8; Hogue, Uncivil War, pp. 116–43. 
10 Boston Post, Nov. 6, 1874; New York World, March 27, 1874. 
117	
	
intimidation by Democratic paramilitary organisations, but during the 1874 contests a 
pitched battle between the Crescent City White League and New Orleans’ police erupted. 
The Battle of Liberty Place was the result of the contested gubernatorial election of 1872 
between Republican William Kellogg and Democrat John McEnery that still remained 
unsettled in 1874. When federal troops were deployed to quell the violence, the White 
Leaguers retreated from the city and a regiment of US soldiers would remain in the 
Crescent City until the end of Reconstruction. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 ‘The Louisiana Outrages – Attack upon the Police in the Streets of New Orleans,’ Harper’s 
Weekly, October 3, 1874 
 
When Congress reconvened in early 1875, southern Democrats immediately 
attacked the administration’s continued determination to deploy the military during 
election season. In the House of Representatives, William Robbins  attacked the ‘selfish 
ambitions of the radical leaders’ that had made the South ‘full of violence, disorder, and 
bloodshed.’11 Robbins was not the sole Democrat to voice his anger at the Republicans’ 
southern policy in early 1875, as James M. Leach (D-NC), Matt W. Ransom (D-NC), and 
John W. Stevenson (D-KY), all condemned an administration that they believed had 
‘ceased to govern wisely,’ and created a ‘people so lost, so blind … as the people of the 
South are.’12 Violence in New Orleans reflected a wider trend toward organised violence 
during southern elections. Despite the presence of armed troops focused on ensuring 
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freedmen’s voting rights by ‘suppressing banditti,’ White Leagues had proved effective 
in helping to return political power in the South to the Democracy.13  
Throughout 1874, Mississippians had witnessed widespread racial and political 
violence that had left hundreds dead. Most firmly in the minds of the state’s citizens were 
the riots that had pervaded Vicksburg in December and driven the African-American 
Sheriff Peter Crosby from the city. The violence had left dozens of blacks dead and was 
only quelled by the deployment of federal troops.14 With the fracture of the Republicans 
over the nomination of Governor Adelbert Ames in 1875, however, Democrats sensed a 
return to power in the state. Under pressure from Ames, the state legislature passed a new 
Militia Act in the spring that empowered the governor to organise militia to put down 
violence. In response, Mississippi Democrats reasoned the new legislation ‘had the effect 
of inducing the conservatives and democrats … who desired a change of administration 
… to think that [the bill demonstrated] the determination to carry the election by force or 
intimidation, and by military violence if necessary.’ 15  A particular grievance of 
Mississippi Democrats was the racial composition of militias. Just as General James 
Longstreet, the only high-ranking former-Confederate to join the Republican party, had 
commanded the alliance of metropolitan police and African American militiamen at the 
Battle of Liberty Place, the Mississippi militia act allowed for the recruitment and 
deployment of former-slaves to suppress white electoral violence.  Democrats deplored 
the arming and recruitment of blacks as not only a desperate partisan attempt to sustain 
Republican rule, but as an attempt to humiliate and disempower whites in Mississippi. As 
they had done in Louisiana, whites banded together in White Leagues, gathered weapons, 
and began a systematic programme of violence and intimidation to keep Republican 
voters away from the polls in the autumn. White paramilitary groups broke up Republican 
meetings, threatened black families with violence, and intimidated white Republicans on 
the pretext that Ames was willing to use his own militia to do the same to Democrats.16 
When the systematic attacks on Republican voters degenerated into massacres in the 
streets of southern cities, southern Democrats refused to acknowledge any involvement 
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in the fracas, claiming that the violence was either the result of private disputes, newly-
armed blacks, or  ‘entirely unpremeditated.’17 
Insistent that the Republicans were obstructing sectional reconciliation, 
congressional Democrats vilified Ames for having ‘conjured up a spirit of despair and 
anxiety upon the part of the unhappy people over whom he had been placed to rule which 
threatened to wrap that State in flame and blood.’18 Democrats had found it difficult to 
adapt to a political environment in which African Americans were part of the political 
nation, but by the mid-1870s their condemnation of Republicans as obstructers of 
sectional reconciliation began to undermine northerners’ support for federal intervention 
in the South. The Democrats’ attack on southern Republican governance was not simply 
the continued repetition of the well-worn tropes of ‘tyranny’ and ‘despotism,’ but was 
deeply embedded within a reconciliatory tone. Confederate veteran Matt Ransom spoke 
at length in the Senate in February, fusing memories of the Lost Cause and wartime 
Unionism. He said that General Lee’s name: 
  
now inspires me with higher and purer devotion to my country. It elevates 
me above sectional lines, it lifts me over local and temporary prejudices 
… It was my fortune to be at Appomattox Court House to see General Lee 
and General Grant side by side. That scene can never fade from my 
memory … Instead of sectional passions, divisions, strifes, let the blood, 
the tears, the affections of American soldiers, be they from the North or 
from the South, form a bow of peace that shall stand forever as the bond 
and arch of a united people. Upon it there will be drops of sorrow, but it 
will be radiant with honor and patriotic duty and hope.19  
 
Congressional Democrats frequently came to the defence of the violent attacks 
perpetrated by southern whites, blaming Republicans for African American dependence 
on federal protection. They claimed Republican intervention had instead ‘of teaching [the 
freedman] to use wisely the gifts he has received … keep him pining for some great 
imaginary blessing still ahead, some El Dorado … to which your legislation is to transport 
him.’20 In fact, Democrats argued that there was no hatred between southern whites and 
freedmen, and that Republicans had fabricated this for the ‘partisan purposes’ of 
justifying the use of military force during southern elections.21 By making explicit links 
																																								 																				
17 Mississippi in 1875, pp. LIV, 395, 409. 
18 Ibid., p. LXXII. 
19 Congressional Record, 44th Cong., 2d Session, pp. 62–3. 
20 Ibid., pp. 36–7. 
21 Ibid., p. 139. 
120	
	
between Republican misgovernment, ongoing violence, and racial tension, Democrats 
argued that only by overthrowing Republican rule could sectional reconciliation and 
racial cooperation become reality. 
Five years before being signed into law in 1875, Charles Sumner’s Civil Rights 
Act had been introduced into the Senate. It proposed to protect equal treatment in public 
accommodations, transportation, and education, alongside guaranteeing jury service for 
African Americans. Co-sponsored by the former Democrat, Benjamin Butler, Sumner’s 
bill provided the legal grounds for racial integration in public accommodation and 
services. By the time it was passed in the aftermath of Sumner’s death in 1874, the lofty 
ambitions of its author had been curtailed by dwindling northern public commitment to 
racial equality. Despite the bill’s watering down, the Democratic press latched onto the 
bill as another example of unwarranted federal intervention that forced racial equality 
upon an unwilling white population and endangered sectional reconciliation. 22  The 
Indiana State Sentinel claimed that ‘the passage of the civil rights bill has loosened the 
floodgates of hate as they were never loosened before.’23 Democratic newspapers across 
the nation reported widespread opposition to the bill, citing the examples of a manager of 
the Louisville Public Library refusing admission to a black barber, and of New York and 
Cincinnati hotels turning away black customers.24 Democrats were uniformly opposed to 
the Civil Rights Bill, and sought to utilise white-line politics to suppress freedmen’s rights 
and undermine Reconstruction. 
Violent intimidation played an important role in ensuring black and white 
Republicans stayed away from the polls, but Democrats knew the importance of avoiding 
disturbances on election day. Had reports flooded in of a ‘reign of terror’ in the South, 
party leaders knew what the outcome would be – the election would be voided by 
Republicans’ interventionism and home rule would once again slip from their grasp.25 
Instead, by conducting peaceful elections, Democratic leaders believed that northern 
onlookers would be unable to deny the legitimacy of any contest and Republicans would 
be forced to accept the result. The chairman of the state Democratic Executive Committee 
of Mississippi, James Z. George, sent telegrams to county level Democratic committees 
that read, ‘Tell our people to use every effort to secure a peaceful election and prevent 
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disorder. This must be done, if possible, so far as we are concerned. Faith must be kept 
in the peace agreement.’26 In Mississippi, Democrats disparaged reports of violence as 
election day approached, claiming that ‘It is entirely false that armed men are patrolling 
the streets and roads of Yazoo, with ropes at their saddles,’ and that when violence had 
erupted Democrats were quick to claim that ‘Negroes were, beyond question, the first to 
exhibit guns … all our acts incident to a more vigorous campaign are misrepresented by 
the party seeking to hold power.’27  
Violence and intimidation would become a central theme in southern elections in 
1876, and the Republicans hoped to use testimony from the Senate’s investigation of the 
Mississippi election for political gain in 1876.28 Yet by the end of 1875, the conflation of 
racial and reconciliatory rhetoric had become a powerful tool for the Democrats. Public 
support of a continued federal presence in the South had begun to wane and so had 
commitment to racial equality. Despite this, the Democracy still had one barrier to 
overcome to ensure its return to the White House. Because many northerners feared the 
return of the ex-Rebels to national power, the bloody shirt remained a potent political tool 
for the Republicans. The Democrats had yet to think of a viable strategy to distance their 
party from its wartime taint of disloyalty, but with the hundredth anniversary of the 
Declaration of Independence just around the corner, however, Democratic leaders hoped 
to reinvigorate the party’s patriotic appeal. 
 
1876: A Centennial Crisis 
 
Democrats began the nation’s centennial year with a profound sense of optimism. 
Despite dissension over currency reform, many Democrats interpreted the party’s recent 
electoral success as a sign that they would soon be returning to the White House. On April 
1, 1876, ex-Governor William Dorsheimer of New York proclaimed that, ‘I don’t believe 
that [the Republican] party which has become so corrupt can be reformed, while it 
remains in power.’29 Despite Democratic hopes of riding the reform issue to the White 
House, the centennial contest threw both the Democratic party and the nation into another 
major crisis. Disputed electoral returns in Louisiana, Florida and Oregon threatened to 
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plunge the country into renewed civil war, yet the Republicans and Democrats were able 
to reach a compromise over the winter of 1876–1877 to resolve the unprecedented 
situation. Following a series of bargains between southern Democrats and Republicans, 
and some dramatic u-turns from northern Democrats, the Republican Rutherford B. 
Hayes was sworn into office and Reconstruction was effectively ended. 
On March 13, 1876, the New York Herald claimed that the country had been 
‘afflicted with a “Centennial” mania,’ and that American life was being consumed by the 
commemoration.30 The paper wrote that ‘we have “Centennial coffee” for breakfast and 
take a morning stroll with a “Centennial cigar,” that ‘Fashion demands a “Centennial hat” 
and a “Centennial scarf,”’ and that ‘politicians already talk about a “Centennial canvass” 
in which there shall be no candidate in whose veins do not run the blue blood of the 
Revolution.’31 To many Democrats, the centennial offered an opportunity to demonstrate 
how far the nation had come since the Civil War. Much has been written by scholars 
about African American involvement in the Centennial as an exercise in constructing 
usable pasts, how relations with Native Americans deteriorated as a result of the 
exhibition, and how the Philadelphia celebrations were used to forward sectional 
reconciliation.32 Despite the clear plans of politicians to use the Centennial for party gain, 
little has been written on the partisan dimensions of the Centennial celebration.33 For 
northern Democrats the Centennial presented an opportunity to demonstrate that the 
South had accepted the military results of the war. In turn, they hoped that by emphasising 
their party’s nationalism they could blunt Republican bloody shirt rhetoric, ensure the 
restoration of home rule and return the South to Democratic control. The Baltimore Sun, 
the city’s leading Democratic newspaper, predicted a ‘year full of incident,’ in which for 
‘the first time in many years there is a considerable change in the political complexion at 
Washington.’34 
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No matter how deeply thoughts about the Centennial pervaded the nation, not all 
Americans felt optimistic about the celebrations. Southerners felt particularly aggrieved 
that rather than finding an answer to the economic crisis, northerners were more 
concerned about canonising the Union war effort. The New Orleans Democrat asked its 
readership, ‘What has the hundredth anniversary of American independence given us but 
degradation for our State and these bitter and shameful things?’35 The paper claimed that 
if Louisiana attended the Centennial celebrations, ‘she is there … in rags and chains, and 
because she has been driven there by the whips and kicks of those who rule over and 
disgrace her. Louisiana at the Centennial is indeed a bitter, burning, infamous lie.’36 For 
northern Democrats, this posed a problem. While they hoped to use the Centennial to 
solidify the relationship between the northern and southern wings of their party, the 
bitterness felt by some southern whites at their treatment during Reconstruction did not 
project the reconciliatory spirit that northern Democrats had hoped for. Yet, while some 
southern Democrats disowned the Centennial, their northern co-partisans proved ready to 
embrace it, at least cautiously. 
While the New York Herald claimed that the ‘Centennial is perhaps the most 
remarkable event that will happen in our day,’ the paper also tried to manage public 
expectations of the celebration.37 According to the paper, Philadelphia was ‘in an ecstasy 
of anticipation and preparation,’ but the Herald warned that similar celebrations in Europe 
had shown ‘the results of centuries of civilization,’ and that in comparison, ‘America will 
show the results of one century of hard work … We shall learn, if we apply the lesson 
aright, that we are not the greatest of nations; that, with our strength and wealth, we may 
sit at the feet of the elder world and see how we have been surpassed in the achievements 
of human genius and skill.’ 38  As the Centennial approached, managing expectations 
became increasingly difficult. Baltimore newspapers reported that ‘on no other former 
occasion has the gala display of flags been so universal in the city.’39 Focus on the nation’s 
future became a principal theme during the Centennial, and Democrats hoped to 
appropriate it in order to repair sectional relations within their party and parry the 
Republicans’ efforts to keep Civil War memories alive. Newspaper editors made 
																																								 																				
35 New Orleans Democrat, May 14, 1876. 
36 Ibid; On the Louisiana response to the Centennial, see Burlie W. Brown, ‘Louisiana and the Nation’s 
First One-Hundredth Birthday,’ Louisiana History Vol. 18, No. 3 (July, 1977), pp. 261–75. 
37 New York Herald, March 13, 1876. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Baltimore Sun, July 4, 1876. 
124	
	
comparisons between the Revolution and the Civil War in Unionist rhetoric that they 
hoped would appeal to embittered southerners and patriotic northern voters alike. The 
New York Herald claimed that if ‘any one event in this century shows that we have not 
fallen from the standard of our fathers it is the war for the Union … That war is far enough 
off for both sides to see that any other result than the integrity of the Union would have 
been a calamity. What a sad, sad day this would be if instead of one Union, one Flag, one 
confederation of States, if instead of one common memory we should celebrate our 
independence as a rent Republic! It would indeed be the centennial of humiliation and 
shame.’40  
Despite the hopes of many Democrats that the Centennial would provide the 
country with some much-needed unity, the celebrations in Philadelphia were limited in 
their ability to reconcile North and South. The Civil War had a central position in the 
Centennial, with northerners celebrating Union victories at Gettysburg, and without a 
prominent southern presence, the Philadelphia convention appeared more a chastisement 
of the Confederacy than an attempt to further sectional reconciliation.41 In the midst of 
the ‘Centennial mania’ that gripped the nation, Democrats collided over the nomination 
of their presidential candidate. Democrats clearly intended to portray themselves as 
reformers, and in April former New York governor Dorsheimer presented the election as 
a question about ‘whether the American people have virtue enough to drive the money 
changers out of their temple, and to give to the country that honest, prudent and 
economical government which it used to have.’ 42  In doing so, Democrats hoped to 
capitalise on the scandals that had been uncovered during Grant’s presidency by 
portraying their party as the only institution able to end rampant corruption of the 
administration. 
When the party’s leaders arrived in St. Louis to choose their presidential nominee, 
it soon became clear that the decision would be made based upon the two great questions 
of the time: ending corrupt Republican Reconstruction and currency reform. Democrats 
hoped they could nominate a ticket that not only unified their party for the upcoming 
contest, but also appealed to the numerous independent voters, many of whom were 
reform-minded Liberal Republicans. But nominating a ticket that could reconcile hard-
																																								 																				
40 New York Herald, July 4, 1876. 
41 On the central position of the Battle of Gettysburg at the Centennial, see, Gold, ‘“Fighting It Over 
Again,”’ pp. 277–310.  
42 William Dorsheimer Speech, April 1, 1876, Blair Papers, LOC. 
125	
	
money northeasterners with soft-money midwesterners would be a strenuous task. While 
many northern Democrats felt positive about the party’s chances, claiming they could 
‘scarcely conceive of our defeat under any circumstances,’ the difficulty of unifying the 
party did not point to such a clear-cut success.43  
On May 2, former Confederate general and incumbent governor of Virginia, 
James L. Kemper, wrote to Montgomery Blair on the state of the Democracy and the role 
of the southern delegates in the convention. Kemper asserted that if it were his choice, 
‘the South would give no vote at St. Louis as between competing Democrats, but would 
simply ratify the ultimate choice of the North.’ 44  Kemper’s suggestion reflected the 
postwar dominance of northern Democrats in the party and how fragile public opinion in 
the South was towards sectional relations. Kemper did not share the views of many of his 
northern brethren that the party was strong and on the verge of returning to national 
supremacy, but rather that it was ‘in the midst of many difficulties which some of its 
leaders don’t see.’45 The Virginian believed that sectional animosity was still ingrained in 
northerners to such an extent that ‘any false step on the part of the South will be the 
explosion of a mine which will blow up the Democracy … Any zealous activity of ours 
in any direction is made to mean renewed secession either open or disguised.’46  
With uncertainty rife within Democratic ranks over the presidential election, party 
leaders pondered who in their ranks could defeat Rutherford B. Hayes and his running 
mate, William A. Wheeler. Democrats claimed that Republicans’ insistence to continue 
to wave the bloody shirt obstructed sectional reconciliation and the national prosperity 
that would follow it.47 Republican suggestions that it was too soon to trust the Democracy 
with the control of the national government, due to its large southern element, had long 
been a successful rhetorical tool that Democrats hoped to blunt by portraying the 
Republicans as greedy partisans who were so desperate to hold on to their offices that 
they were willing to stand in the way of economic resurgence.48  
On June 24, the hotels of St. Louis were filled with Democrats who were excited 
at the prospect of the party’s approaching convention. A heavy downpour that night 
cooled the air, making for a humid opening day as ‘rivers of perspiration ran down the 
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faces of the fierce democracy.’49 The delegates hoped to wrap up proceedings and adjourn 
in two days, but division over the party’s presidential nomination made this outcome 
unlikely. Having carried the New York governorship by fifty thousand votes in 1874, and 
with a staunch reformist background, Samuel J. Tilden appeared to have the necessary 
credentials. But the New Yorker split opinion within the Democratic ranks. According 
his supporters Tilden’s role in dismantling the Tweed ring in 1871 was clear evidence 
that he would ‘use all his energies to restore the government to its ancient honor and 
dignity,’ but to those who were unconvinced by his dedication to reform, he was seen as 
little more than ‘a political trickster.’50  
As the convention opened, the Chairman of the National Democratic Committee, 
Augustus Schell, and the Temporary Chairman to the Convention, Henry M. Watterson, 
latched straight onto the issue of reform as ‘the inexorable demand of the American 
people’ that could not be ‘underestimated, overlooked, [or] avoided,’ lest ‘we shall lose 
the poor man’s last hope – civil liberty itself.’51 The opening speeches of the convention 
focused clearly upon the question of ‘whether honest government, administered by honest 
men, shall be restored to the American people.’52 As they had done in the years preceding 
the convention, Democrats relentlessly claimed how closely related the issues of reform, 
reconciliation, and the end of Reconstruction were. Before reading the party’s platform 
to the delegation, August Belmont proclaimed that the election ‘will decide whether the 
corrupt and sectional party … is to be fastened upon us for four years more, or whether 
the Democratic party will be able to regain the reins of government in order to guide us 
back to peace, union, and prosperity.’ Belmont argued that ‘in order to escape the 
indignation of an outraged people, whose confidence they [Republicans] have so 
shamefully betrayed, they appeal to sectional and sectarian prejudices in order to sow the 
seeds of discord between North and South, Protestant and Catholic.’53 While reform and 
opposition to the Republicans’ refusal to provide funds for Catholic public schooling, the 
underlying tensions over economic and financial policy came to dictate the proceedings. 
In closing the discussions on the first day of the convention, Samuel ‘Sunset’ Cox urged 
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his fellow co-partisans to forego the money question that he saw as a minor issue that 
could be patiently resolved by curing ‘the body politic from all its cancers.’ He argued 
that ‘it is not on these mere fiscal or temporary questions that we are to win this contest 
altogether. We have fundamental principles of government as old as the revolution, which 
have marked parties from the beginning; the idea of home rule, self-government, express 
and granted powers. Stand by them.’54 
When it came to candidates, the Democrats had a number of strong options to 
choose from in 1876. Former Union general Winfield Scott Hancock appealed greatly to 
many Democrats across the nation due to his ability to combat Republican bloody shirt 
rhetoric; Thomas A. Hendricks’ conversion to the soft-money cause engendered him to 
many Midwesterners; and Bayard held considerable appeal in the South and among 
Northeasterners who opposed Tilden. For the influential hard-money delegates from the 
northeast, Tilden was the logical choice. He had developed a popular reputation as a 
leading reformer, had strong hard-money credentials, a measure of personal wealth that 
could be used during the canvass, and he had demonstrated his ability to secure his home 
state of New York by sweeping the race for governor in 1874 by a plurality of 50,000 
votes. 
Ultimately, the party compromised over the money question and planted itself 
firmly upon reform and Republican corruption as its campaign message. Tilden, as the 
candidate with the strongest reform credentials headed up the ticket, and Thomas A. 
Hendricks, a soft-money advocate from Indiana, was nominated as his running mate. 
Despite clear divisions in the convention, with Daniel Voorhees clashing with Belmont 
over resumption, the strong appeals made by Belmont and the President of the 
Convention, former Union general, John A. McClernand, for the party to ‘guide us back 
to peace, union and prosperity,’ struck a chord with delegates.55 And despite conflicts over 
currency, delegates tried to put sectionalism behind them. On the second day of the 
convention, former vice president and Confederate general, John Breckinridge, addressed 
the delegation and proclaimed,  
 
I do not like to hear so much in this Convention of the East, of the West, 
and of the South. We talk as if we were three separate governments, or 
three separate countries, under some unknown and intangible treat of 
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alliance … Where does the West and the East begin? Where is the South 
of which we hear so much? We are not here as Eastern men, or as Southern 
men, but we are here as Democrats and Americans.56 
 
The platform itself, penned by August Belmont, stressed the need to protect the 
people ‘from a corrupt centralism which, after inflicting upon ten States the rapacity of 
carpet-bag tyrannies, has honeycombed the offices of the Federal Government itself with 
incapacity, waste and fraud; infected States and municipalities with the contagion of 
misrule, and locked fast the prosperity of an industrious people in the paralysis of hard 
times.’57 On the money question, the party’s stance reflected the fissure between soft and 
hard money Democrats. While, to the delight of hard-money advocates, the platform 
committed the party to a return to specie payments, the simultaneous pledge to repeal the 
Resumption Act of 1875 equated to an effectual dodge of the greenback question.58  
While the party attempted to paper over financial policy disputes, consensus was 
easier to achieve over the catch-all issue of government reform which appealed not only 
to Democrats across the country but also to many independent voters previously aligned 
with the Liberal Republican movement.59 As the nation entered the campaign, the battle-
lines had been drawn: the reformist Democracy aligned against the ‘reckless, selfish, and 
aggressive’ Republicans.60 
Drawing from the experience of the 1874 congressional midterms, Democrats 
focused tightly upon the reform issue, and highlighted the corrupt nature of Republican 
government. They frequently referred to Tilden as the ‘ring-breaker’ and attacked the 
Republicans for the vast expenditure of the Grant presidency that had ‘furnished food for 
the corrupt manipulators of political machinery.’61 The Republicans hoped to exploit anti-
Catholic sentiment by making a congressional debate about public schooling a central 
issue in the campaign. In December 1875, Republican congressman James G. Blaine had 
introduced a proposed amendment to the Constitution to settle growing agitation over the 
use of public funds in education. The public schooling issue had first reared its head in 
the immediate aftermath of the Civil War when Charles Sumner had proposed to only 
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readmit southern states to Congress once public schools had been established. Though 
this was not adopted, the Department of Education was established in 1867, and the 
funding of public schools became a particularly divisive issue. In New York, the 
Democratic Tammany Hall had supported a provision to ensure that one-fifth of state 
funds for education be used to support non-public schools, and in New York, this 
invariably meant to Catholic ones. By the mid-1870s, funding for schools had become a 
national issue, and the Republicans were determined to capitalise on anti-Catholic 
sentiment that was opposed to the use of public money on Catholic schools. Blaine’s 
Amendment proposed to prohibit the use of public money for sectarian schools, and while 
it was defeated in the Senate, the Republicans hoped to use the issue to rouse anti-Catholic 
sentiment among its predominantly Protestant voter base. 62  Democrats resoundingly 
condemned the Republicans for sowing ‘the seeds of religious discord where now for 
more than a century every religion has been tolerated’ and for encroaching once more on 
the rights of the states by trying to centralise more power in Washington.63 The Democrats 
further pledged their opposition to the Blaine Amendment in their platform by attacking 
the ‘false issue by which they [Republicans] would enkindle sectarian strife’ in order to 
solidify their support among Catholic communities, and, in practice the issue lost the 
Democrats few votes. 64 
Beyond the debate over public schooling, the Republicans predictably played 
upon popular memories of the War of the Rebellion, disparaged southern violence and 
furiously waved the bloody shirt. Worsening violence across the southern states had put 
an end to the fusionist strategies of many moderate southern Democrats and played into 
the hands of the Republicans. In Hamburg, South Carolina, in July, a paramilitary band 
of Democrats called the Red Shirts descended on a Republican meeting and massacred 
six freedmen. Northern Republicans immediately condemned the brutality of southern 
Democrats and made links between the reform message of northern Democrats and the 
white supremacist violence of southerners (see Figure 5.2). 
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 Figure 5.2 Thomas Nast, ‘The Hamburg Riot, July, 1876,’ Harper’s Weekly 
 
 With widespread southern racial violence directed at Republican supporters, 
bloody shirt rhetoric resonated with northern voters. As the nation neared election day, 
the feeling was reminiscent of 1860–61. On September 15, Thomas F. Bayard wrote to 
August Belmont that ‘sometimes it seems to me that the red glare of the Civil War, and 
the whirl of excitement and wild success have destroyed all capacity for calm and just 
reflection and decision’ and that the solid opposition to Republican rule among southern 
whites could only result in ‘general disaster – and a [sic] estimation of that want of 
confidence in the future which is today an … obstacle to restored prosperity.’65 Similarly, 
James J. Farnau told his fellow Ohioan William Allen that ‘we are in the midst of another 
heated campaign, which will leave its mark on the country, as permanently as that of 
1860.’ 66  Not only did Democrats highlight this widespread fracture in the national 
political landscape, but they also feared for the future of the party if they could not secure 
victory. Democrats moaned that ‘since the rebellion the Republicans think they have the 
exclusive right to the United States, and that the Democratic party have no lot or part in 
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it,’ and worried that ‘if the Democracy cannot carry the election this year … it will never 
be able to push the party in power, from its place.’67 
 As October arrived, the outlook appeared good for Democrats.68 In the South, the 
violent suppression of voters by White Leagues and Red Shirts kept many Republicans 
away from the polls, and the Democracy’s reform message gained traction in states across 
the North, including Tilden’s home state of New York. After turnout had dwindled in 
1872 to just 72%, American voters turned out in much higher numbers in 1876. And as 
the results flooded in, Democrats began to celebrate a victory. Alongside securing New 
York, the Tilden ticket obtained a narrow victory in Indiana, and redeemed the majority 
of the southern states, and needed just one more Electoral College vote. As Democratic 
newspapers exalted that Tilden was to be inaugurated however, Republican papers began 
to declare Hayes the victor.69 With both sides claiming victories and accusing the other 
party of fraud in Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Oregon, the nation soon 
descended into a crisis that pushed the Union to the brink of renewed civil war. 
 
The Compromise of 1877: A Democratic Crisis 
 
 As the country waited with baited breath for news of the identity of their next 
president, Democrats hardened their belief that the Republicans were attempting to steal 
the election. Both parties had been equally fraudulent in their attempts to secure victory 
in 1876, but they also professed innocence and demanded justice for their party and 
Americans. Throughout November and December, Democrats continually worried about 
how the election would be settled, but believed that as Tilden had carried the popular 
vote, he was the rightful president.70 Party leaders received frequent correspondence that 
claimed that ‘nothing but justice will satisfy an aggrieved and outraged people,’ that ‘if 
three states can be counted out to such pleasure of the dominant party to-day – what of 
the morrow?’71 Democratic supporters hoped that ‘our trusted leaders will not tell us, that 
the coming years will right this wrong. We believe it not. We are not clamoring for a 
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triumph of party – we simply ask that right should triumph over wrong – that principle 
and manhood shall once again be allowed to come to the surface.’72 The debate over the 
election result therefore became a question of more significance than just party politics. 
Rather, it reflected the deep-seated worries of Americans for the implications of a 
fraudulently carried election. Having witnessed the downfall of the Tweed Ring in 1871, 
Americans could scarcely comprehend the consequences of the presidency being stolen 
by political tricksters. As the party that had cast itself as the saviours of honest 
government during the campaign, the Democracy’s commitment to these claims came 
under close scrutiny during the winter of 1876–1877.  
 As the new year passed with no resolution to the crisis, Democrats took a firm 
stance on the dispute. On January 8, 1877, Gideon Welles wrote to Montgomery Blair 
that ‘it is sad to see so many … good men, demoralized by these abominable proceedings 
– willing to have party triumph by fraud and violence regardless of consequence.’73 This 
stance would become the public position of the Democrats who cast the Republicans as 
enemies of the republic. 74  With no resolution in sight and the inauguration rapidly 
approaching, Congress agreed for a commission to be established to decide the outcome 
of the election. When the Electoral Commission Bill passed, Democrats felt positive 
about the situation. The commission would consist of 15 members, equally split between 
Republicans and Democrats, with the intention that the independent Supreme Court 
justice, Illinoisan David Davis, would have the deciding vote. Democrats reasoned that 
as Tilden had polled the majority of the public vote that Davis’s independence would lead 
him to side with the New Yorker. Convinced of this outcome, Thomas F. Bayard wrote 
to August Belmont that that he believed the commission would  ‘not only a present bridge 
over threatened disaster – but a firm highway for continuous travel … I believe Mr. 
Tilden’s induction to office is by this made not only possible but probable.’75 Senator 
Bayard’s optimism would, however, prove short-lived. 
 In the midst of the electoral crisis, Davis had been in the running to be elected as 
an Illinois senator. Knowing this, Tilden’s nephew, William T. Pelton had worked with 
Cyrus McCormick to fraudulently sway the election in Davis’ favour to endear the 
support of the justice on the Electoral Commission. Pelton and McCormick’s strategy had 
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worked, but backfired when Davis immediately refused to serve on the commission once 
he learned of his election. In his place, Republican justice Joseph Bradley was appointed 
to the commission. With the Republicans now outnumbering the Democrats eight to 
seven, Democratic opinion split. Pennsylvania Democrat, Joseph Nelson, immediately 
claimed that it was ‘so evident that the Republicans on this Commission are so biased by 
party prejudices that … would it not be better for every Democratic member to resign 
forthwith, and then let affairs take another course.’76 Others noted that while ‘some of our 
people are gloomy over the matter … I have hope that all will be well in the end. [But] if 
the panel to which the question has been submitted fails its duty, through party fear or 
favor … certainly we are amidst evil times, and the hopes of a free Republic being long 
contained in this country are fast fading out.’77 However Democrats felt about the likely 
success of the commission, most party supporters simply hoped that ‘nothing will be 
proposed or done by the democrats that will compromise the high integrity taught by 
democracy.’78 If the commission ruled in favour of Hayes, therefore, Democrats were 
faced with a tough decision that threatened to alienate their supporters; resist or acquiesce. 
 When the Electoral Commission reached its verdict, granting Hayes the victory 
by eight to seven in a vote dictated by partisanship, Democrats were outraged. Across the 
nation, party supporters ‘gave up all hope of having justice done us by mortal man.’79 
Congressional Democrats were bombarded by letters from their constituents urging the 
party to ‘adopt a firm and courageous policy – one that we can fight to the bitter end.’80 
W.W.H. Davis, editor of the Pennsylvanian newspaper, the Doylestown Democrat, wrote 
to Speaker of the House Samuel Randall suggesting that ‘it becomes very important for 
the Democratic party to fix upon a policy, which should be followed without deviation to 
the end of Hayes’ term. It will never do for the party to … submit to this monstrous 
usurpation and outrage. Our policy should be peaceful, but bitter, aggressive, and 
unyielding.’ 81  Boston Democrat, Hiram Caper went even further in his opposition, 
claiming that a ‘more infamous record cannot be found in history – and it should be boldly 
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met by the Democracy. Nothing the Democrats can do will be so bad as the submission 
to such fraud and revolution.’82 Democratic newspapers denounced the decision of the 
Commission, claiming that ‘[t]he game is played out. Our elective monarch for the 
Olympiad beginning next 4th of March will be a person elected by a minority of the nation 
only, and set up against the will of the majority by the effective agencies of fraud, forgery, 
bribery, partisan sharp practices.’83 
 With public pressure and attention fixed firmly upon Washington, the national 
leadership initiated a policy to stop the passage of the bill authorizing Hayes’ election. 
Led by the filibusters and delaying strategies of Senator Bayard, Fernando Wood, and 
Samuel J. Randall, the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, supported 
by the Democratic minority in the Senate, set out with the intention of stopping Hayes’ 
inauguration. With a Republican majority in the Senate, however, the battleground 
emerged in the Democratic-controlled House, where party supporters nationwide hoped 
that their representatives’ integrity would hold. It was in these critical stages that the 
presidential crisis became more than a simple question of whether Hayes would be 
inaugurated or not; rather, for the Democracy, it became a question of whether party 
supporters would be able to trust the party in the future. 
 With the Democratic House holding firm after nearly a week of deliberations, and 
the inauguration drawing closer, Americans began to contemplate the implications of 
having no definitive answer to who would assume the presidency and what impact this 
would have on the nation. Republicans urged congressional Democrats to support the 
commission’s conclusion, claiming that it was their patriotic duty to ensure the nation had 
a leader come March. Democrats however, dismissed such reasoning by asserting that 
‘We fought in 1776 for the right of choosing our rulers and shall we give up this right in 
1877?’84 The uncertainty of the nation’s future security with no president-elect caused 
divisions within the Democratic ranks at Washington. Party activists worried that ‘low 
murmerings of discontent in reference to the settlement of the Presidential Question, has 
assumed proportions that portend evil to the future harmony of the Democratic Party.’85 
Party supporters continued to flood congressional Democrats with messages of support. 
They urged Speaker Randall ‘to stand fast in [your] present attitude’ as ‘our future 
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prosperity, our reputation among foreign nations – yea our very liberties demand men to 
grapple with and throttle those Republican demons in their den of iniquity.’ 86  But 
correctly sensing that many southern Democrats who were eager to secure investment in 
the region were being persuaded by Republicans to support Hayes’ inauguration in return 
for federal aid for a planned Texas & Pacific Railroad, Randall began to turn his back on 
the filibustering Democrats.87  
 Despite the appeals of rank-and-file Democrats ‘for justice’s sake, for decency’s 
sake, for our children’s sake prevent this most damnable fraud from being consummated 
if possible,’ Randall and Fernando Wood turned against the obstructionist sentiment of 
the Democratic masses.88 Believing that the nation had to avoid a renewed civil war at all 
costs, Randall helped to ensure Hayes’s inauguration.89 Against this backdrop, the u-turn 
of Randall, Wood and the Democratic leadership in the House took on new significance. 
Despite the emphasis scholars have placed on the bargaining success of southern Bourbon 
Democrats with northern Republicans, it was the actions of leading Democrats that held 
the most significance for the party moving forward.90 Having heard rumours that the 
southern Democrats were preparing to back Hayes’s claim to the presidency, these 
leading Democrats saw little benefit in preventing a seemingly inevitable outcome. Rather 
than returning to the obstructionist tactics of the late-1860s, Randall and Wood believed 
that accepting the result, however damaging in the short-term, would provide long-term 
benefits to the party. In their eyes, peacefully acquiescing in Hayes’s election, would 
show that Democrats were not blinded by partisanship and in turn would damage the 
potency of Republican attacks on their nationalism and sense of patriotic responsibility. 
In light of the intense partisanship of 1876, and the burning desire of Democrats to return 
to the White House, the willingness of leading Democrats to acquiesce was remarkable 
helped to pave the way for victory in 1884. 
 With Rutherford B. Hayes’ inauguration on March 4, 1877, Americans breathed 
a hefty sigh of relief. As a result of the reversals of leading Democrats such as Randall 
and Wood, alongside a substantial backing by southern congressional Democrats, the 
country retreated from the threat of renewed civil war. Yet for the Democrats who now 
faced the consequences of their decision to support the compromise, the crisis had only 
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just begun – a crisis that scholars have not yet fully addressed. Despite losing 26 seats in 
the House, the Democracy still retained its majority in that chamber. It also reduced the 
Republicans’ Senate majority to just 5. Many northern and southern Democratic 
supporters felt betrayed by the actions of many party leaders in allowing the Republicans 
to regain the White House.  They bemoaned the fact that the ‘people of this country have 
been deceived and cheated’ and that the ‘Democratic party has been murdered, the dead 
cannot be restored to life.’91 The Lawrence Daily Journal deplored the ‘infamous dirt-
eating’ of the congressional Democrats who supported the compromise, and warned that 
‘[t]hey may appeal to the people; but the appeal will be in vain. The “democratic” party 
dog is dead.’92 The rank-and-file Democrats, who were deeply angered by the party 
leadership’s cowardice, were not cognisant that they were acting in the party’s long-term 
interests. Samuel Barlow recognised this fact when, in March, he wrote to Thomas Bayard 
‘I can say, notwithstanding the result, that it is much better than war or even any long 
delayed settlement and what we have lost at home we have more than gained abroad, as 
the whole world is astounded at our ability to settle such a question without a resort to 
arms.’93  
 
Labour and the Third Party Challenge, 1877–1878 
 
 With the electoral crisis settled and Hayes inaugurated president, Americans 
returned to the critical issue of rejuvenating the failing economy. Southern Democrats 
had supported the compromise partly because of the promise of a major new southern 
railroad that would provide the region with a desperately needed economic boost. This, 
coupled with the withdrawal of federal troops from the South to their barracks, seemed 
to signal a new dawn for southern whites who had been anxious to ‘redeem’ the region 
from carpetbag rule. In solving one question however, another raised its head to confront 
the Democrats.  
 Following the third wage cut in the space of a year, employees of the Baltimore 
& Ohio Railroad in Martinsburg, West Virginia, began a strike in July 1877 that would 
last into September. Railroad workers refused to allow trains to move until the corporation 
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guaranteed to increase wages. As news of the Martinsburg strike spread, labourers in 
Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, St. Louis, New York, Albany, Buffalo, and Chicago 
joined the West Virginians in their stand against the railroaders. The strike became more 
than a localised dispute over wages – a nationwide protest against monopolisation, 
embodied by the railroads and the inequality brought about by industrial capitalism. 
While the Democratic press did not denounce the strike immediately, as it spread, causing 
millions of dollars in damage to property, the New York Herald condemned strikers for 
‘aiming a savage and ruthless blow at the public peace and order.’94 The Great Strike 
highlighted issues that the party was yet to solve. The increasingly business-oriented 
Bourbon party leadership was slowly but surely disenchanting working class supporters 
of the party. The consolidation of class structures during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction had not only increased class divisions, but also changed expectations of 
the role of the American state. Industrial workers expected the government not simply to 
bow to the wishes of monopolists, but to protect the working classes from exploitation. 
Throughout Reconstruction, the Democracy had been trying to reconcile this expectation 
to protect the working class with its belief in laissez-faire. With the Great Strike, the party 
leadership was forced to confront how committed they were to the well being of their 
working-class supporters. 
Labour unrest, coupled with ongoing divisions over the currency question, put the 
Democracy in a precarious position. In the wake of the fractious Electoral Commission 
proceedings, Democrats hoped to find unifying issues to heal the party’s rifts. Since 1871, 
the Democracy had made civil service reform the cornerstone of the party’s national 
strategy, and in the aftermath of the presidential crisis, the reformist message of the party 
continued to resonate with the public. At the Mississippi Democratic convention in 
August 1877, Lucius Q. C. Lamar spoke on the state of national politics and stressed the 
Democracy’s importance to the South. Lamar said that ‘there can be no disputing the 
proposition that … the Democratic party is entitled to the credit of having rescued the 
South from oppression, and the whole country from the despotism in which corrupt 
Radicalism sought to plunge it.’95 The Mississippi senator hoped to heal the wounds 
inflicted upon the party earlier that year by stressing its continuing opposition to tyranny. 
He hoped that by claiming that ‘it is on duty now guarding against the encroachments of 
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monopolies and the threats of centralization’ that the party could consolidate its support 
among working-class Americans.  
 Despite the claims of the partisan press that the ‘Democratic party is the best 
friend of the working man’ and that should ‘he desire a better state of affairs, more labor 
and better pay, it would be well for him to spurn all the delusions of a “Greenback” party, 
“National” party or any other organization save the true and tried Democratic party,’ 
division within the party ranks over currency undermined these assertions.96 Since 1876, 
the Democrats had tried to galvanise faith in the party by effectively repealing the 
Resumption Act, and stopping further contraction of paper currency. They had also 
moved towards the abolition of the National banks and pushed for tariff reform to aid 
agricultural and labouring interests, but the party remained ‘hopelessly divided’ over 
currency issues and lacked a coherent financial creed. 97  Many Americans were 
disappointed that unemployment among the working classes had seen little improvement, 
and the Democratic-controlled House had ‘done little or nothing … to relieve the 
suffering of the laboring classes.’98 The growth of support for the new Greenback party 
was more than the result of a discussion over the theoretical basis of money. Rather, it 
was the result of widespread disillusionment with the Democrats and the Republicans. 
The two major parties had provided little respite from poverty to the working classes, and 
had instead endorsed policies that helped commerce and business flourish in the belief 
that the fruits of profit would improve the lives of labouring citizens. 99  In this 
environment, the Greenback challenge was the outcome of the two-party system’s 
inability to reflect the needs of working-class voters, and provided an opportunity for a 
natural alliance between supporters of soft-money and disillusioned labourers.100 
 On July 15, 1878 Frank Gibbs, a Massachusetts resident, wrote to the former 
Union general, Benjamin F. Butler, to commend his stance on the currency question. 
Gibbs called for a new party ‘with new issues, new principles, and a new name’ to be 
established with Butler as its standard-bearer. He claimed that ‘the parties had killed their 
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names and the names had killed the parties’ and that he ‘did not believe the turbulent 
political waters of the country could or would be soothed under the watch word of 
Republicanism or Democracy.’101 Butler, a former Democrat, had a controversial past, 
having gained the nickname ‘The Beast’ during his wartime occupation of New 
Orleans.102  Throughout July and August, Butler received further correspondence that 
highlighted the diminishing appeal of the Democratic party across the nation. 
Correspondents noted the party’s disorganisation, that it had become ‘arbitrary, [and] 
dictatorial,’ and had ‘lost its charm among the whites of the poorer and laboring 
classes.’103 
 To hard-money Democrats, the espousals of Thurman, Voorhees, and Butler in 
support of paper money were nothing short of heresy. Many deplored the speeches made 
by such leading Democrats, and attacked them for turning national attention away from 
the more immediate labour question and towards that of greenbacks.104 Yet, the very 
success of greenbackers’ appeals was due to the class-infused rhetoric that they employed. 
New York Democrat M. H. Winder wrote to Randall claiming that ‘if now the Democratic 
party will boldly accept the greenback principle … the great mass of the “National Party” 
would promptly flock to its standard to such an extent that it would be disbanded.’105 
Moreover, reports from the South showed how greenbackism had become more than a 
midwestern phenomenon. The German-born, former Confederate Gustav Schleicher, a 
Texas congressman, wrote to Bayard detailing the views of Democrats in the state. 
Schleicher claimed to be the only Democrat standing against soft money, when all others 
‘from fear of the Greenbackers, has taken up a Greenback mongrel platform.’106 His stand 
against soft-money Texas Democrats received attention throughout the national party, 
with Louis Shade, the editor of the Wilmington Sentinel, praising the congressman for not 
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yielding an ‘iota of the old Democratic faith.’ 107  Shade, alongside other Democrats, 
viewed the conflict over currency as crucial to the 1880 presidential campaign and hoped 
to push soft-money men from the national leadership. Yet the refusal of hard-money 
Democrats to embrace soft-money principles only demonstrated their misunderstanding 
of labourers’ conditions. New Orleans Greenbacker, E. North Cullom, highlighted the 
discontent felt within the working classes in a letter to Randall, claiming that ‘the 
Democracy has lost its charm among the whites of the poorer and laboring classes … The 
fact is, pauperism and absolute destitution are so widespread and keenly felt that no choice 
is left but change.’108  
While hard-money men claimed that reductions in taxes and federal expenditure, 
coupled with the development of foreign commerce to expand markets for the nation’s 
agricultural and industrial interests, would curtail the depression, such arguments held 
little traction with regular voters and failed to stem the growing threat posed by the 
Greenbackers.109 With the 1878 election rapidly approaching, Butler held a remarkably 
strong position with his soft-money appeals targeted towards typically Democratic-voting 
labourers. Hard-money Democrats despaired at the growing appeal of inflationary 
greenbackism. They commented on the ‘fruitlessness of our efforts to stand out against 
the widespread political and economical heresies of the day.’110 Many feared for the future 
of the party, believing that Bayard remained the ‘only hope in 1880,’ as previously 
stalwart Democrats such as Thurman, Voorhees, and Hendricks had ‘yielded to the 
clamor of the hour.’111 
With little cohesion over financial policy, Democrats hoped to harness other 
issues to counter the Greenback assault. While Democratic newspaper editors praised 
electoral success in Indiana, Iowa, and West Virginia, the situation in Massachusetts and 
New York presented a different picture. Under Butler’s lead in Massachusetts, the 
Greenbackers threatened to take supporters from ‘the rank and file of the Democratic 
party.’112  By November, Democrats such as Charles T. Russell were noting that the 
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Greenbackers in Massachusetts had decimated the Democracy to the extent that ‘many 
Democrats, to defeat [Butler], will vote for the Republican candidate,’ such was the belief 
amongst Democrats that a Butler victory would spell the end for the party.113 In New 
York, August Belmont felt similarly when he received word that the Greenbackers had 
defeated the Republican ticket in Maine. In a letter to Bayard, Belmont wrote that ‘the 
success of the Greenback movement in that region bodes no good to the Country, and I 
fear it will make the demagogues of our party more reckless in their cowardice … If these 
doctrines of dishonesty & ignorance prevail, the very foundations of our political 
existence are endangered & self government becomes a failure … The idea that inflation 
by an additional issue of irredeemable paper money will raise prices and give better 
remuneration to labor is so preposterous … that it is incomprehensible to me how the 
masses can be misled by such absurdities.’114  
The results of the 1878 midterms clearly demonstrated how the events of 1876 
and 1877 had shaken public confidence in the Democracy. As class tensions reached 
boiling point in the Great Strike of 1877, the Greenback party capitalised on the growing 
disenchantment with an elite Democratic party leadership felt within working class 
circles, and received over a million votes in the 1878 elections, gaining eleven 
congressmen in the process.115 Not only did Greenbackers run well in the Midwest and 
the South, where soft-money policies had gained traction among voters, but they also 
picked up surprise congressional seats in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maine. 116 
Writing to August Belmont in the aftermath of the Greenback successes, Thomas Bayard 
expressed his worry that ‘how parties will be organized in two years hence can scarcely 
be conjectured.’117 
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Chapter Six 
  
“Partisan Spoilsmen and Impetuous Reformers:” Civil Service Reform and the 
Democracy’s Return to Power, 1878–1884 
 
 
 
On December 3, 1878 the New York World published an editorial that reflected 
the confusion within Democratic ranks over the outcome of the recent midterm elections. 
The paper concluded that it was impossible to ‘tabulate the votes in any symmetrical and 
satisfactory form’ owing to the distinctiveness of local conditions during the canvass.1 
Despite this, the return of a nearly solidly Democratic South was an important moment 
in the resurrection of the party and would be an ever-present pattern for the rest of the 
century. Less sure, was whether they could achieve victories in the North, with New York, 
New Jersey, and Indiana being the party’s only realistic opportunities. To combat this, 
Democrats urged a more rigorous local organisation of the party to ensure high levels of 
voter turnout, and to let ‘the Democratic principles of which Jefferson was the apostle, 
prevail.’2 In the years that followed, the Bourbons would provide some much needed 
unity for the party. In the environment that would emerge in the aftermath of another 
presidential assassination, the Bourbon Democrats’ message of civil service reform, 
decentralisation, and honest government, epitomised by Washington-outsider Grover 
Cleveland, secured the Democracy’s first presidential election victory since 1856.  
 Rampant corruption, fat-cat industrial capitalists, widespread economic and social 
upheaval, and political mudslinging underlined the murkiness of the Gilded Age. In recent 
years, scholars of Gilded Age politics have moved away from the characterisation of the 
era by Matthew Josephson and Ray Ginger as one devoid of any issues capable of dividing 
Republicans and Democrats.3 While they agree that the last thirty years of the nineteenth 
century was a period in which the disparity between the rich and poor grew substantially 
and corrupt politicos fraudulently stuffed ballot boxes to win elections, historians 
including Charles Calhoun have argued that the Republicans and the Democrats 
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maintained distinctly different ideological positions over the role of the government.4 To 
dismiss the Gilded Age as an era lacking partisan distinctiveness overlooks the 
complexities of the era and diminishes the ongoing debate over the Civil War’s legacy. 
The 1880 canvass had all the hallmarks of a Reconstruction-era presidential election – 
the Republicans furiously waved the bloody shirt, both candidates were Union veterans, 
and the Democrats lambasted the corrupt nature of Republican government. As such, the 
choice presented to Americans in 1880 was similar to those of the 1868 and 1876 
elections: ‘corrupt’ Republicans or ‘disloyal’ Democrats.  The 1884 contest would be the 
first postwar election that was not fought primarily over the legacy of the Civil War, but 
this did not mean that voters found it hard to distinguish between the two parties. In fact, 
Democrats and Republicans presented distinctive visions for the future that moved away 
from the Civil War. This chapter demonstrates how the early 1880s allowed for a break 
from the past ushered in a new era in American political conflict. 
 
The Presidential Election of 1880 
 
 In early 1879 congressional Democrats took what they hoped would be the final 
step towards ending federal intervention in southern elections. Emboldened by their 
success across the South in the 1878 midterm elections, they attached a series of riders to 
appropriations bills to prohibit the army from protecting voters from violent intimidation 
and federal officers from overseeing elections. In doing so, the Democrats sought to 
repeal the Enforcement Acts of 1870–1871 and guarantee a Solid South in 1880. With 
Congress split between a Democratically-controlled House and a Republican Senate, 
however, the appropriations bills with their new riders failed to pass. As a result, when 
Congress adjourned in February and $45,000,000 of the federal budget remained 
unallocated, the nation faced the possibility of a government shutdown.5 
To bring an end to the crisis, President Rutherford B. Hayes called for a special 
session of Congress to be convened on March 18. Unfortunately for Hayes, this first 
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seating of the forty-sixth Congress would have Democratic majorities in both the House 
and Senate. As a result, the appropriations bills were passed with all their riders attached, 
prohibiting the use of federal troops and officers in southern elections. On April 29, 
President Hayes vetoed the bill on the grounds that ‘[n]ational legislation to provide 
safeguards for free and honest elections is necessary … not only to secure the right to 
vote to the enfranchised race at the South, but also to prevent fraudulent voting in the 
large cities of the North.’6 Dismayed by Hayes’s veto and their failure to obtain the two-
thirds majority necessary to pass a congressional override, the Democrats reintroduced 
and passed the bill with riders attached, and were immediately faced with another 
presidential veto. The New York Sun immediately attacked the ‘Fraudulent President’ for 
vetoing provisions that were ‘wise, necessary, [and] indispensible’ and that any Democrat 
who accepted the veto was ‘foolish, unpatriotic, ridiculous.’7 
The contest over the Army Appropriations bill proved to be a disaster for the 
Democrats who were unable to defeat the obstructionist tactics of Hayes and the 
Republican congressional minority. For the Republicans, however, it led to the emergence 
of a potential presidential nominee. Looking forward to the 1880 presidential race, the 
Republicans had few options because of Hayes’s refusal to run for a second term. As a 
result, many had been sounding out Grant for a potential third-term, but this proved 
controversial. With the Democrats hammering the reform question, Grant’s connection 
with Reconstruction-era corruption alienated a number of reform-minded Republicans.  
The Democrats, however, faced problems of their own. Straight-out party 
newspapers highlighted the troubling trend of fusionism during the 1878 elections. The 
strength of the Greenback appeal had pushed many northeastern Democrats to support 
fusion candidates. Looking forward, the Democratic press urged the party to ‘let the 
Jeffersonian doctrines prevail’ and reunite behind the principles of laissez-faire, hard 
money, civil service reform, and anti-centralisation. 8  While fusionism had proved 
successful in maintaining their congressional majority, the lack of a clear party identity 
posed problems in a national race. Democrats realised that being ‘silent partners’ in the 
presidential election would not solve the ‘puzzle’ of the Democracy’s political identity 
and the press urged the party to rally around its increasingly powerful Bourbon element.9 
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Moreover, the World urged Democrats to be vigilant in their approach to politics, saying 
that ‘Democrats everywhere should inform themselves carefully alike of the action of 
their party throughout the country and of the movements of their Republican opponents’ 
and that ‘failure to do this in 1876 contributed greatly to the loss by the Democracy of the 
fruits of the victory fairly won at the polls.’10 
While leading congressional Democrats’ role in the 1877 compromise had led to 
internal friction, the contested election ultimately proved to be a rallying point for the 
party. Democrats latched onto claims that Tilden had been fraudulently counted out in 
1876 and that ‘any true Democrat should support the nomination of Tilden to right the 
wrong of four years earlier.’ Yet, Tilden did not hold the same appeal in 1880 as he had 
done in 1876. Many believed that he could not neither ensure the independent vote, nor a 
Solid South for the party.11  
 In June 1879 the New York Sun asked its readers whether ‘a Democratic 
Convention [could] consistently denounce the Electoral Commission Fraud and turn its 
back on the man who represents the real issues of the campaign.’12 The paper called for 
‘the grand old Jeffersonian Democrat as our Standard Bearer … the great Ring Smasher’ 
to lead the party back to the White House.13  Yet soon after the Sun called for Tilden to 
lead the party’s ticket, he announced that he would not accept the party’s nomination.14 
In declining, Tilden projected a sense of disdain for and demoralisation with politics that 
showed how deeply he was affected by the 1876 loss. He wrote that, 
 
I desire nothing so much as an honorable discharge … [and] seek the 
repose of private life … To those who think my renomination and 
reelection indispensable to an effectual vindication of the right of the 
people to elect their rulers violated in my person, I have accorded as long 
a reserve of decision as possible, but I cannot overcome my repugnance to 
enter into a new engagement which involves four years of ceaseless toil.15 
 
With Tilden out of the running, the usual suspects came into the spotlight. As in 
1876, Thomas F. Bayard, Samuel J. Randall, Winfield Scott Hancock and Thomas 
Hendricks battled for the party’s nomination. While Randall’s position as Speaker of the 
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House endeared him to many of Tilden’s former supporters, his protectionist beliefs made 
him unpalatable to free traders. Similarly, Hendricks’ soft-money tendencies alienated 
the party’s significant hard-money element. Conversely, Bayard’s considerable 
experience as a leading Democratic voice in the Senate, consistent support of hard-money 
policies, denunciation of Radical Republicanism, and lenient voice on secession gave him 
a national appeal.16 Hancock, on the other hand, had been sounded out at every convention 
since 1868, and the hero of Gettysburg’s support for sectional reconciliation and 
opposition to Radicalism rendered him attractive to southern Democrats.  
As Democrats from across the nation descended on Cincinnati for their national 
convention in June 1880, the city was brimming with activity. Democrats paraded through 
the streets in support of their desired candidate. Braving the intense June heat, a column 
of three thousand Hendricks men entered the city, cheering and shouting, while Randall 
clubs stood on every corner, wearing white blue badges in support of the Pennsylvanian.17 
Tilden’s declination had caused a stir among Democrats who hoped to seize the 
opportunity to make their man the next president. After three years of discord in the 
Democratic ranks, delegates made distinct attempts to heal the rifts in the party. Speakers 
frequently referred to the party’s last successful presidential canvass in 1856 that had also 
held its convention in Cincinnati, and urged their fellow partisans to put division behind 
them. On the convention’s second day, Governor Richard B. Hubbard of Texas 
disparaged the petty factionalism of northern Democrats that put the nation at risk. He 
said that,  
 
we [southerners] have come up here with the olive branch, forgetting the 
memories of the past, burying in a common grave the discords of the great 
war, honorable alike to both sections of this country … We are men who 
go into the race from principle and not for men; Tilden will die, and Kelly 
will die, and Hendricks will die … [but] Their memories will live, and the 
principles of the Democratic party will live … We [the South] ask for no 
Presidents, no Vice-Presidents. We do not even ask an organization in your 
Convention. And when we come upon bended knees and ask you among 
yourselves to bury the hatchet, and to save us from a future of tyranny that 
we have endured in the past, then we hope, and we have the right to expect, 
that the great Democratic party will place its foot on schism and discord 
wherever it may be.18  
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After the preliminary organisation of the convention, candidates for the 
presidential nomination started to be sounded out. Bayard’s name promptly entered the 
fold as his fellow Delawarean delegate, George Gray, emphatically proclaimed, ‘His is 
no sectional fame … Who, more than he, will, as a candidate, appeal to the best traditions 
of our party and of our country? … His very name will be a platform. It will fire every 
Democratic heart with new zeal, and will place a sword in the hands of every honest man 
to drive from place and power the reckless men who have held for four years against the 
expressed will of the American people.’19 As each state’s delegates were allowed to make 
nominations numerous strong candidates such as Thomas A. Hendricks and Colonel 
William R. Morrision emerged, but it was Pennsylvanian Daniel Dougherty who ignited 
the battle between Bayard and Hancock. In addressing the convention, Dougherty 
immediately reminded the delegates that Hancock’s first act as a military governor in 
Louisiana and Texas was ‘to salute the [C]onstitution! by proclaiming amid the joyous 
greetings of an oppressed people that the military, save in actual war, shall be subservient 
to the civil power.’20 The Pennsylvanian sustained his focus on sectional reconciliation in 
nominating Hancock, and claimed that his nomination would ‘thrill the land from end to 
end, crush the last embers of sectional strife’ and that ‘with him as our chieftain the bloody 
banner of the Republicans will fall from their palsied grasp.’21 As the southern delegates 
stepped forward to make their nominations, it was clear that they would acquiesce in the 
choice of the northern Democratic leadership on the party’s candidate. While South 
Carolinian Wade Hampton expressed his preference for Bayard due to his ability to attract 
more conservative Republican votes, his purpose in addressing the convention was to 
express that southerners asked ‘for no place, for no position; for no pledges, for no 
patronage, no promise. We come simply as Democrats to sustain the great Democratic 
party.’22 
After the first round of ballots were cast, Bayard and Hancock emerged as the 
clear favourites, with both candidates picking up votes from northern and southern states. 
With little to pick between the two candidates, the convention adjourned and reassembled 
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the following day. With New York’s seventy votes being cast for an also-ran candidate, 
Samuel J. Randall, it was clear that the Empire State would have the decisive say on the 
party’s nominee. After a second ballot was held and with Randall out of the running, the 
New York delegation conferred their votes to Hancock, initiating a cascade of reversals 
to support Hancock. In the end, Bayard and Randall’s hard stances on hard money and 
tariff legislation pushed delegates to support the more agreeable Hancock. The general’s 
wartime record and widespread support among southerners made his nomination a 
formality. In support of Hancock’s nomination, the party’s platform focused on its 
reformist message of the past decade, opposed government centralisation, took a hard-
money stance on finance, denounced the ‘great fraud’ of 1876, and proposed an anti-
Chinese immigration bill, while declaring itself ‘the friend of labor and the laboring 
man.’23 Bayard’s supporters were disappointed by the result, but the inclusion of a hard-
money plank in the party’s platform eased their worries, and Hancock’s appeal to the 
Union veteran vote was undoubtedly a significant step forward for a party that had 
struggled to distance itself from wartime accusations of treason. Even Bayard himself 
noted that Hancock’s nomination was ‘under all circumstances … the best thing … for 
the party and the Country … he is in conflict with no one [and] he silences absolutely 
[Republican] appeals to sectional animosities and war prejudices.’24  
Hancock’s nomination was well received and party supporters believed it had put 
the Democracy on the path back to the White House. The Mobile Register wrote that 
Hancock’s ‘record, as a citizen and a soldier, is unassailable by the Republican party,’ 
while the Times-Picayune proclaimed that the ‘boys in blue and the boys in gray have one 
leader now.’25 The focus of Democrats on sectional reconciliation became a crucial theme 
throughout the 1880 campaign. Even the Republican press recognised the strength of the 
nomination. The Philadelphia Press declared that Hancock’s ‘candidacy strips the contest 
of the last vestige of sectionalism, and leaves the Republicans with no attribute outside 
the inherent merits of their candidate and present record that can appeal to patriotism.’26 
With the hero of Gettysburg as their standard bearer, the jubilant Baltimore Gazette 
proclaimed that ‘on the 4th of March 1881, the new regime will begin, and under the wise 
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and patriotic administration of Hancock the land we love will enter upon a new career of 
prosperity and glory.’27 
As the campaign began in earnest, Democrats and Republicans fell into the well-
worn rhetorical tropes of Reconstruction-era elections. Despite Hancock’s candidacy, the 
Republicans again waved the bloody shirt, and argued that a vote for Hancock was a vote 
for the suppression of the black vote and the reversal of all the gains of Reconstruction 
(see Figure 6.1). 
 
     Figure 6.1 ‘Only Waiting for the Signal,’ Harper’s Weekly, Oct. 30, 1880 
 
Democrats expected to return a solid South, but knew that the party would have 
to secure victories in key northern states to win the presidency. To combat the working-
class appeal of the Greenbackers, the Democrats claimed to protect the interests of labour 
by endorsing the anti-Chinese immigration bill that would protect white workers from 
being undercut by cheap Chinese labour. Moreover, early reports suggested that Hancock 
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was drawing support from Republicans. In July, the New York Times and New York World 
noted that formerly Republican-voting Union veterans and conservative Republicans 
were joining Hancock Clubs and expressing distrust of the Garfield-Arthur ticket.28 Yet 
despite Hancock’s candidacy, memories of the Civil War still pervaded the post-
Reconstruction North and hampered the Democrats’ chances. The Greenback movement 
had significantly blunted their claim to be the party of the labouring classes, while 
disunity over the currency issue had opened up deep fractures within the party. 
In the final count, Hancock received just 2,000 popular votes less than Garfield, 
but his critical failure was his inability to secure enough Electoral College votes in the 
North. The party’s support of anti-Chinese immigration laws helped the Democrats win 
California, and Democratic stronghold of New Jersey summarily returned their votes for 
Hancock, but the Democrats witnessed narrow defeats in the northern states that were so 
critical to its success. Moreover, while party leaders hoped the vice presidential nominee, 
William H. English, could secure his home state of Indiana but when he failed to do so, 
the party was unable to make any meaningful inroads into the Republicans’ northern 
strength. Hancock lost New York by just 20,000 votes, while in Indiana the margin was 
even slimmer at a mere 7,000 votes.29 While the return of a solid South to the Democrats 
for the first time since before the Civil War was an important step forward for the party, 
the 1880 canvass demonstrated the continued resonance of Unionist Civil War memory 
in the North and condemned the Democrats to defeat by 214 electoral college votes to 
155.30  
 
The Assassination of President Garfield and the Unification of the Democrats 
 
On March 4, 1881, President James A. Garfield delivered his inaugural address to 
expectant onlookers. The new commander-in-chief advocated universal free education, 
voting reform, religious freedom, yet opposition to polygamy under the Mormon Church, 
and committed his party to civil service reform. He remarked that the ‘civil service can 
never be placed on a satisfactory basis until it is regulated by law … I shall at the proper 
time ask Congress to fix the tenure of the minor offices of the several Executive 
Departments and prescribe the grounds upon which removals shall be made during the 
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terms for which incumbents have been appointed.’31 The Democrats would need some 
convincing that the Republicans would follow through on Garfield’s promise but on July 
2, 1881 the movement for civil service reform was given new impetus.  
Walking arm-in-arm with Secretary of State James G. Blaine, the president was 
crossing the ladies’ waiting room of the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Station in 
Washington when suddenly two shots rang out. Garfield slumped to the floor.32 As reports 
of the assassination hit the presses of the nation’s leading newspapers, Americans reeled 
upon hearing that their president had been shot. The press reported that the attempt on 
Garfield’s life had ‘shocked the national mind and … overwhelmed the hearts of the entire 
people,’ and that ‘political divisions are lost sight of.’33 As details of the identity of the 
would-be assassin emerged, Democrats pointed to the spoils system as the root of evil in 
the American political nation. The assassin, Charles Guiteau, had become angered by his 
failure to secure a civil service appointment under the new administration. Having applied 
almost daily for an office, Guiteau had grown furious and finally snapped. Hoping to use 
the assassination to give the party a boost following the Democrats’ defeat in 1880, the 
Baltimore Sun took aim at the spoils system. The paper proclaimed that the president had 
fallen ‘to a debased and corrupt civil-service system.’34 Other Democrats, including Wade 
Hampton, had no intentions of ignoring the partisan potential of the assassination. Instead, 
he blamed it on stalwartism and factionalism within the Republican party itself.35 The 
Democratic press quickly rallied behind Hampton’s attack on the Republicans and 
opposed any suggestion that Guiteau was ‘“simply and absolutely mad”’ as it seemed to 
belittle the crime and overlook the corruption of the Republican party.36  
While scandals had plagued Republican administrations since the end of the Civil 
War, none had been able to dethrone the party. Yet, after Garfield’s eventual death in 
September, Democrats sensed an opportunity. On October 4, the chairman of the 
Executive Committee of the New York Civil Service Reform Association, Everett P. 
Wheeler, wrote to Thomas Bayard that Garfield’s death had ‘aroused the sympathy of the 
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whole country and … [has] drawn special attention to the cause of Civil Service 
Reform.’37 In light of the death of President Garfield after a two-month struggle, public 
faith in politics and politicians hit a low point.38 Reform was elevated to the top of the 
nation’s agenda. This was critical for the Democrats who, over the next three years, would 
capitalise on their decade-long crusade for civil service reform. 
In Buffalo in late 1881, the incumbent Republican mayor, Alexander Brush, lost 
his bid for re-election to a local Democrat, Grover Cleveland. Cleveland had been born 
in New Jersey, but relocated to New York where, in 1854, he took a clerical job before 
studying law and being admitted to the bar in 1859. Despite being born into a family of 
Whigs and Republicans, Cleveland had identified with the decentralising tendencies of 
the Democratic party from a young age. During the Civil War he had avoided military 
service by using his personal wealth to pay for a replacement and had gained a reputation 
for attacking corrupt officials and opposing the spoils system during his time as a public 
official during Reconstruction. After serving as the Sheriff of Erie County in 1871, 
Cleveland was chosen as the Democrats’ mayoral nominee based on his clean public 
record.39 Upon accepting the mayoral nomination, he ran a campaign grounded in his 
reform credentials, promising to ‘relieve our citizens from their present load of taxation 
… [and] a more rigid scrutiny of all public expenditures.’ 40  Through his typically 
conservative Democratic campaign message, Cleveland secured a comfortable victory in 
1881 and began his term the following year. While not a nationally significant result, 
Cleveland’s election signaled to the New York Democracy that reform was becoming 
instrumental to electoral victory. The powerful Tammany machine was quick to take 
notice. In fact, the result immediately threw Democratic politics in the Empire State into 
a stand-off between reform advocates and the Tammanyites of New York City. While the 
election of a pro-reform mayor of Buffalo appeared insignificant, Cleveland’s rapid rise 
through the Democratic ranks in the early 1880s was instrumental in the party’s return to 
power in 1884. 
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The Democrats sought to capitalise on the return of the reform cause to the 
forefront of national politics by casting themselves as the arbiters of honest government. 
Closely linked to civil service reform was the ongoing debate over currency. While the 
Democrats seemed no closer to compromising over the use of paper money, a group of 
inflationary free silver advocates were gaining traction in national economic debate.41 
Almost immediately, hard money Democrats attacked what they viewed as an affront to 
honest government and sound economic practice. In December 1881 the Brooklyn Eagle 
published an editorial that attempted to expose the problems of using coinage made of 
different metals. The paper wrote that to ‘make two legal tenders of different metals, 
varying continually in value, at the same time, is beyond human power. Whichever metal 
is cheaper … debtors will be sure to pay in.’42 While conflicts over currency within the 
party continued, Democrats remained much less divided over the repayment of the public 
debt, tariff reform, and the reduction of taxation.43 The hard-money Democrats, led by the 
Bourbon element of the party, sought to entwine economic responsibility with reform to 
portray the party as the party of respectability, sound money, and honest government. The 
message was not only a strong one, but it was also logical. Republican attacks on the 
Democracy since the war had focused on belittling the Democrats’ suitability to govern 
the Republic. The decentralising, reformist message of the Bourbons therefore, was an 
attempt to diminish such attacks and plot a path back to the presidency.  
The party’s commitment to laissez-faire and hard money had pushed many white 
labourers to support various third-parties, including the Greenbackers and Midwestern 
Grangers, but growing anti-Chinese sentiment provided the foundation for the 
Democracy to re-establish its resonance with working class Americans. While agitation 
in California over Chinese immigration had failed to provide a binding issue for the 
Democrats in 1880, it spilled over into national politics soon after. The labour movement 
of Irish-American Californian Dennis Kearney had steadily gained traction nationally 
since his attempt to boost opposition to Chinese immigration in Boston in 1878. Four 
years later it prompted a fractious debate in Congress. For the Democrats, the entrance of 
Chinese immigration into a national debate on the relationship between immigration, 
labour, and race, presented a much-needed opportunity to unify the working classes 
behind the party. The Democratic press immediately and uniformly supported the 
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proposed bill to suspend Chinese immigration and played upon anti-Chinese sentiment to 
portray the party as protecting American jobs and wages. In November 1880 the Angell 
commission sent by President Hayes to negotiate the modification of the Burlingame 
Treaty in order to enable Congress to regulate, limit, or suspend Chinese immigration into 
the United States, and the Democrats ardently supported the measure.44 Across the nation, 
journalists investigated the merits of Chinese immigration and, on the Democratic side, 
seemed unanimous in their findings. The New Orleans Times-Picayune commented that 
despite the hard-working and cheap nature of Chinese labour, the problem was that ‘they 
come here in herds … they do not settle here [sic] as immigrants, but take their earnings, 
sooner or later, with them to their own country … Scarcely any of them are women, and 
ninety-nine hundredths of these are prostitutes.’45 The arguments of Democratic papers 
focused not on the work of Chinese immigrants themselves, but on the moral impact on 
society and the sheer volume of workers: ‘China has 400,000,000 people, and glad 
enough it is to pour out upon us its degraded and starving scum.’46 Democrats argued that 
white American workers who intended to remain in the country and contribute to society 
fell victim to depressed wages and spiraling unemployment. They added that any party 
member who would vote against the suspension of Chinese immigration for twenty-five 
years was ‘an unfathomable sort of a Democrat.’47 
The Republicans, however, were less united over the issue of Chinese 
immigration, and many rebelled against the Hayes administration’s support of amending 
the Burlingame Treaty of 1868. For them, to support a measure that seemingly 
acknowledged a key distinction between races in terms of superiority, contradicted the 
path the party had taken since its inception in 1854. As the Times-Picayune noted, ‘if 
passed, that bill would fix, as a consummation of public opinion, a distinction of races at 
war with the very raison d’etre of the Republican party.’48 On March 1, Senator, George 
F. Hoar, a Massachusetts Republican, rose to condemn the unjust bill. He asserted that 
‘to rescue humanity from … degradation is, we are taught to believe, the great object of 
God’s moral government on earth … It is not by Chinese policies that China is to be 
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civilized.’ Rather, Hoar argued, the principles of the Declaration of Independence would 
help to spread and secure civilization across the Earth.49 When the Chinese Exclusion Act 
came to a vote in Congress, only three Democratic congressmen and no Democratic 
senators voted against it.50 While Republicans split over the notion of racial equality, 
Democrats remained consistent advocates of white supremacy and the enforcement of 
racial separation. The racial dimensions of class politics were crucial to solidifying the 
Democracy’s working-class appeal.  As Reconstruction ended, conflicts between ethnic 
and racial minorities consolidated into ‘white’ and ‘non-white.’ 51  By supporting the 
Chinese Exclusion Act, Democrats sought to strengthen their working class appeal, and 
simultaneously draw conservative Republicans who supported the measure into their 
ranks. 
 
Reform At Last: The Pendleton Civil Service Act  
 
On December 6, 1881 Ohio senator George H. Pendleton introduced a civil 
service reform bill in the Senate that sought to bring an end to the spoils system. Pendleton 
advocated the establishment of a new Civil Service Commission that would ensure that 
appointments would be based on qualifications and capability, rather than partisan 
alignment. The bill would prohibit the removal of civil servants based on political 
affiliation, and instead, removals from office demanded just cause based on the 
performance of civil servants.52 Despite Pendleton’s intention to address concerns over 
patronage in the federal government, his proposed bill did not receive unanimous support 
from fellow Democrats. Debate over the bill produced numerous clashes between 
congressional Democrats throughout 1882. Typical of congressional Democrats who 
opposed the Pendleton bill, Senator John Stuart Williams of Kentucky argued that 
rotation in office was crucial to the success of the spoils system. Republicans, Williams 
argued, had abused the spoils system as no other party had done before by bloating the 
federal government and abusing public money. The key to reform, according to the 
																																								 																				
49 Chinese Immigration: Speech of Hon. Geo. F. Hoar of Massachusetts, delivered in the Senate of the 
United States, Wednesday, March 1, 1882 (Washington D. C., 1882), pp. 27-8. 
50 https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/47-1/h83; https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/47-1/s370.   
51  On whiteness studies, see David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the 
American Working Class (London: Verso, 1991); Alexander Saxton, The Rise and Fall of the White 
Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America (London: Verso, 1990). 
52 Mach, ‘Gentleman George’, p. 181; Sean M. Theriault, ‘Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the Power of 
the People,’ Journal of Politics Vol. 65, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 59-60; Ari Hoogenboom, ‘The Pendleton 
Act and the Civil Service,’ American Historical Review Vol. 64, No. 2 (Jan., 1959), pp. 310-2. 
156	
	
Kentuckian, was not through legislation, but ‘to put a good, honest Democratic President 
in 1884.’53 
When Pendleton faced re-election late in 1882, the canvass became a referendum 
over the senator’s reform bill, and the weakness of Republican opposition appeared to 
give him the advantage. The Louisiana Democrat noted that it could ‘not conceive a 
worse position for [the Republicans] to be in’ and that if the Democracy could not win in 
Ohio ‘there is hardly any imaginable combination of circumstances from which victory 
would ensue.’54 The challenge Pendleton faced, however, came not from the Republicans, 
but from within his party. John R. McLean, the editor of the Democratic Cincinnati 
Gazette, sought to rid the state party of its old leadership, embodied by Pendleton and 
John G. Thompson, and launched an attack against Pendleton and his reform agenda. 
McLean proclaimed with conviction that there would be an ‘overwhelming declaration in 
favour of a change of party control in November 1884’ and that Democrats could not 
afford ‘to abandon broad Democratic principles for the benefit of aristocratic paragons 
who demand a Civil Service “reform” which shall protect Senators and Congressmen 
from the solicitations of their aspiring constituents.’55 McLean believed, like senators 
Benjamin H. Hill and Williams that the Democracy stood on the verge of returning to 
power and that to stop themselves from taking the spoils of victory would only ensure the 
entrenchment of corrupt civil servants. 56  Despite McLean’s success in blocking 
Thompson’s election to the state central committee, Pendleton was named chairman of 
the Democratic state convention and reform was made a central plank in the contest.57 In 
the final count, Pendleton was triumphantly returned to the Senate and the Democrats 
won resounding victories across the state.  
Elsewhere in 1882 the Democrats fared particularly well. Placing reform at the 
centre of the campaign, they won significant victories across the Midwest, California, 
Pennsylvania, and the South, propelling the party to a majority in the House of 
Representatives. The midterm results highlighted the strength of the party’s reform 
message. Since the Democracy’s alliance with the Liberal Republicans in 1872, party 
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leaders had recognised the importance of securing the support of pro-reform Republicans 
to win northern states.58 Despite the extent of Republican defeat in 1882, Democrats were 
cautious about their success. The Baltimore Sun reminded its readers that in 1872, the 
Nation had proclaimed that the Democratic party was dead. Ten years later, the Sun 
warned that the Democracy could not allow the Republicans to recover and stressed that 
the Democrats had it ‘in their power to incorporate their new allies [Independent 
Republicans] in their ranks. They have before them two years in which by making 
themselves a good record for reform they may gain the confidence of the people.’59 
As the conflict over Pendleton’s civil service bill came to a head over the winter 
of 1882-1883, little cohesion among Democrats emerged over reform. Former Indiana 
governor and vice-presidential nominee, Thomas A. Hendricks, toed the anti-Pendleton 
bill line, claiming that the proposed amendments to the appointment system would mean 
that ‘frauds will become more secure and reform more difficult.’60 Similarly, the Jackson 
Clarion derided the bill for not going far enough, in that it only applied to less than ten 
percent of offices, with most of those of minor significance, and argued that ‘what is 
wanted is reform that will operate impartially; a reform that will strike the giant oaks as 
well as the slender saplings.’61 Pendleton continued to be lambasted in the Cincinnati 
Enquirer, but not all was doom and gloom for the senator. Advocates of the bill, such as 
former Ohio State Treasurer Anthony Howells, claimed that Pendleton was acting 
according to the platform of the Ohio Democracy that had just won a landslide victory in 
the fall, and Pendleton believed the results had given him a mandate to push the bill 
through Congress.62 Civil service reform had just helped to propel the party to nationwide 
victories. The Democrats needed to show the public that they were willing to change a 
system that they had derided as having been corrupted by Republicans for over a decade. 
After over a decade of campaigning for change, turning their back on reform at a moment 
when it appeared to be beneficial to the party would have cast them in the same light as 
Republicans eager to fill patronage positions with men from their own party. 
Despite the divisive nature of the bill among Democrats, Pendleton received near-
unanimous support from the Republicans. Following the results of the 1882 midterms, 
the Republicans decided against opposing the bill. By all accounts, Pendleton’s proposed 
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reforms were not only mild, but allowed Republicans the opportunity to keep a number 
of their own appointees in office. In the final roll call, the measure passed both houses 
comfortably, by 39-5 in the Senate, and 155-46 in the House, yet the voting patterns 
clearly demonstrated how split the Democrats were over the issue. In the House, the 
Democrats split 48-38, with 42 abstentions, in support of the bill, and in the Senate, they 
split 14-5, with 18 not voting.63 Democratic opposition to the Pendleton bill was most 
widespread among southern and midwestern congressmen, while it received strong 
support in areas such as New York where the Independent vote would be critical to 
securing the state in 1884. In these latter areas, it became crucial for Democrats to present 
themselves as advocates of reform to gain the support of increasingly dissident reform-
minded Republicans. More significantly, however, the results demonstrated the 
increasing dominance within the national Democratic party of Bourbon Democrats. The 
bill’s most ardent Democratic backing came largely from Bourbons, such as John Carlisle 
of Kentucky, Lucius Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi, and Thomas Bayard, all of whom had 
become leading members of the party. Following the 1882 midterms, Carlisle had become 
the first southern leader of the House since the Civil War, while Lamar held a prominent 
position as a leading advocate of the New South. Similarly, Bayard had been leader of 
the Senate briefly in 1881 and was many Democrats’ pick for the presidential nomination 
in 1884.64 With the downfall of Reconstruction in the South, civil service reform helped 
to promote Bourbons to leading roles in the national party and was crucial to the 
Democracy’s return to power by 1884. Not only did their emphasis on reform and 
decentralisation resonate with voters in the wake of Garfield’s assassination, but their 
efforts to modernise the party and blunted the potency of Republican attacks on the 
Democracy’s tainted past.  
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The Democracy’s Return to Power, 1884 
 
With the passage of Pendleton’s civil service bill, thoughts quickly turned to the 
presidential election of 1884. While the contest remained over eighteen months away, the 
Democrats felt positive about their chances for victory. The midterms had demonstrated 
the appeal of reform and, having passed the civil service act, the lines of battle for the 
1884 race had been outlined by early 1883. In the following months Democrats not only 
began jostling for position in anticipation of the national convention, but they also hoped 
to maintain a degree of unity within the party. Conflicts in the past over currency reform 
had openly fractured the party. Democrats therefore had to work hard to smooth over any 
signs of division within the party’s ranks throughout 1883. 
The central challenge to party unity in 1883 came from the continued emergence 
of independent movements. Following the success of independents across the South, the 
spread of similar organisations to northern states such as Massachusetts provided some 
concern for Democrats. In March, the Baltimore Sun wrote of the growing Massachusetts 
movement that ‘every little new scheme or feature in political warfare is introduced to 
agitate the public mind. The latest idea is an independent movement, distinct and separate 
from affiliation or connection with either of the prominent political parties.’65 While 
Massachusetts had a history of being a staunch Republican stronghold, political 
developments in the state still held significant national considerations for the Democrats 
moving forward.  
After his conversion to the Greenback party in the 1870s, Benjamin Butler proved 
a major thorn in the side of the northern Democracy. When the former Union general 
rejoined the Democrats in 1880, party leaders hoped that Butler’s influence on national 
politics had waned. Yet, with the emergence of a new independent movement in his home 
state, Butler moved again to put himself on the presidential map. While in 1883 Butler 
was a member of the Democratic party, his soft-money views and shady past on reform 
ensured that he did not endear himself to the growing influence of the Bourbons within 
the party. Moreover, the rank-and-file Democrats who expected their presidential 
candidate to be Bayard, Cleveland, or Randall worried about the potential for the 
maverick Butler to make an independent run for the presidency.66 Thus, when Butler was 
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convincingly defeated in the race for Massachusetts governor by Republican George D. 
Robinson, few Democrats felt particularly aggrieved.  
As the Bourbons grew in strength, they hoped to consolidate their hold over the 
national party leadership through the speakership contest. With reform now regarded as 
a central tenet of the national Democracy, the contest focused upon the issue of the tariff. 
The two candidates, Samuel J. Randall and John G. Carlisle, took different stances on the 
issue. Carlisle, a Kentuckian, was an advocate of a tariff for revenue only and thus drew 
the support of the party’s leading Bourbon element. Conversely, Randall’s support of a 
more moderate reduction of internal taxation and lower tariffs, put him at odds with the 
party’s mainstream.67 With the growing strength of the free trade Bourbons, Randall was 
ousted from the speakership and Carlisle’s election as the House’s new speaker clearly 
demonstrated that control of the party now lay firmly in the hands of the Bourbons. 
With Carlisle elected to the Speakership, the nation turned towards the 
presidential election. Reform was clearly the main issue of the campaign and Democrats 
wasted no time in casting the Republicans as corrupt. The New York Sun alleged that their 
opponents had become so corrupt that ‘a Republican Congress deemed it necessary to put 
the party into the hands of a Commission to insure good behavior.’68 Democrats viewed 
1884 as their opportunity to regain the presidency for the first time in nearly thirty years. 
The Baltimore Sun proclaimed that there ‘never was a time when boldness and a definite 
policy were more needed in the declarations and actions of the [D]emocratic party than 
at present. The last congressional election indicated that the country was growing weary 
of Republican rule. The old sectional issues were worn out. Bitter antagonisms were 
splitting the [R]epublican party into factions.’69 With Democratic organs pressing home 
the view of the Republican party as hopelessly corrupt, the Democracy began to consider 
its options for the presidential nomination. 
Unlike the Republicans who had few stand-out candidates for the presidential 
nomination, the Democrats appeared spoilt for choice in their search for a new president. 
Among the leading candidates were Bayard and Randall but, as in 1880, many northern 
Democrats discussed the possibility of the nomination of ‘the old ticket’ of Tilden and 
Hendricks. Others, however, were not so convinced of the viability of a renewal of the 
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1876 ticket. Bayard himself, who had made his presidential aspirations clear, remarked 
on the action of the West Virginia Democratic convention in April, which had declared 
in favour of a Tilden nomination, that ‘I do not want, nor can I logically or reasonably 
expect to receive a nomination at the hands of a set of delegates, who … approve of the 
nomination of Mr. Tilden … I am unable to believe that Mr. Tilden’s physical condition 
renders it possible for him even to contemplate the assumption of the labor of the canvass, 
much less the duties of the Chief Magistracy.’70 Yet, it would not be from the Democrats’ 
pool of experienced national leaders that the party’s presidential hopeful would be chosen. 
Instead, it would be a Washington outsider from New York, Grover Cleveland, who 
would burst onto the national scene in 1884. 
Since his election as Buffalo mayor in 1881, Cleveland had gained a reputation 
for the strict deployment of his veto power against any action that he deemed against the 
public interest and an unwarranted use of public funds. His view of executive power was 
clear and uncompromising at a time when Americans had become used to the liberal use 
of patronage appointments and a murky style of politics.71 His strong stance on reform 
and willingness to take on machine politics in Buffalo quickly enhanced his reputation 
across the state, and in 1882 he was elected governor off the back of his success on 
Buffalo. In the political environment of the 1880s, Cleveland was a rarity: a politician 
with a clean public record, untainted by the corruption of the federal government. After 
his election Cleveland continued his stand against machine politics, much to the disgust 
of ‘Honest’ John Kelly and Tammany Hall. In his inaugural address, he had made his 
intentions clear when he called for ‘vigilance on the part of the citizen … [to] take part in 
the regulation and administration of the government of our State, and thus become, not 
only the keepers of our own interests, but contributors to the progress and prosperity 
which will await us.’72 Despite losing support from Democratic Tammanyites, he gained 
plaudits from the Independent Republicans and reformers of the Empire State, and this 
would be a major source of his strength in the forthcoming presidential canvass. In 1884 
then, the country seemed ready for a Grover Cleveland to step forward; a Washington 
outsider with a clean public record and a penchant for reform who was also capable of 
winning the crucial New York Electoral College votes to propel the party back to the 
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White House. Moreover, to the leading Bourbon element, Cleveland had sound views on 
other issues. He believed in hard money and opposed bimetallism, high tariffs and 
inflation; in essence, Cleveland was the quintessential eastern Bourbon that the 
Democracy had been searching for. 
As supporters of Bayard, Randall, Tilden, and Cleveland began jostling in 
anticipation of the party’s Chicago convention, the Republicans met in the city’s 
Exposition Hall where two candidates emerged from the pack: James G. Blaine of Maine 
and incumbent president Chester A. Arthur. Blaine, Secretary of State under Garfield, 
was vulnerable to the Democratic castigation of the party as corrupt but he quickly 
emerged as the favourite for the nomination. This, however, posed a problem for 
Republicans who were worried that a significant number of their party would bolt if he 
secured the nomination. Reformers in the party despised the Maine Senator and hoped to 
secure Arthur’s nomination over the somewhat shady Blaine. Yet the influence of 
Blaine’s opponents in the convention failed to materialise and after four rounds of voting 
Blaine was nominated on a ticket completed by former Union general John A. Logan for 
vice president. If Blaine alienated the significant independent classes, the choice of Logan 
for vice president did little to give the Republicans a chance for victory in any southern 
states. Logan, a former Union general, had gained a reputation for being ‘an exponent of 
sectional hatred’ and was despised throughout the South.73 The Blaine-Logan nomination 
of 1884 aimed to secure victory solely through the northern states. It proved to be a serious 
miscalculation by the Republicans.  
When news of Blaine’s nomination spread across the country, it became clear that 
the reform-minded Independents would not support his candidacy. As they had done in 
1872 as Liberal Republicans, the ‘Mugwumps’ of 1884 reluctantly rebelled against a 
candidate they viewed as corrupt. Carl Schurz remarked that ‘it was by no means with a 
light heart that I declared myself against [Blaine]. But I could not conscientiously do 
otherwise. The Republican party has been called the party of moral law. It once deserved 
that … We have now a question of political ethics to deal with in which the character of 
the Republican party is directly involved.’74 Despite this stance, Schurz still regarded 
Blaine as a strong candidate. In a letter to Bayard, Schurz warned the senator that ‘the 
revolt in the Republican party is at this moment very strong. But it would be a mistake to 
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consider Blaine a weak candidate. He is weak in his own party, but he will have the 
support of the Irish dynamite faction, and the speculators … He will have a large 
campaign fund.’75 Schurz added that the ‘Democratic candidate … will, therefore, need 
the support of the Independent Republicans to make up for desertions and to furnish the 
necessary majority’ and ‘[Republicans] will undoubtedly cast a more than sufficient 
number of votes, if the character of the Democratic candidate, be such as to overcome 
this disinclination to “vote for a Democrat!”’76 The Mugwumps were clearly disappointed 
with Blaine’s nomination, but Democrats needed to proceed with caution. In the canvass, 
Blaine would be vulnerable on the reform issue, and Democrats recognised this. While 
Hancock’s selection as the party’s candidate in 1880 had been the result of a focus on 
sectional reconciliation rather than reform, the Democrats recognised the necessity of the 
party to nominate a reform-minded candidate to defeat Blaine.77  
As delegates to the Democratic National Convention made their way through 
Chicago towards Exposition Hall on a cool, misty morning, an air of confidence 
abounded. With Blaine the candidate for the Republicans, Democrats were convinced that 
any nomination that placed Bayard, Randall, or Cleveland at the head of the ticket was 
sure of victory.78 On the surface, it appeared that securing a majority of ballots would be 
difficult for the candidates.79 Yet in the political landscape of 1884 Cleveland’s appeal as 
a reformer outshone the political experience of Bayard and secured the nomination for 
the New Yorker. Reflecting on the close defeat of the Hancock-English ticket four years 
earlier, the party nominated Indianan Thomas A. Hendricks for vice president; the 
Republican victories in New York and Indiana had swung the election for them in 1880 
and the Democrats clearly responded to this in 1884. Aware of the strength of the 
Mugwumps in New York, the Democratic party’s 1884 platform intentionally appealed 
to reform-minded Republicans who they had previous dealings with in 1872. It noted that 
‘the Government should not always be controlled by one political party … Otherwise 
abuses grow, and the Government, instead of being carried on for the general welfare, 
becomes an instrumentality for imposing heavy burdens on the many who are governed, 
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for the benefit of the few who govern.’80  Beyond civil service reform, the platform 
reflected the accession of the Bourbons to the forefront of the national Democratic 
leadership. It demonstrated the fiscal conservatism of the Bourbons, adhering to hard 
money, opposition to government grants to railroads, monopolies, the importation of 
foreign labour, and the reduction of ‘taxation to the lowest limit consistent with due regard 
to the preservation of the faith of the Nation to its creditors.’81 In doing so, the Bourbons 
were able to create the bridge between the Democrats and sceptical Republicans that the 
party had attempted to establish since the early years of Reconstruction. The Democrats 
saw their mission as one to stop the spread of the centralising tendency in American 
politics. In this regard, the ideological crossover between themselves and Republican 
reformers made an alliance logical, but it had been particularly elusive until this point. In 
1884 however, the Democrats made a particularly astute nomination in Cleveland, and 
was able to craft a platform to match. Reflecting on the political situation in 1884, James 
R. Doolittle, the former Republican, told Hendricks that his old party had ‘become the 
party of centralisation’ and that ‘when I call all these things to mind, words fail to express 
the necessity to overthrow that party; and to place the administration in the hands of the 
true Democratic Republican party, regenerated as it now seems to be, and to bring true 
and genuine reform with it, into every branch of the government.’82 
The canvass that followed was one of the dirtiest in American history, with 
personal attacks at the centre of mudslinging in the contest. From the outset, the 
Democrats had the upper hand. In 1876, Blaine had been accused of receiving $64,000 
from the Union Pacific Railroad in 1871 as collateral for bonds he held in the company. 
Known as the Mulligan letters, the scandal had resulted in a public denial by Blaine on 
April 24, 1876, and Democrats latched onto it to cast the Maine Senator as dishonest and 
morally repugnant (see Figure 6.2). Despite his clean political record, reports that 
Cleveland had fathered an illegitimate child surfaced in Buffalo. Immediately, the 
Republican press jumped on the reports in an attempt to call into question Cleveland’s 
character (see Figure 6.3). When Cleveland publicly admitted to claims that he had been 
financially supporting the mother, Maria Crofts Halpin, public opinion did not shift 
against the New Yorker. Instead, people identified with him, believing that ‘there is 
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something in a manly confession which clears the air, and gives assurance’ to the public.83 
In a letter to Schurz, Reginald H. Williams wrote that ‘Mr. Blaine’s faults are those by 
which governments are overthrown and republics wrecked and ruined; his crimes are 
public crimes … The errors of Gov. Cleveland, on the other hand, are purely private and 
personal, with which the public have nothing to do.’84 
 
 
Figure 6.2 ‘His Own Destroyer – A Pleasant Situation for a Presidential Candidate,’ Puck, Sept. 24, 1884 
 
Against Cleveland’s record of successfully overhauling corruption in Buffalo, 
Blaine’s past immediately put the Republicans on the back foot. Their attacks on 
Cleveland for being relatively new to public affairs largely fell flat. In August the 
Cincinnati Gazette wrote that the ‘attacks upon Blaine have been arraignments of his 
public career, and [the] absence of any weak point in the official life of Cleveland has 
seriously embarrassed the Republican journalists.’85 Moreover, the Gazette asserted that 
the ‘successful fight made by Cleveland against a gigantic ring of corruptionists in 
Buffalo has satisfied the people of his ability as a reformer as well as his probity.’86 In 
response, the Republicans hoped their vice-presidential nominee John A. Logan could 
rekindle public memories of the Civil War, and stressed that the general had given 
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‘courage in the hour of fear, and kindled fires of devout patriotism when the embers were 
growing weak and low.’87 Yet, with the battleground of the canvass firmly fixed on 
reform, Republican attempts to revive sectionalism were blurred by the profligacy of their 
presidential candidate.  
 
Figure 6.3 ‘Another Voice for Cleveland,’ The Judge, Sept. 27, 1884   
 
By mid-August the Cleveland campaign was running strong. While some 
Democrats doubted his ability to appeal to white industrial workers, the New Yorker 
addressed the issue in his acceptance letter. He echoed his intentions to reform the federal 
government, but also promoted improved welfare for the working class and showed his 
support for the labour movement by writing that ‘a true American sentiment recognizes 
the dignity of labor and the fact that honor lies in honest toil. Contented labor is an element 
of national prosperity … Our workingmen are not asking unreasonable indulgence, but 
… they seek the same consideration which those demand who have other interests at 
stake.’88 While the Democrats hoped that Cleveland’s letter would ensure the support of 
the working classes, the announcement that Benjamin Butler would run for the presidency 
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on the Anti-Monopoly and Greenback parties’ tickets held the potential to draw votes 
away from Blaine and Cleveland.89 The Republicans, however, had more to worry about 
than simply losing votes to a Greenback candidate who would steal votes from both 
parties. The growth of the cause of moral reform had resulted in the rapid rise of the 
Prohibitionist party in the early 1880s. Led by Kansas native John St. John, the 
Prohibitionists drew their support heavily from the Republican ranks. Advocates of 
temperance had castigated the Democrats for appealing to European immigrants, 
primarily the Irish, who they regarded as habitual drunkards, and thus held little appeal 
to typical Democratic voters.90 While scholars such as Emil Pocock have argued that the 
Prohibition appeal in New York swung the state in Cleveland’s favour, it was Blaine 
himself who helped to bolster Democratic support among European immigrants when, in 
New York in October, Presbyterian minister Samuel D. Buchard pledged his support for 
the Republicans by saying ‘We are Republicans, and don’t propose to leave our party and 
identify ourselves with the party whose antecedents have been Rum, Romanism and 
Rebellion. We are loyal to our flag, we are loyal to you.’91 Instead of repudiating the 
statement, Blaine allowed the comment to fester, and pushed possible Republican- voting 
Catholics and Irish firmly into the Democratic camp. 
Heavy rain hit the eastern seaboard on election day, drenching states such as New 
York. As the results began to be reported, it once again appeared that the 1884 election 
would be a tight race. Scholars have advanced various reasons for the outcome of the 
1884 election, pointing to the influence of the Mugwump vote, the weather, Blaine’s 
blunders during the canvass, and the influence of prohibition as defining causes for the 
Democracy’s return to the White House in 1884.92 Undoubtedly the torrential rain caused 
many rural Republicans to stay at home, just as the significant Independent vote 
contributed to Cleveland’s slim victory in New York. Yet however the intricacies of the 
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campaign itself influenced the outcome, this was the election that Democrats had waited 
for since reform had become a rallying cry for the party in the early 1870s. Against the 
backdrop of constant Republican derision of their party’s unsuitability to govern due to 
its synonymy with rebellion and disloyalty, the Democrats had dedicated themselves to 
changing the public perceptions of their party. Thus, when the 1884 election became a 
mudslinging contest over honesty and morality, the Democrats’ long-established rhetoric 
of providing honest government made it difficult for their Republican adversaries, who 
had been constantly attacked as corrupt men only seeking partisan gain, to provide a 
strong enough riposte. Moreover, the decision to run a Washington outsider and New 
Yorker with a candidate who had a past record of securing the Electoral College votes of 
Indiana was particularly astute. Cleveland emerged just as the reform debate reached a 
crescendo. His outsider status had kept him removed from the murkiness of federal 
politics, so that by 1884 he was the right man at the right time for the Democratic party. 
He had a clean public record and was amenable to the national Democratic leadership. 
With the solid South secured, the Democracy still needed a significant northern state to 
secure the election. In Cleveland they found the means to do so. In the final analysis, 
therefore, only by placing the 1884 campaign in the context of the Democratic party’s 
struggle with the legacy of the Civil War can its return to power be fully understood. 
Blaine may have made political miscalculations and the weather may have stopped 
Republican voters from turning out, but it was the ability of the Democracy to resurrect 
itself as a party that stood for honesty and respectability that gave its members the victory 
they so desperately wanted. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
‘U.S. President Grover Cleveland Inauguration, Capitol Building, Washington D.C., USA,’ Bain New Service, March 
4, 1885 
 
On an unseasonably warm day in March 1885, 50,000 Americans gathered to 
witness the inauguration of the first Democratic president since 1856. As the president-
elect made his way through the Capitol to the East Portico, Democrats jostled for position 
to catch a glimpse of ‘The Man Who Has Been Waited For Twenty-four Years.’1 Unlike 
his predecessors, Cleveland departed from the custom of reading from a script and 
delivered his inaugural from memory with ‘iron-clad self-profession, in a firm, clear 
voice.’2 Flanked by leading members of the party including Samuel J. Randall, and a 
small cadre of Union veterans, Cleveland addressed the vast crowd that had assembled 
before him. ‘To-day the executive brand of the Government is transferred to new 
keeping,’ he declared, ‘but this is still the Government of all the people, and it should be 
none the less an object of their affectionate solicitude … if from this hour we cheerfully 
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and honestly abandon all sectional prejudice and distrust, and determine, with manly 
confidence in one another, to work out harmoniously the achievements of our national 
destiny, we shall deserve to realize all the benefits which our happy form of government 
can bestow.’3 While Cleveland’s speech lacked the verve of many of his contemporaries, 
the New Yorker delivered it with a firm conviction that the return of the Democratic party 
to the White House had finally closed the books on the Civil War. 
Having endured the longest period of single party dominance since the 
Democratic-Republican victories that placed Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James 
Monroe and John Quincy Adams in the White House, Democrats were relieved that their 
party had not faded into obscurity. Cleveland’s election in 1884 was an important moment 
for a party that had become deeply conflicted over the party’s future in the aftermath of 
slavery, and put an end to any lingering doubts about the Democracy’s central place in 
the nation’s partisan landscape. By tracing the postbellum path of the Democratic party, 
this thesis has brought the previously unstudied process of Democratic reunification and 
resurgence to the forefront of the Reconstruction narrative. In doing so, it has 
demonstrated that, firstly, the Civil War caused a crisis in partisanship that pushed 
Democrats into seeking alternative party organisations. Secondly, that the institutional 
memory of the Democratic party provided a foundation for sectional reconciliation. And 
finally, that the endurance of public memories of the civil crisis was the most significant 
barrier to the party’s postbellum resurgence.   
During the Civil War, the Democratic party fractured along a myriad of fault-lines 
that went far beyond the North-South sectional divide. Consumed by an anti-partisan 
culture that demonised oppositional politics, the War Democrats joined their former 
enemies in denouncing the Peace Democratic dissenters of the Union war effort. When 
the nation emerged from the crucible of war in 1865, the Democracy was in a state of 
flux. Wary of the stigma of disloyalty that clung to their Democratic allies, now former-
War Democrats surveyed the political landscape uncertain of the future of their party. 
The Democracy’s return to power can be understood as being significantly 
influenced by its bipartisan interactions. Through their involvement in the wartime Union 
party, National Unionism in 1866, and the Liberal Republican movement in 1872, 
Democrats set a precedent for working across the partisan divide that would be influential 
in their party’s return to the White House in 1884. Conventional scholarly wisdom 
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characterises nineteenth-century partisanship as a less malleable concept than the 
Democracy’s path back to the presidency suggests. 4  Although the antiparty rhetoric 
commonplace during the Civil War subsided in the aftermath of Appomattox, the wartime 
experience of bipartisanship helped to narrow the imagined distance between the 
Republicans and the Democrats. Contrary to the observation that the Civil War 
strengthened the two-party system, the early years of Reconstruction were characterised 
by active attempts by accommodationist Democrats to construct a new national party that 
would render the Democracy untenable. Until 1874, the future of the Democratic party 
was uncertain. These attempts to create bipartisan alliances severely hindered the unity 
of the party, and it was only in the aftermath of the catastrophic Liberal Republican 
campaign of 1872 that the future of the party was set in stone. By the time the next 
opportunity for a bipartisan alliance arrived in 1884, the Democrats effectively exploited 
the precedent that had been set early in Reconstruction. For all the factional conflicts 
within the Democracy over national party strategy and the economic legacies of the war, 
reform provided a constant point of unity for the party. Reform had been the grounds for 
the Liberal-Democratic alliance in 1872, and the Democrats had been incessantly 
campaigning on the issue since, hoping to draw discontented Republicans into the party 
fold. Consistency was the key for the Democrats, and by placing reform at the centre of 
their party’s image they managed to cast themselves as the party of honest government. 
The Democratic party also played an important role in achieving sectional 
reconciliation. Reconciliation was a central theme to the resurgence of the Democracy in 
the postbellum era, and this builds upon recent scholarship that has emphasised the limits 
of reconciliation, by asserting that the institutional memory of the Democratic party was 
central to reunifying white northerners and southerners.5 Before the Democrats’ fracture 
at Charleston in 1860, their party had been dependent on its appeal across the sectional 
dividing line to secure national ascendancy. During the early years of Reconstruction, 
Democrats coalesced behind a virulent racism that stood opposed to racial equality and 
the Republican Reconstruction settlement. In an attempt to restore southern faith in the 
party, northern Democrats rarely condemned the barbarous acts of violence perpetrated 
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across the South. Rather, northern Democrats frequently played upon the racial fears of 
white labourers in order to solidify their appeal for white man’s government. While white 
supremacy provided an important ideological glue to unite northern and southern 
Democrats, racial prejudice alone was not sufficient to bridge the bloody chasm during 
Reconstruction. Grandiose public displays of reconciliation that celebrated the return of 
the South to the Union attempted to restore fraternal feelings between northerners and 
southerners, but most of these were unable to achieve their aims. However, this thesis 
contends that the Democracy itself was crucial in reconciling northerners and southerners, 
and scholars have overlooked the role it played. Democrats regularly made appeals to the 
institutional memory of their party to reconcile its northern and southern wings, and acted 
as a rallying cry against Republican corruption, centralisation, and racial equality. They 
frequently referenced Andrew Jackson and Thomas Jefferson to rekindle shared 
memories of a fraternal past that both northerners and southerners could rally behind. In 
doing so, postbellum Democrats were, by 1884, able to put the legacy of Charleston 
behind them and join hands across the bloody chasm within the Democratic organisation.  
Despite the attempts of Democrats to use the institutional memory of their party 
to ensure the unity of their party, and bipartisanship to create electoral majorities, the 
single biggest barrier to the Democracy’s return to power was the lingering legacy of the 
Civil War. Both in the North and the South, the wartime actions of Peace Democrats and 
Confederates were chastised as treasonous, and the party struggled to shake itself of the 
stigma of disloyalty. As long as Reconstruction dominated the national political debate, 
the Republicans continued to furious wave the bloody shirt and the Democracy stood little 
chance of overthrowing Radical rule. To a certain extent, therefore, the party was 
dependent upon external factors to propel the party back to power. Undoubtedly, the 
economic depression initiated by the Panic of 1873 shifted the political landscape of 
Reconstruction, but scholars have too readily assumed that the Democracy would 
inevitably return to the White House.6 Rather, this thesis has shown that the endurance of 
the divergent legacies of the Civil War did not just disappear, but the Democrats 
themselves played a crucial role in shifting the national political landscape away from 
Reconstruction and towards economics and reform. The path of the Democracy from 
1860 through to 1884, therefore, was not simply a process of being rigid in its views, 
policies, and actions. Nor was it a matter of pulling down the central pillars of the party 
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and forming a new one in its place. Rather, the Democrats learned from their experiences 
of wartime partisan conflict by appealing to the middle ground of American politics, 
harnessed the forces of centralisation unleashed by the Civil War through civil service 
reform, and refashioned itself behind a unifying banner: white man’s democracy and 
honest government. 
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